Medieval bishops were not only churchmen—they were also expected to provide troops for their rulers’ wars. David Bachrach explores how bishops and abbots used military contracts to secure the services of well-armed fighting men when they were needed.
By David Bachrach
Scholars of the Hundred Years’ War are very familiar with the concepts of military contracts and retainer agreements through which magnates recruited troops for campaigns undertaken by the kings of England. By contrast, there has been much less attention paid to the efforts of prelates of the imperial church under the Ottonian (919-1024) and Salian (1024-1125) dynasties to recruit the substantial contingents that they were required to bring on campaign for service with the German kings. However, charters, and particularly those issued by bishops and abbots, illuminate the quite extensive efforts of these prelates to secure in advance the services of contingents of troops when the king summoned his ecclesiastical officials to war.
The Military Obligations of Medieval Bishops
The Indiculus loricatorum, a late 10th-century document listing the contingents of armoured horsemen (loricati) that bishops, abbots and other magnates were expected to provide as reinforcements for Emperor Otto II in Italy, c. 981. The list offers rare evidence for the military obligations placed upon the imperial church during the Ottonian period. Staatsbibliothek Bamberg, Msc.Patr.107, fol. 1r.
The famous indiculus loricatorum, issued in 981 by Otto II (973-983) gives a sense of the scale of the contingents that prelates were required to dispatch and even lead on royal/imperial campaigns. The bishop of Strasbourg and the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, for example, were required to dispatch 100 armored horsemen (loricati) over the Alps as a supplement (supplementum) to the men whom they had already sent earlier that year with the emperor. These 100 loricati, of course, represented only part of the forces sent by the bishops, as the units of mounted troops required support personnel. It should also be kept in mind that the requirements for military service beyond the Alps were always substantially lower than within the German kingdom itself. Overall, the 300 loricati dispatched by these three bishops, and the more than 1000 additional loricati sent by another 14 abbots and bishops in 981, represented just a fraction of the overall military forces available to these prelates.
As is well documented in narrative accounts and in both royal and private charters, prelates frequently fulfilled their military obligations to the ruler with two types of troops, depending on the specific demands of the king. In some cases, prelates who had received immunities from local comital authorities, were able to mobilize their tenants for military service in the king’s army. The great benefit to the bishops and abbots was that this type of military service imposed no financial burdens on their churches. As subjects of the king, these tenants owed military service at their own expense to the res publica commensurate with their overall wealth. However, these tenants were essentially militia troops and mostly were equipped and modestly trained to serve on foot. Consequently, if the king demanded highly trained and well-equipped men, who could serve both on horseback and on foot, the bishops were compelled to deploy the men of their military households. It is likely that many of the loricati dispatched in 981 were troops of this type.
The Cost of Maintaining an Army
Gero, the future Archbishop of Cologne, receives the Gero Codex from the scribe Anno in a dedication miniature produced at Reichenau around 965–970. Gero became Archbishop of Cologne in 969 and served until his death in 976. Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt, Hs. 1948, fol. 7v.
From the perspective of bishops and abbots, maintaining a substantial group of well-trained troops as part of their household made sense in both military and political terms. They were assured of having high-quality troops and could meet the ruler’s demands in a speedy fashion, thereby keeping, as royal charters often state, “his grace”. However, from a purely economic perspective a large military household was very expensive. Even if prelates maintained a high proportion of non-casati troops, that is those who received housing, food, and supplies but not landed beneficia, the purchase and care of the warhorses used by these men imposed very high costs. To these costs must be added the production and maintenance of armor and weapons.
In order to ensure that they could provide the right types of troops in the required numbers when summoned by the king, many prelates sought to mitigate the costs of permanently employing all of the fighting men whom they might need by negotiating retaining contracts with local members of the secular elite to provide fighting men when these were required.
Contracts for Military Service
Meinwerk, Bishop of Paderborn from 1009 to 1036, depicted on a portable altar produced at Helmarshausen around 1100. Bishops such as Meinwerk were powerful figures within the imperial church, whose responsibilities extended beyond ecclesiastical affairs to the political and military service of the German kings. Wikimedia Commons
In some cases, these contracts involved a single man and often were built upon an existing relationship with a donor to the church. The Vita of Bishop Meinwerk of Paderborn (1009-1036), for example, records that a free man (liber homo) named Roddech gave property to the church in return for which he received both money in coin and the equipment necessary to serve as a soldier (miles), including a shield and an expensive horse. In a similar vein, Bishop Benno of Osnabrück (1068-1088) recruited a nobilis named Folcher to serve, when necessary, as a miles of the church in the context of a precarial agreement. Folcher gave property to Osnabrück, which he received back with some additional lands, to hold as a beneficium. Notably, the charter states explicitly that Folcher was to have these lands “according to the law as the other milites who were connected to this church.” However, Folcher did not actually join the bishop’s military household. Folcher’s service was only required periodically.
An agreement on a much grander scale is illuminated in a charter issued by Bishop Udo of Hildesheim (1079-1114) in 1110. The partner in this agreement, a man named Aeicho, who is denoted as an ingenuus homo (but not as a nobilis) was quite wealthy. As part of the precarial agreement, Aeicho gave properties totaling 73 mansi with more than 200 dependent laborers to the church of Hildesheim. To put this grant into perspective, a man with twelve mansi in the Carolingian period was required to provide a fully equipped fighting man and a warhorse for service in the ruler’s campaign.
In return for this generous donation, Aeicho received from Bishop Udo an entire estate, which included an episcopal fortification and all of its appurtenances, which included the levies imposed on the dependent population for its maintenance.
The military terms of the agreement were as follows: Aeicho committed to serving with all of his retainers, numbering fifteen men, under the bishop’s command within the boundaries of the diocese and more broadly within Westphalia whenever the “pagans” attacked. However, he was not required to go on campaign outside the diocese. He did have a choice of whether to go at the bishop’s cost.
One final arrangement, negotiated between Count Walram of Limburg (1032-1082) and Archbishop Eberhard of Trier (1047-1066) in 1052, provides insight both into the king’s interest in encouraging prelates to develop retainer agreements and also the difference between service obligations north and south of the Alps. Archbishop Eberhard states explicitly in the introduction to his charter that he was acting at the urging of King Henry III (1039-1056). According to the terms of the agreement, which was a precarial arrangement similar to those discussed above, Walram donated property in ten locations to the church, which he received back as a beneficium along with the church’s interests in fifteen separate estates. The military clause states that Walram committed to providing forty armed men (scutati) for service with the archbishop in the lands north of the Alps. By contrast, Walram was to provide only twenty scutati for service in Italy, either with the archbishop, or in case of the prelate’s absence, directly under the authority of the king.
In sum, these agreements, and many more could be adduced, illuminate the creative ways in which prelates sought to ensure that they had sufficient well-armed and equipped troops to meet the obligations imposed on them by the king. In all these cases, the bishops gave up, in the short term, much more than they received. This was the nature of most precarial agreements. However, in the long term they obtained not only military service, when needed, but also additional assets for their churches.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
Top Image: The Second Horseman of the Apocalypse, representing War, depicted in the Bamberg Apocalypse, c. 1010. Staatsbibliothek Bamberg, Msc.Bibl.140, fol. 14v.
Medieval bishops were not only churchmen—they were also expected to provide troops for their rulers’ wars. David Bachrach explores how bishops and abbots used military contracts to secure the services of well-armed fighting men when they were needed.
By David Bachrach
Scholars of the Hundred Years’ War are very familiar with the concepts of military contracts and retainer agreements through which magnates recruited troops for campaigns undertaken by the kings of England. By contrast, there has been much less attention paid to the efforts of prelates of the imperial church under the Ottonian (919-1024) and Salian (1024-1125) dynasties to recruit the substantial contingents that they were required to bring on campaign for service with the German kings. However, charters, and particularly those issued by bishops and abbots, illuminate the quite extensive efforts of these prelates to secure in advance the services of contingents of troops when the king summoned his ecclesiastical officials to war.
The Military Obligations of Medieval Bishops
The famous indiculus loricatorum, issued in 981 by Otto II (973-983) gives a sense of the scale of the contingents that prelates were required to dispatch and even lead on royal/imperial campaigns. The bishop of Strasbourg and the archbishops of Cologne and Mainz, for example, were required to dispatch 100 armored horsemen (loricati) over the Alps as a supplement (supplementum) to the men whom they had already sent earlier that year with the emperor. These 100 loricati, of course, represented only part of the forces sent by the bishops, as the units of mounted troops required support personnel. It should also be kept in mind that the requirements for military service beyond the Alps were always substantially lower than within the German kingdom itself. Overall, the 300 loricati dispatched by these three bishops, and the more than 1000 additional loricati sent by another 14 abbots and bishops in 981, represented just a fraction of the overall military forces available to these prelates.
As is well documented in narrative accounts and in both royal and private charters, prelates frequently fulfilled their military obligations to the ruler with two types of troops, depending on the specific demands of the king. In some cases, prelates who had received immunities from local comital authorities, were able to mobilize their tenants for military service in the king’s army. The great benefit to the bishops and abbots was that this type of military service imposed no financial burdens on their churches. As subjects of the king, these tenants owed military service at their own expense to the res publica commensurate with their overall wealth. However, these tenants were essentially militia troops and mostly were equipped and modestly trained to serve on foot. Consequently, if the king demanded highly trained and well-equipped men, who could serve both on horseback and on foot, the bishops were compelled to deploy the men of their military households. It is likely that many of the loricati dispatched in 981 were troops of this type.
The Cost of Maintaining an Army
From the perspective of bishops and abbots, maintaining a substantial group of well-trained troops as part of their household made sense in both military and political terms. They were assured of having high-quality troops and could meet the ruler’s demands in a speedy fashion, thereby keeping, as royal charters often state, “his grace”. However, from a purely economic perspective a large military household was very expensive. Even if prelates maintained a high proportion of non-casati troops, that is those who received housing, food, and supplies but not landed beneficia, the purchase and care of the warhorses used by these men imposed very high costs. To these costs must be added the production and maintenance of armor and weapons.
In order to ensure that they could provide the right types of troops in the required numbers when summoned by the king, many prelates sought to mitigate the costs of permanently employing all of the fighting men whom they might need by negotiating retaining contracts with local members of the secular elite to provide fighting men when these were required.
Contracts for Military Service
In some cases, these contracts involved a single man and often were built upon an existing relationship with a donor to the church. The Vita of Bishop Meinwerk of Paderborn (1009-1036), for example, records that a free man (liber homo) named Roddech gave property to the church in return for which he received both money in coin and the equipment necessary to serve as a soldier (miles), including a shield and an expensive horse. In a similar vein, Bishop Benno of Osnabrück (1068-1088) recruited a nobilis named Folcher to serve, when necessary, as a miles of the church in the context of a precarial agreement. Folcher gave property to Osnabrück, which he received back with some additional lands, to hold as a beneficium. Notably, the charter states explicitly that Folcher was to have these lands “according to the law as the other milites who were connected to this church.” However, Folcher did not actually join the bishop’s military household. Folcher’s service was only required periodically.
An agreement on a much grander scale is illuminated in a charter issued by Bishop Udo of Hildesheim (1079-1114) in 1110. The partner in this agreement, a man named Aeicho, who is denoted as an ingenuus homo (but not as a nobilis) was quite wealthy. As part of the precarial agreement, Aeicho gave properties totaling 73 mansi with more than 200 dependent laborers to the church of Hildesheim. To put this grant into perspective, a man with twelve mansi in the Carolingian period was required to provide a fully equipped fighting man and a warhorse for service in the ruler’s campaign.
In return for this generous donation, Aeicho received from Bishop Udo an entire estate, which included an episcopal fortification and all of its appurtenances, which included the levies imposed on the dependent population for its maintenance.
The military terms of the agreement were as follows: Aeicho committed to serving with all of his retainers, numbering fifteen men, under the bishop’s command within the boundaries of the diocese and more broadly within Westphalia whenever the “pagans” attacked. However, he was not required to go on campaign outside the diocese. He did have a choice of whether to go at the bishop’s cost.
One final arrangement, negotiated between Count Walram of Limburg (1032-1082) and Archbishop Eberhard of Trier (1047-1066) in 1052, provides insight both into the king’s interest in encouraging prelates to develop retainer agreements and also the difference between service obligations north and south of the Alps. Archbishop Eberhard states explicitly in the introduction to his charter that he was acting at the urging of King Henry III (1039-1056). According to the terms of the agreement, which was a precarial arrangement similar to those discussed above, Walram donated property in ten locations to the church, which he received back as a beneficium along with the church’s interests in fifteen separate estates. The military clause states that Walram committed to providing forty armed men (scutati) for service with the archbishop in the lands north of the Alps. By contrast, Walram was to provide only twenty scutati for service in Italy, either with the archbishop, or in case of the prelate’s absence, directly under the authority of the king.
In sum, these agreements, and many more could be adduced, illuminate the creative ways in which prelates sought to ensure that they had sufficient well-armed and equipped troops to meet the obligations imposed on them by the king. In all these cases, the bishops gave up, in the short term, much more than they received. This was the nature of most precarial agreements. However, in the long term they obtained not only military service, when needed, but also additional assets for their churches.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
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Top Image: The Second Horseman of the Apocalypse, representing War, depicted in the Bamberg Apocalypse, c. 1010. Staatsbibliothek Bamberg, Msc.Bibl.140, fol. 14v.
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