What happened when the same man was called to war by more than one lord? David Bachrach examines how Carolingian and Ottonian rulers managed the competing military obligations of fighting men in early medieval Germany.
By David Bachrach
The rulers of Carolingian East Francia and Ottonian Germany waged numerous wars of conquest from the mid-ninth to the early eleventh century. These campaigns required the mobilization of very large armies, particularly when engaged in the subjugation of territories that were protected by substantial numbers of fortifications. The numerically preponderant element in most Carolingian and Ottonian campaign armies consisted of militia troops, that is men who met the property and wealth requirements for service in the royal host. Many of these men were allodial landowners, while others were the tenants of wealthy secular landlords or of churches. However, the Carolingian and Ottonian rulers did not rely on militia forces alone for their campaign armies. These rulers employed substantial military households of professional fighting men and required wealthy individuals as well as ecclesiastical institutions to do the same. But who was responsible for mobilizing militia forces and professional soldiers for duty on campaign? What happened when the same man owed military service both for his allodial property and also because he was the member of the military household of a magnate? The ways in which Carolingian rulers as well as their Ottonian successors in early medieval Germany resolved these administrative problems illuminate the sophistication of their military systems.
Identifying Men Liable for Military Service
Louis the Pious, contemporary depiction from 826 as a miles Christi (soldier of Christ), with a poem of Rabanus Maurus overlaid.
Capitularies issued by Charlemagne, Louis the Pious, and Charles the Bald all make clear that counts, sub-comital officials (centenarii) and officials dispatched from the royal court (missi) had a shared responsibility for identifying men liable for military service because of their wealth and property holdings. A capitulary issued by Louis the Pious in 829, for example, stated that royal missi were to carry out inquests in every county and within every sub-comital district (centena) and write a report with two parts. First, they were to list how many free men lived there who were liable for service in the army. Secondly, they were to provide a list of those who did not personally possess sufficient resources to be liable for service, but who could be joined with two other men to send one of their number on campaign. In this manner, Louis’s capitulary recapitulated the selection mechanisms, although not the specific details of Charlemagne’s commands in the first decade of the century.
The county-by-county and centena-by-centena census of men liable for military service was an effective means for gathering critical data for the royal court about the scale of military forces that were available from the expeditionary levy, and where these men lived. However, these surveys appear to have had some noteworthy gaps in the information that they provided to the court. First, wealthy men often possessed property in more than one comital jurisdiction. The same man, therefore, might be liable for military service on the same campaign with more than one count.
Secondly, and perhaps even more commonly, it is clear that many individuals who leased property from substantial landowners, particularly churches, also possessed allodial properties of their own. Consequently, the same man might be summoned for military service by the count in whose comitatus he owned land and also might be summoned by his landlord to help fulfill the landlord’s military obligation for the campaign.
Third, it is clear that many men who served as professional soldiers in the military households of great landlords also possessed allodial properties. Consequently, these men might also be subject to mobilization by the count in whose comitatus they possessed property at the same time that they were summoned for service by the magnate whom they served professionally.
Protecting the Fighting Men of Bishops and Abbots
Statue of Altfrid of Hildesheim in Essen – photo by Frank Vincentz / Wikimedia Commons
It seems very likely that governmental authorities throughout the Carolingian Empire were able to resolve these potential conflicts. However, the clearest evidence that we have comes from East Francia under Louis the German and his successors, as well as from Ottonian Germany. In this context, a surviving fragment of a charter issued by Louis the German (840-876) on behalf of the Bishop Altfrid of Hildesheim (851-874), which is unfortunately undated, illuminates one of the ways in which Carolingian rulers approached this problem. In this case, Louis issued an edict, stating: “let no greater or lesser person dare to constrain his (Altfrid’s) men, whether noble or free, whether tenants or slaves, so long as they are on campaign, or at legal proceeding, or in any royal service.”
In this case, we see a general prohibition on anyone interfering in any way with Altfrid’s homines while they were engaged in royal service, including on campaign. The expansive language of the text also makes clear that Louis was giving this protection not only to members of the bishop’s military household, but also to the much broader category of his free and unfree agricultural dependents, that is the bishop’s coloni and servi. It should be noted, in this context, that Louis the German anticipated that agricultural tenants as well as slaves would, at some point, be involved in the king’s service, including on campaign.
Arnulf of Carinthia and the Soldiers of Corvey
Arnulf of Carinthia depicted in a 14th-century manuscript – München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek clm 313, fol. 63r
Louis the German’s grandson, Arnulf of Carinthia (888-899), formally addressed the narrower issue of the double obligations of some professional soldiers in a privilege that he issued on behalf of Abbot Gotschalk of Corvey (890-900) in June 897. The document took the form of a circular letter and was addressed to all the bishops, abbots, counts, subordinate comital officials (vicarii), individuals appointed to high positions, and all others who were important because of their familial status, who were in Saxony. Arnulf stated that he had been made aware that some of the recipients of this circular letter “had compelled, outside the bounds of the law, the military forces of the monastery, which is called New Corbie, that is the vassals of this same abbot to go on campaign.”
Arnulf emphasized that the authority to summon this militia had been granted by his predecessors to the monastery and abbot of Corvey. Arnulf therefore stated: “we expressly command all of you and furthermore prohibit that any of you in any way presume to compel these same soldiers (milites) through any iniquitous distraint to pay any exactions or to serve on campaign.”
The exactiones mentioned by Arnulf almost certainly refer to the heribannum, which was the fine imposed on those liable for military service in the king’s army who refused to join the host.
Arnulf’s choice of addressees as well as the content of the letter illuminates several aspects of the structure of the military recruitment system that operated in Saxony, and more broadly in East Francia during this period. First, a wide range of individuals played a role in mobilizing men to serve in the king’s army. Naturally, these included the counts and the sub-comital officials, who often were denoted as vicarii in the East and centenarii in the West.
Bishops and abbots, such as Abbot Gotschalk himself, as well as Bishop Altfrid, discussed above, also had this obligation with respect to their own military households and sometimes their tenants as well. The maiores de natu were simply wealthy men, who likely fulfilled their own military obligations to the crown through the deployment of a combination of professional soldiers and their own tenants.
Any one of these office holders, ecclesiastical officials, or wealthy individuals might have had jurisdiction over or an economic arrangement with one of the miles employed by Abbot Gotschalk. Arnulf’s intervention in this case was certainly a boon to the abbot, who now had no worries that the members of his military household would be available when he summoned them.
In addition, however, Arnulf’s privilege to the monastery of Corvey was also a privilege to Corvey’s milites, who had been freed from any military obligations they owed for either their allodial lands or their tenancies. This largess by the king probably provided the additional benefit from the perspective of the monastery of making it much easier to recruit well-established men to serve as soldiers.
Continuity Under the Ottonian Kings
The Ottonian kings maintained the Carolingian system of military obligations and concomitantly dealt with the administrative problems involved in the mobilization of men for military service who had competing obligations. This continuity in practice can be seen quite clearly, for example, in the renewal of the privileges for Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim (993-1022) issued in 1013 by King Henry II (1002-1024). The Ottonian ruler reiterated that the bishops of Hildesheim had the authority to mobilize their own dependents for military service in the king’s army, and emphasized that “no governmental official or anyone holding judicial authority shall presume to harass or contradict or compel to go on another campaign any person who appears to be one of his (Bernward’s) men when they have departed for campaign duty, or to go to the palace, or in any other service for us.”
In sum, the Carolingian and Ottonian rulers understood that their expansive demands for military service from very broad swathes of the population brought with them the potential for significant administrative problems. Rather than simply allowing these problems to fester or placing the burden of disentangling these competing obligations on the individuals summoned for military service, these rulers devised solutions. This approach to governance is one of the hallmarks of both the Carolingian and Ottonian Empires.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
The making of lists for military service, required in the Carolingian capitularies, is attested in fortuitously surviving administrative documents. One such list has recently been published with extensive commentary in Stefan Esders, Massimiliano Bassetti, and Wolfgang Haubrichs, Verwaltete Treue: Ein Verzeichnis vereidigter Personen aus dem Norden des regnum Italiae zur Zeit Ludwigs II. (Berlin, 2024).
Top Image: Detail of a king and soldiers in the 11th-century manuscript Codex Aureus of Echternach
What happened when the same man was called to war by more than one lord? David Bachrach examines how Carolingian and Ottonian rulers managed the competing military obligations of fighting men in early medieval Germany.
By David Bachrach
The rulers of Carolingian East Francia and Ottonian Germany waged numerous wars of conquest from the mid-ninth to the early eleventh century. These campaigns required the mobilization of very large armies, particularly when engaged in the subjugation of territories that were protected by substantial numbers of fortifications. The numerically preponderant element in most Carolingian and Ottonian campaign armies consisted of militia troops, that is men who met the property and wealth requirements for service in the royal host. Many of these men were allodial landowners, while others were the tenants of wealthy secular landlords or of churches. However, the Carolingian and Ottonian rulers did not rely on militia forces alone for their campaign armies. These rulers employed substantial military households of professional fighting men and required wealthy individuals as well as ecclesiastical institutions to do the same. But who was responsible for mobilizing militia forces and professional soldiers for duty on campaign? What happened when the same man owed military service both for his allodial property and also because he was the member of the military household of a magnate? The ways in which Carolingian rulers as well as their Ottonian successors in early medieval Germany resolved these administrative problems illuminate the sophistication of their military systems.
Identifying Men Liable for Military Service
Capitularies issued by Charlemagne, Louis the Pious, and Charles the Bald all make clear that counts, sub-comital officials (centenarii) and officials dispatched from the royal court (missi) had a shared responsibility for identifying men liable for military service because of their wealth and property holdings. A capitulary issued by Louis the Pious in 829, for example, stated that royal missi were to carry out inquests in every county and within every sub-comital district (centena) and write a report with two parts. First, they were to list how many free men lived there who were liable for service in the army. Secondly, they were to provide a list of those who did not personally possess sufficient resources to be liable for service, but who could be joined with two other men to send one of their number on campaign. In this manner, Louis’s capitulary recapitulated the selection mechanisms, although not the specific details of Charlemagne’s commands in the first decade of the century.
The county-by-county and centena-by-centena census of men liable for military service was an effective means for gathering critical data for the royal court about the scale of military forces that were available from the expeditionary levy, and where these men lived. However, these surveys appear to have had some noteworthy gaps in the information that they provided to the court. First, wealthy men often possessed property in more than one comital jurisdiction. The same man, therefore, might be liable for military service on the same campaign with more than one count.
Secondly, and perhaps even more commonly, it is clear that many individuals who leased property from substantial landowners, particularly churches, also possessed allodial properties of their own. Consequently, the same man might be summoned for military service by the count in whose comitatus he owned land and also might be summoned by his landlord to help fulfill the landlord’s military obligation for the campaign.
Third, it is clear that many men who served as professional soldiers in the military households of great landlords also possessed allodial properties. Consequently, these men might also be subject to mobilization by the count in whose comitatus they possessed property at the same time that they were summoned for service by the magnate whom they served professionally.
Protecting the Fighting Men of Bishops and Abbots
It seems very likely that governmental authorities throughout the Carolingian Empire were able to resolve these potential conflicts. However, the clearest evidence that we have comes from East Francia under Louis the German and his successors, as well as from Ottonian Germany. In this context, a surviving fragment of a charter issued by Louis the German (840-876) on behalf of the Bishop Altfrid of Hildesheim (851-874), which is unfortunately undated, illuminates one of the ways in which Carolingian rulers approached this problem. In this case, Louis issued an edict, stating: “let no greater or lesser person dare to constrain his (Altfrid’s) men, whether noble or free, whether tenants or slaves, so long as they are on campaign, or at legal proceeding, or in any royal service.”
In this case, we see a general prohibition on anyone interfering in any way with Altfrid’s homines while they were engaged in royal service, including on campaign. The expansive language of the text also makes clear that Louis was giving this protection not only to members of the bishop’s military household, but also to the much broader category of his free and unfree agricultural dependents, that is the bishop’s coloni and servi. It should be noted, in this context, that Louis the German anticipated that agricultural tenants as well as slaves would, at some point, be involved in the king’s service, including on campaign.
Arnulf of Carinthia and the Soldiers of Corvey
Louis the German’s grandson, Arnulf of Carinthia (888-899), formally addressed the narrower issue of the double obligations of some professional soldiers in a privilege that he issued on behalf of Abbot Gotschalk of Corvey (890-900) in June 897. The document took the form of a circular letter and was addressed to all the bishops, abbots, counts, subordinate comital officials (vicarii), individuals appointed to high positions, and all others who were important because of their familial status, who were in Saxony. Arnulf stated that he had been made aware that some of the recipients of this circular letter “had compelled, outside the bounds of the law, the military forces of the monastery, which is called New Corbie, that is the vassals of this same abbot to go on campaign.”
Arnulf emphasized that the authority to summon this militia had been granted by his predecessors to the monastery and abbot of Corvey. Arnulf therefore stated: “we expressly command all of you and furthermore prohibit that any of you in any way presume to compel these same soldiers (milites) through any iniquitous distraint to pay any exactions or to serve on campaign.”
The exactiones mentioned by Arnulf almost certainly refer to the heribannum, which was the fine imposed on those liable for military service in the king’s army who refused to join the host.
Arnulf’s choice of addressees as well as the content of the letter illuminates several aspects of the structure of the military recruitment system that operated in Saxony, and more broadly in East Francia during this period. First, a wide range of individuals played a role in mobilizing men to serve in the king’s army. Naturally, these included the counts and the sub-comital officials, who often were denoted as vicarii in the East and centenarii in the West.
Bishops and abbots, such as Abbot Gotschalk himself, as well as Bishop Altfrid, discussed above, also had this obligation with respect to their own military households and sometimes their tenants as well. The maiores de natu were simply wealthy men, who likely fulfilled their own military obligations to the crown through the deployment of a combination of professional soldiers and their own tenants.
Any one of these office holders, ecclesiastical officials, or wealthy individuals might have had jurisdiction over or an economic arrangement with one of the miles employed by Abbot Gotschalk. Arnulf’s intervention in this case was certainly a boon to the abbot, who now had no worries that the members of his military household would be available when he summoned them.
In addition, however, Arnulf’s privilege to the monastery of Corvey was also a privilege to Corvey’s milites, who had been freed from any military obligations they owed for either their allodial lands or their tenancies. This largess by the king probably provided the additional benefit from the perspective of the monastery of making it much easier to recruit well-established men to serve as soldiers.
Continuity Under the Ottonian Kings
The Ottonian kings maintained the Carolingian system of military obligations and concomitantly dealt with the administrative problems involved in the mobilization of men for military service who had competing obligations. This continuity in practice can be seen quite clearly, for example, in the renewal of the privileges for Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim (993-1022) issued in 1013 by King Henry II (1002-1024). The Ottonian ruler reiterated that the bishops of Hildesheim had the authority to mobilize their own dependents for military service in the king’s army, and emphasized that “no governmental official or anyone holding judicial authority shall presume to harass or contradict or compel to go on another campaign any person who appears to be one of his (Bernward’s) men when they have departed for campaign duty, or to go to the palace, or in any other service for us.”
In sum, the Carolingian and Ottonian rulers understood that their expansive demands for military service from very broad swathes of the population brought with them the potential for significant administrative problems. Rather than simply allowing these problems to fester or placing the burden of disentangling these competing obligations on the individuals summoned for military service, these rulers devised solutions. This approach to governance is one of the hallmarks of both the Carolingian and Ottonian Empires.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
Click here to read more from David Bachrach
Further Readings:
The making of lists for military service, required in the Carolingian capitularies, is attested in fortuitously surviving administrative documents. One such list has recently been published with extensive commentary in Stefan Esders, Massimiliano Bassetti, and Wolfgang Haubrichs, Verwaltete Treue: Ein Verzeichnis vereidigter Personen aus dem Norden des regnum Italiae zur Zeit Ludwigs II. (Berlin, 2024).
Top Image: Detail of a king and soldiers in the 11th-century manuscript Codex Aureus of Echternach
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