Advertisement
Features

Mamluks vs. Mongols

By Adam Ali

The Mongols presented the greatest threat to the early Mamluk sultanate.

To be more specific, it was not all Mongols, but the Mongols of the Ilkhanate who were the enemies of the Mamluks. The Ilkhanate was the khanate established in the south western part of the Mongol Empire. It was founded by Hulegu in 1256 and lasted until its dissolution in 1335. Its core regions included Iran, Azerbaijan, Anatolia, and Iraq; it at its peak it also controlled parts of Georgia, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Dagestan, and Tajikistan. Although the fledgling Mamluk regime in Egypt had to contend with the Crusader States (discussed in the previous article) in the Levant as well as the Ayyubid princes of Syria in the second half of the 13th century, the Mongols were by far the toughest challenge they had to face.

Hulegu Khan was the grandson of Genghis Khan. Upon the accession of Mongke Khan, his brother, to the position of Great Khan in 1251 Hulegu was tasked with conquering the Muslim territories to the west. The sources state that he was given command of one fifth of the Mongol army. What the exact size of this army was is up for debate; however, estimates ranging from 100,000 to over 300,000 men have been given by various sources and scholars. Either way, it was a huge army. Furthermore, by this time, Mongol armies were not composed solely of Mongol warriors and it could be argued that a big part (if not the majority) of the army that accompanied Hulegu, like the army of the Golden Horde, was composed of Turks from among the various conquered tribes. Hulegu was also accompanied by Chinese engineers and siege experts, who were to prove instrumental in the reduction of the castles and fortified cities on his westward march.

Advertisement

Mongke tasked Hulegu with the destruction of the Nizari Ismailis (frequently referred to in the sources and popular histories as the Assassins) whose polity was centered on Alamut in Northern Iran, the conquest of the Lurs and other independent Iranian and Kurdish groups, the subjugation or destruction of the Abbasid caliphate, and the conquest of Syria and Egypt. By 1258 Hulegu had destroyed the Nizari Ismailis, subjugated all of Iran, and conquered Baghdad. The last Abbasid caliph, al-Mustasim, was killed and the city was subjected to a terrible massacre and sacking.

Image by Arab League / Wikimedia Commons

The Battle of Ayn Jalut

In 1260, the Mongols advanced into Syria. They were joined by the Franks of Antioch under Bohemond VI and the army of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia under Hethum I. Both had already submitted to Hulegu and became his vassals. Aleppo and Damascus were taken without much difficulty. Some of the Ayyubids had also gone over to the Mongols, and the Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, al-Nasir Yusuf, was captured. Hulegu promised he would make him his viceroy in Syria. With the fall of Baghdad and the conquest of Syria, the center of Muslim power shifted westward to the Mamluks in Egypt.

Advertisement

Qutuz (r. 1259-1260), the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, decided to fight the Mongols. Hulegu had sent envoys to Cairo with a humiliating letter to the Mamluks commanding them to submit. Qutuz, angered by the letter, had Hulegu’s envoys cut in half and marched out to Palestine to face the Mongols. The two armies met at the famous Battle of Ayn Jalut (sometimes spelled Ain Jalut- the spring of Goliath). The Mamluks defeated the Mongols after some heavy fighting. At two points, the Mongols pushed the Mamluk lines back and almost broke through. However, at the end of the day the Mamluks prevailed and the Mongols were put to flight.

Map by MapMaster / Wikimedia Commons

This battle is probably the most famous clash between these two antagonists, but it was certainly not the biggest. Hulegu had withdrawn from Syria prior to the battle, taking with him the bulk of his forces and leaving behind 10,000-20,000 men under his lieutenant, Kitbugha. Several reasons have been cited for Hulegu’s withdrawal including the death of Mongke Khan and a succession crisis in the east; threats to the Ilkhanate from the other Mongol khanates, particularly the Golden Horde; the lack of sufficient pasturelands in Syria to sustain Hulegu’s massive army for long – Mongol warriors took multiple mounts on campaign with them (5-15) so even a modest force of 10,000 men was accompanied by tens of thousands of horses and steppe ponies. The Mamluk and Mongol armies at Ayn Jalut were almost evenly matched in number at around 20,000 men for either side and both fought using steppe tactics. However, the Mamluks’ professionalism, training, and discipline won the day as it would in almost all the future encounters between the two sides.

Ayn Jalut is remembered because it is one of the earliest accounts of the defeat of the vaunted Mongol army in battle. Even though it was a small contingent of 20,000 men, such forces wreaked havoc on much larger enemy forces elsewhere. An example is the great cavalry raid into the Caucasus region and Southern Russia led by Jebe and Subutai in 1221-1223. A small Mongol force of about 20,000 men defeated superior Georgian, Kypchak, Lezgian, Alan, Circassian, and Rus armies. The campaign culminated in the Battle of the Kalka river where the small Mongol force reportedly defeated an army 80,000 strong composed of the forces of the principalities of Rus and Kyphcak tribes.

The Bahriyya regiment, al-Salih Ayyub’s elite unit, formed the spearhead of the Mamluk vanguard and once again distinguished itself at Ayn Jalut (see last three articles for more on the Bahriyya). Qutuz was murdered during the march back to Cairo by Baybars, the commander of the Bahriyya, and a group of Mamluk amirs. Baybars was then proclaimed the new sultan by the army. His reign was focused on eliminating the Crusader presence and, more importantly, safeguarding the sultanate against the Mongol threat. This anti-Ilkhanid policy was not unwarranted because the Mongols would launch six large scale offensives against Syria during the next five decades (1260, 1281, 1299, 1300, 1303 and 1312). In addition to these important military encounters, there were numerous raids by both sides across the frontier and a considerable amount of espionage. During this conflict, the Mamluks practiced a defensive strategy. Most of the major military campaigns that ended in a decisive pitched battle were fought in Syria after the Mongols invaded the region. The one exception to this defensive policy was Baybars’ expedition into Anatolia in 1277.

Advertisement

It was during Baybars’ reign that the Mamluk army was enlarged and further professionalized to prepare it for the inevitable return of the Mongols to Syria, which was now under Mamluk rule. According to the sources the professional standing army grew from around 10,000-15,000 men to 40,000 during his reign. Baybars also instituted a very strict training and educational program for the Mamluks, which produced excellent, disciplined, and highly efficient soldiers. In addition to enlarging and improving the standing army, Baybars also utilized auxiliaries, primarily the Turkmen and Bedouin tribes of Syria as well as the Kurds. These auxiliaries supplemented the army during military campaigns. They also acted as scouts, raiders, and skirmishers. These auxiliary tribes were also important during times of peace. They patrolled the borders and informed the authorities of enemy movements. They were the first line of defense when the Mongols launched attacks and raids across the Euphrates frontier and they also patrolled the roads and kept them safe.

Baybars and the other early Mamluk rulers took the Ilkhanid threat very seriously and acted even at the slightest rumor of an impending Mongol attack. For example, in 1262 Baybars received word through his spy network that Hulegu was mustering an army. It was unclear whether the Ilkhanids were preparing to invade Syria or to move north against the Golden Horde. Rather than be caught unprepared, Baybars had all the grasslands around the Aleppo region burned to deprive the Mongol horses from grass. He also made plans to evacuate the civilian population of Syria and sent scouts and Arab tribesmen to patrol, reconnoiter, and raid along the frontier.

A Mongol expedition against Syria did not materialize in 1262, but in 1264 similar rumors did result in a very real attack. A large Ilkhanid force besieged the important frontier fortress of al-Bira, which guarded one of the fords on the Euphrates. Baybars immediately dispatched two forces of 4,000 horsemen in the two days following the arrival of the news. He then personally oversaw the mobilization of the entire army which was to follow the smaller forces he had dispatched to help in the defense. The garrison of al-Bira put up a stubborn defense and the Ilkhanid forces withdrew upon sighting the Mamluk forces that were approaching to relieve the fortress. Another attempt was made by the Ilkhanids on al-Bira in 1272. Baybars rode out with his army to push back Mongols. The Ilkhanid general, upon learning that the Mamluk army was approaching, dispatched 5,000 mean to block the fords to discourage the Mamluks from making a crossing. Baybars’ forces crossed the river under fire, took the other bank, and pushed the Mongol forces back after some heavy fighting. Upon hearing of the defeat of their comrades and that the Mamluk army had succeeded in crossing the river, the other Mongol units broke off the siege and retreated.

Advertisement

Mamluk-Mongol Battles

As mentioned earlier, the most well-known encounter between the Mamluks and the Mongols was the Battle of Ayn Jalut in 1260. However, the true test of Mamluk military prowess would occur in the subsequent Ilkhanid invasions of Syria over a period of five decades. Most of the battles that were fought in these campaigns were much larger than Ayn Jalut. These battles include the Battle of Hims (or Homs, 1281), the Battle of Wadi al-Khazindar (1299), the Battle of Marj al-Suffar (1303), and the Battle of Elbistan (or Abulustayn, 1277). These battles will be discussed below in more detail.

A major Mongol invasion of Syria did not take place during Baybars’ lifetime. The army he built up would be put to the test during the reign of his successor and friend Qalawun (r. 1279-1290) at the Battle of Hims/Homs (often referred to as the Second Battle of Hims because a smaller battle was fought near Hims/Homs against the Mongols in 1261) in 1281. The Ilkhan Abaqa’s (r. 1265-1282) brother, Monge Temur, was appointed as the general of the army that invaded Syria. He commanded a large army numbering 50,000-80,000 men including at least 3-5 Mongol tumens and a considerable number of Armenian, Georgian, and Rumi (i.e. Turkish Seljuk troops of Rum/Anatolia) vassal auxiliary troops and a small contingent of Franks including some Knights Hospitaller. Qalawun’s army reportedly numbered 30,000-50,000 men at this battle. It is always tricky pinpointing the exact numbers of these armies because the sources give such a broad range. However, it is quite certain that the Mongols outnumbered the Mamluks because Abaqa would not have invaded Syria with a force inferior or equal to the one Qalawun could put in the field.

Baybars al Mansuri, an amir/officer in the Mamluk army who was both an eyewitness of and participant in the battle left a detailed account of the Mamluk army’s battle formations. The army was divided into six divisions: the vanguard in the center; the right and left wings were on either side of the vanguard; the right and left flanks were to positioned to the right and left of the two wings respectively, the center was in the middle and behind the vanguard. The center, vanguard, and the right and left wings of the army were composed primarily of mamluk contingents, including the Royal Mamluks, mamluks of the amirs, and the units of the halqa. In addition to the mamluk units, the right wing was reinforced by the provincial armies of Damascus and Hama. The auxiliary troops were positioned on the flanks with the Turkmen on the left flank and the Arab tribes of Syria on the right flank. The Mongols drew their line up in three major divisions: center, right and left wings. The right wing was heavily reinforced with all the auxiliary soldiers from the vassal kingdoms in addition to the Mongol troops.

Both sides had reinforced their right wings due to intelligence from defectors and captives stating that the other side had a very strong left wing. Initially, the battle hung in the balance. The Mongol right wing routed the Mamluk left wing and the Mamluk right wing shattered the Mongol left. The victorious Mongol right wing pursued their defeated foes off the field. The Mamluk right wing and flank, on the other hand, did not give chase to the defeated Mongols. Instead, they turned around and enveloped the Mongol center and routed it, only giving chase when victory was ensured. When the Mongol right wing returned to the field it also withdrew after having seen that the Mongols were defeated. This point in the battle was a close call for Qalawun because he remained on the field with only his personal entourage. When the Mongol right wing was seen returning, all the banners were furled up so as not to draw their attention to the sultan and his small troop. Both sides suffered heavy casualties in the fighting, but the Mamluks were the victors. They were left in possession of the field and had prevented another Ilkhanid attempt to conquer Syria.

Advertisement

The Battle of Wadi al-Khazindar in 1299 was the only major defeat that the Mamluks suffered at the hands of the Ilkhanids. Ghazan Khan (r. 1295-1304) invaded Syria with a force of Mongols, Armenians, and Georgians numbering around 60,000-100,000 men (the lower estimate being more accurate). Al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1293-1294, 1299-1309, 1320-1340) met them at Wadi al-Khazindar, north east of Hims/Homs with his army which was around 20,000-30,000 strong. The Mamluks initiated the fighting with an all-out charge against the Mongols who had dismounted to rest. A part of the Mongol force was sent on a wide detour to outflank the Mamluks, who thought that this unit was withdrawing. The Mongols were initially driven back, but they rallied and formed a defensive wall using their horses and other animals, from behind which they showered the Mamluks with arrows. The arrival of the Mongol flanking force at the rear of the Mamluk army was the killing blow that causing the Mamluks to withdraw.

Despite this defeat, most of the Mamluk army was able to disengage in relatively good order, so much so that the Mongols only followed cautiously fearing they were being lured into a trap. The Mongols occupied Damascus but held it for less than a year. When the Mamluks returned the following year, the Mongols withdrew. A major factor that contributed to the Mamluk defeat at Wadi al-Khazindar was the fact that there was internal strife within the army at the time.  There had been a major rebellion by the Oirats. They were a Mongol tribe that had migrated into the Mamluk domains and joined the Mamluk army. Reportedly up to 18,000 Oirat warriors came to Syria and Egypt and most of them were relegated to the halqa or the auxiliaries. They had plotted to revolt and murder the sultan and to return Kitbugha (a former deposed sultan who also happened to be an Oirat) to the throne. These plans were discovered, the revolt was put down, and hundreds of Oirats were purged and executed.

The Battle of Wadi al-Khazandar depicted in the early 14th century – BNF Nouvelle acquisition française 886, fol. 31v[
Ghazan Khan led another invasion of Syria in 1304 that culminated in the Battle of Marj al-Suffar (also known as the Battle of Shaqhab). At this battle a Mongol force of about 20,000-30,000 men faced al-Nasir Muhammad’s army of around 15,000-20,000 men. The Mamluk army, despite its humiliating defeat a few years earlier, performed flawlessly and the outcome was a resounding victory for the Mamluks. The Mamluks were drawn up for battle in a similar manner to their formations at the Battle of Hims/Homs. The Mongol left wing attacked the Mamluk right, which held. The Mongols shifted troops from the center to the left to support this attack in an attempt to drive the Mamluk right wing off the field. These efforts managed to push the Mamluk right back. The weakening of the Mongol center and the subsequent strong advance of the Mongol left, however, allowed the Mamluk center and left to envelope the Mongols, forcing them to retreat to a hill where they spent the night surrounded. On the following day, the Mamluks opened a gap in their lines, a typical steppe tactic used by the Mongols on numerous occasions, to lure the hungry and thirsty Mongols out and to give them the hope of escape. The bait worked and groups of Mongol warriors tried to make a run for the nearby stream, where they were slaughtered. Those remaining on the hill were also attacked and routed.

As mentioned above, most of the early Mamluk sultanate’s military operations against the Ilkhanids were defensive in nature and aimed to prevent the Mongol conquest of Syria and subsequently of Egypt as well. However, Baybars did launch one major offensive campaign against the Ilkhanids in Anatolia. Baybars’ Anatolian campaign culminated in the Battle of Elbistan (Abulustayn) in 1277. It is unclear what Baybars’ reasons and objective were for this campaign. He did end up occupying the Seljuk capital of Caesarea, had himself proclaimed sultan there, and struck coins in his name after his victory. He may have wanted to make a show of force by launching a massive raid to destabilize the Mongol hold on Anatolia, gain military support from some of the inhabitants of the region, or maybe even to occupy the region permanently. However, due his untimely death that same year and any gains he made in Anatolia were lost. At the battle of Elbistan, the Mamluks defeated the Mongols decisively. The two armies that faced each other were relatively small. The Mongols had one tumen (10,000) and 2,000 Georgian auxiliaries and Baybars had with him around 10,000-14,000 men. The Mamluk soldiers’ more accurate and longer range archery, their heavy armor, and their larger and stronger war horses all contributed to the outcome of the battle in which, according to the sources, 6,770 Mongols were killed as opposed to a relatively small number of Mamluks.

The Mamluk-Ilkhanid war came to an end when both sides signed a peace treaty in 1323. Thus, ended the threat of Mongol invasion that had plagued the Mamluks for the first six decades of their sultanate. The Ilkhanate did not last long and disintegrated in less than a decade after the signing of this agreement in 1335.

The Threat from Tamerlane

The Mamluk Sultanate would not face another major threat from the east until the coming of Timur Lang or Tamerlane (r. 1370-1405) in the late 14th and early 15th centuries. The first contact that the Mamluks had with Timur was during the 1380s when the latter started his campaigns in the west, especially after their intensification after the Timurid conquest of Baghdad in 1393. The Mamluk sultan, Barquq (r. 1382–1389, 1390–1399), not only gave Sultan Ahmad of Baghdad refuge after he lost his city, but also sent him back to Iraq with an army to reconquer his lost domains. Barquq also concluded an alliance with Toqtamish of the Golden Horde, Timur’s sworn enemy.

There were no major clashes between Barquq and Timur, but some minor engagements. In 1387, Barquq sent an expeditionary force to Syria upon hearing that Timur’s forces had been sighted in South Eastern Anatolia. This expeditionary force met a contingent of Timur’s army and defeated it in battle near Diyar Bakr. In another incident in 1388, a Mamluk army was sent to besiege the city of Sivas in Anatolia. The besieged appealed to Timur for aid. A Timurid contingent attacked the besiegers but was driven off. The Mamluk army departed from Sivas, after a long and unsuccessful siege, and headed back to Aleppo. It was ambushed by the same Timurid contingent that had come to the relief of Sivas. In a hard-fought battle, the Mamluks were able to defeat the ambushers and according to the sources took 1,000 prisoners and 10,000 of their opponents’ horses.

Like Baybars, Barquq expended a lot of energy and resources to prepare for the inevitable clash with Timur, but it never happened. The invasion of Syria never materialized and while Barquq awaited it with his well-prepared army, news arrived that Timur had withdrawn his forces from the Syrian frontier. There was only minimal contact between the scouting units of the two armies in which the Mamluks had the upper hand. The Mamluk sources claim that Timur was afraid to face Barquq and his formidable army in battle and that he retreated to his homeland. This is a simplistic and subjective account of the events.

However, there could be a kernel of truth in these Mamluk accounts. On can interpret Timur as being more cautious rather than being afraid. He knew he had to deal with Toqtamish, the Mamluks’ ally, and the threat that the armies of the Golden Horde posed to his flank. He must also have been aware of the Mamluks’ defensive policies and correctly gambled that the Golden Horde was more likely to carry out offensive operations at his rear than the Mamluk sultanate. He therefore chose to deal with his enemies to the north and left Syria and the Barquq’s powerful Mamluk army to fight on another day. This strategic gamble worked for Timur. He defeated Toqtamish at the Battle of the Terek River in 1395, forever breaking the power of Toqtamish and the Golden Horde. Four years later Barquq died and the Mamluk sultanate was ruled by his young son, al-Nasir Faraj (r. 1399–1405, 1405–1412), who was only a shadow of the ruler his father had been. He was unable to fully bring the army under his control and there was internal strife in the realm.

Timur fighting Mamluk Sultan, An-Nasir Faraj in a 16th century illustration.

This was the chance Timur was waiting for. He invaded Syria in 1400 and immediately besieged Aleppo. The provincial armies of Syria were gathered in the city. After some initial success repelling enemy assaults and defeating Timur’s advance guard, they sallied out to fight the besiegers but were routed and driven back. As the panicked soldiers rushed for the gates, the pursuing Timurid army was able to gain access to the city, which was plundered, and its citizens were subjected to a terrible slaughter. Timur quickly took Hims/Homs, Hama, Sidon, and Beirut and besieged Damascus. The sultan and his army marched from Egypt to the relief of the city. It seemed that a major clash was inevitable. Preliminary skirmishes between the advance guards of both armies took place and Timur’s forces were driven back. In a more serious clash Timur personally led his forces against Damascus, but he never reached the walls. The right wing of the Egyptian army halted Timur’s advance and drove his forces back. After this setback, the sources state that Timur asked al-Nasir Faraj for a truce and offered a prisoner exchange on two occasions. The Mamluks refused both times.

Despite these setbacks, Timur was destined to emerge the victor. The sultan and his army decamped and departed suddenly, returning to Egypt. Rumors had spread that a group of amirs had left the army and returned to Cairo and plotted to take the Citadel and to overthrow the sultan. Al-Nasir Faraj chose to secure his capital and left Damascus and its citizens to their fate. Damascus fell in 1401, the city was plundered, and its populace was massacred or enslaved. The following year (as was the case after the defeat at Wadi al-Khazindar) the Mamluks mobilized all their forces and marched into Syria to retake their lost domains. However, once again, the armies of the Mamluks and the Timurids were not destined to meet in a pitched battle. Timur had departed, leaving Syria, and marched towards what would be the historic clash of the Battle of Ankara with the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I.

The Mamluks not only survived the Mongol invasions, but also defeated the Mongol army in almost all the major battles that the two sides fought. The battles and campaigns they fought against the Ilkhanids exemplify the discipline, martial prowess, and effectiveness of the Mamluk soldiers. Furthermore, on those occasions when they were defeated or suffered setbacks, the Mamluks were able to rally and regroup and regain all the territories they had lost. The Mamluk sultanate would not have to deal with a major external foe as threatening as the Mongols and Timur until the late fifteenth century when they clashed the with Ottoman Empire. Until then, they mainly contended with internal revolts and uprisings. Both topics that will be examined in upcoming articles.

Adam Ali is a lecturer at the University of Toronto. Click here to read more from Adam.

Top Image: The Battle of Homs – Bibliothèque nationale de France MS NAF 886 fol. 27v

Advertisement