In the early eleventh century, two major Viking incursions threatened the Rhine Delta region of the German kingdom. Contemporary accounts show how local militias, when properly led, were able to mount an effective defense against the Northmen — and how poor leadership could quickly turn success into disaster.
By David Bachrach
The Viking Age generally is understood to have begun in the later eighth century, most notably with the sack of the monastery of Lindisfarne in 793, and to have reached its second apogee with Cnut of Denmark’s conquest of England in 1016. However, following the victory by the East Frankish ruler Arnulf of Carinthia (887–899) over a Viking army at the battle of the Dyle (891), Viking operations on the continent received little attention from contemporary writers, and even less from modern scholars, particularly with regard to the East Frankish/early German kingdom. Concomitantly, the local military forces of the tenth- and eleventh-century German kingdom also largely have been ignored by scholars, who have focused instead on the supposed dominance of warfare by mounted “knightly warriors.”
We are fortunate, therefore, that the early eleventh-century writer known as Alpert of Metz provides detailed accounts of the battles between local defense forces in the Rhine Delta region and the Vikings, in 1006 and 1007, in his little book on contemporary affairs, titled On the Variety of Our Times.
Alpert grew up during the later tenth century as a member of a wealthy and prominent family in the diocese of Utrecht. As a young man, he moved to Metz where he joined the monastery of St. Symphorien. Later in life Alpert returned home and entered the monastery of St. Paul at Utrecht. Through his family connections Alpert cultivated relationships with the leading ecclesiastical figures in the region, including Bishop Burchard of Worms (1000–1025) to whom he dedicated On the Variety of Our Times, as well as Bishops Ansfrid (995–1010) and Adalbold (1010–1026) of Utrecht. Alpert also was particularly well-informed about political events in the regions comprising the modern Netherlands and middle-Rhineland region of modern Germany.
The Viking Raid of 1006
Map of the Low Countries in the year 1000. Map by W. Bilderdijk, created in the 19th century
Alpert prefaced his account of the first of the Viking raids, in 1006, by highlighting the political intrigue in the region between two local counts, Wichmann and Balderich. Their rivalry turned on efforts to control the comital office in the area around Tiel, in the Dutch province of Gelderland. Godfrey, the count of this district, was Balderich’s uncle. However, Wichmann had married Godfrey’s daughter. As a result, both men had two claims to Godfrey’s office based on familial ties, although the ultimate decision about who would serve as count rested with the king, Henry II (1002–1024). The issue of who would succeed Godfrey, and thus would be responsible for overseeing the defense of the district, was particularly pressing because at the time of the raid, Godfrey had grown feeble through a combination of age and illness.
Alpert makes clear that the weak governance offered by Godfrey proved especially problematic when “pirates emerged with a great fleet from the diverse islands of the ocean and moved rapidly up the Merwede River to the port of Tiel.” Alpert claims that rather than offering any resistance, the people living along the banks of the Merwede simply fled with whatever possessions they could carry.
Count Godfrey, who was slow to react, finally set out to face the raiders, but was too late to organize his people. Alpert says of him that “he used his last strength to mount his horse, but he was unable to keep his people from fleeing.” In the absence of any organized opposition, the enemy fleet continued up the river all the way to Tiel, where they plundered and burned the port, and sacked the monastery of St. Walburga.
Only at this point did Count Godfrey finally begin to mobilize his people to oppose the Vikings. He sent messengers to each of the villages within his county, to summon the men to muster for battle. Alpert makes clear that this traditional aspect of local military administration, which dated back to the Carolingian Empire, worked very well and that a huge crowd of men gathered at first light. Godfrey, who was too weak to take personal command of the levy, appointed Count Balderich, his nephew, as well as Hunerick, count of the neighboring district, to take command of the militia troops. Alpert stressed that Hunerick, in particular, had earned a reputation as a military leader when serving with Emperor Otto III (983–1002) in Italy.
Despite their late start and the damage that had already been done by the raiders, Alpert expresses his pride in the efforts of the militia troops on the second day of the raid. He states that “when they caught sight of our men, the enemy grew terrified at their rapid approach.” The Vikings fled back to their ships, pursued by the militia, with both sides suffering some losses. Alpert credits the militia troops with keeping the Vikings from moving inland from the river and doing even more damage.
Around noon of the second day, after they had sailed a few miles downriver and put some distance between themselves and the pursuing militia, the Vikings disembarked and drew themselves up into a phalanx formation. Alpert states that the Vikings offered the local forces a chance to attack them, but that “our men” were less experienced than the enemy in fighting and so did not want to engage in battle. However, the Vikings also realized that nothing further was to be gained and sailed away.
Despite the early setbacks, which were caused by the lack of preparation and slow response by the old count, the local militia forces responded quickly and effectively when they were summoned. They forced the Vikings to retreat after their initial encounter and successfully faced them down even after the raiders had been able to gain some breathing space and deploy for battle.
The Viking Raid of 1007
18th century view of the Lek River by Hendrik Spilman – Wikimedia Commons
Alpert’s report of the encounter with the Viking raiders the next year once again illuminates the effectiveness of local military institutions but also highlights the problems that resulted from poor leadership. In 1007, Alpert reports, 90 long-ships, representing a force of several thousand men, rowed up the Lek River. This time, the locals were prepared, probably through the effective deployment of lookouts, and immediately responded. Alpert states that a great force of men, both on horseback as well as on foot, were deployed along both banks of the river.
The Viking fleet anchored in the middle of the river and their leaders sent emissaries to negotiate a passage through the district, promising that they would not do any harm in the area. The two sides negotiated a short truce, during which the men of the local militia forces brought in a number of ships so that they could engage the Vikings directly on the water. When the next day dawned, the Vikings realized that they were caught between the flotilla in front of them on the river and the substantial militia forces that were deployed on both banks.
Thus far the local defenses had proven even more effective than had been the case the year before, stopping the Vikings before they could do any damage at all. However, at this point, as Alpert explains, everything went wrong. A rumor spread among the local defenders deployed on the ships that the men on shore had attacked the Vikings and won a great victory. The ship-borne militia troops then launched a disorganized attack against the Viking fleet. Alpert states that: “There was no leader and no fixed battle order. Everyone approached the enemy as if he wished to appear faster than his fellows.”
The Vikings responded by closing up their formation and defeated the local defenders in detail. Seeing what was happening on the river, the men on shore fled and were pursued by the Vikings who killed many of the local defenders. The fleet then sailed to Utrecht, but the raiders were unable to make an effective attack on the fortified town.
Alpert’s account of the two Viking raids in 1006 and 1007 highlights both the continuing threat posed by the “Northmen” to the coastal regions of the German kingdom during the early eleventh century, and also the ongoing effectiveness of the local levies so long as they had good leadership. This was not a period dominated militarily by a warrior elite of aristocrats on horseback, but rather one in which farmers still expected to set aside their plows and pick up weapons of war to defend their homes.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.4
David S. Bachrach, “Civilians and Militia in Ottonian Germany: Warfare in an Era of Small Professional Armies,” in Civilians and Warfare in World History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (London, 2017), 110–131.
In the early eleventh century, two major Viking incursions threatened the Rhine Delta region of the German kingdom. Contemporary accounts show how local militias, when properly led, were able to mount an effective defense against the Northmen — and how poor leadership could quickly turn success into disaster.
By David Bachrach
The Viking Age generally is understood to have begun in the later eighth century, most notably with the sack of the monastery of Lindisfarne in 793, and to have reached its second apogee with Cnut of Denmark’s conquest of England in 1016. However, following the victory by the East Frankish ruler Arnulf of Carinthia (887–899) over a Viking army at the battle of the Dyle (891), Viking operations on the continent received little attention from contemporary writers, and even less from modern scholars, particularly with regard to the East Frankish/early German kingdom. Concomitantly, the local military forces of the tenth- and eleventh-century German kingdom also largely have been ignored by scholars, who have focused instead on the supposed dominance of warfare by mounted “knightly warriors.”
We are fortunate, therefore, that the early eleventh-century writer known as Alpert of Metz provides detailed accounts of the battles between local defense forces in the Rhine Delta region and the Vikings, in 1006 and 1007, in his little book on contemporary affairs, titled On the Variety of Our Times.
Alpert grew up during the later tenth century as a member of a wealthy and prominent family in the diocese of Utrecht. As a young man, he moved to Metz where he joined the monastery of St. Symphorien. Later in life Alpert returned home and entered the monastery of St. Paul at Utrecht. Through his family connections Alpert cultivated relationships with the leading ecclesiastical figures in the region, including Bishop Burchard of Worms (1000–1025) to whom he dedicated On the Variety of Our Times, as well as Bishops Ansfrid (995–1010) and Adalbold (1010–1026) of Utrecht. Alpert also was particularly well-informed about political events in the regions comprising the modern Netherlands and middle-Rhineland region of modern Germany.
The Viking Raid of 1006
Alpert prefaced his account of the first of the Viking raids, in 1006, by highlighting the political intrigue in the region between two local counts, Wichmann and Balderich. Their rivalry turned on efforts to control the comital office in the area around Tiel, in the Dutch province of Gelderland. Godfrey, the count of this district, was Balderich’s uncle. However, Wichmann had married Godfrey’s daughter. As a result, both men had two claims to Godfrey’s office based on familial ties, although the ultimate decision about who would serve as count rested with the king, Henry II (1002–1024). The issue of who would succeed Godfrey, and thus would be responsible for overseeing the defense of the district, was particularly pressing because at the time of the raid, Godfrey had grown feeble through a combination of age and illness.
Alpert makes clear that the weak governance offered by Godfrey proved especially problematic when “pirates emerged with a great fleet from the diverse islands of the ocean and moved rapidly up the Merwede River to the port of Tiel.” Alpert claims that rather than offering any resistance, the people living along the banks of the Merwede simply fled with whatever possessions they could carry.
Count Godfrey, who was slow to react, finally set out to face the raiders, but was too late to organize his people. Alpert says of him that “he used his last strength to mount his horse, but he was unable to keep his people from fleeing.” In the absence of any organized opposition, the enemy fleet continued up the river all the way to Tiel, where they plundered and burned the port, and sacked the monastery of St. Walburga.
Only at this point did Count Godfrey finally begin to mobilize his people to oppose the Vikings. He sent messengers to each of the villages within his county, to summon the men to muster for battle. Alpert makes clear that this traditional aspect of local military administration, which dated back to the Carolingian Empire, worked very well and that a huge crowd of men gathered at first light. Godfrey, who was too weak to take personal command of the levy, appointed Count Balderich, his nephew, as well as Hunerick, count of the neighboring district, to take command of the militia troops. Alpert stressed that Hunerick, in particular, had earned a reputation as a military leader when serving with Emperor Otto III (983–1002) in Italy.
Despite their late start and the damage that had already been done by the raiders, Alpert expresses his pride in the efforts of the militia troops on the second day of the raid. He states that “when they caught sight of our men, the enemy grew terrified at their rapid approach.” The Vikings fled back to their ships, pursued by the militia, with both sides suffering some losses. Alpert credits the militia troops with keeping the Vikings from moving inland from the river and doing even more damage.
Around noon of the second day, after they had sailed a few miles downriver and put some distance between themselves and the pursuing militia, the Vikings disembarked and drew themselves up into a phalanx formation. Alpert states that the Vikings offered the local forces a chance to attack them, but that “our men” were less experienced than the enemy in fighting and so did not want to engage in battle. However, the Vikings also realized that nothing further was to be gained and sailed away.
Despite the early setbacks, which were caused by the lack of preparation and slow response by the old count, the local militia forces responded quickly and effectively when they were summoned. They forced the Vikings to retreat after their initial encounter and successfully faced them down even after the raiders had been able to gain some breathing space and deploy for battle.
The Viking Raid of 1007
Alpert’s report of the encounter with the Viking raiders the next year once again illuminates the effectiveness of local military institutions but also highlights the problems that resulted from poor leadership. In 1007, Alpert reports, 90 long-ships, representing a force of several thousand men, rowed up the Lek River. This time, the locals were prepared, probably through the effective deployment of lookouts, and immediately responded. Alpert states that a great force of men, both on horseback as well as on foot, were deployed along both banks of the river.
The Viking fleet anchored in the middle of the river and their leaders sent emissaries to negotiate a passage through the district, promising that they would not do any harm in the area. The two sides negotiated a short truce, during which the men of the local militia forces brought in a number of ships so that they could engage the Vikings directly on the water. When the next day dawned, the Vikings realized that they were caught between the flotilla in front of them on the river and the substantial militia forces that were deployed on both banks.
Thus far the local defenses had proven even more effective than had been the case the year before, stopping the Vikings before they could do any damage at all. However, at this point, as Alpert explains, everything went wrong. A rumor spread among the local defenders deployed on the ships that the men on shore had attacked the Vikings and won a great victory. The ship-borne militia troops then launched a disorganized attack against the Viking fleet. Alpert states that: “There was no leader and no fixed battle order. Everyone approached the enemy as if he wished to appear faster than his fellows.”
The Vikings responded by closing up their formation and defeated the local defenders in detail. Seeing what was happening on the river, the men on shore fled and were pursued by the Vikings who killed many of the local defenders. The fleet then sailed to Utrecht, but the raiders were unable to make an effective attack on the fortified town.
Alpert’s account of the two Viking raids in 1006 and 1007 highlights both the continuing threat posed by the “Northmen” to the coastal regions of the German kingdom during the early eleventh century, and also the ongoing effectiveness of the local levies so long as they had good leadership. This was not a period dominated militarily by a warrior elite of aristocrats on horseback, but rather one in which farmers still expected to set aside their plows and pick up weapons of war to defend their homes.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.4
Further Reading:
Warfare and Politics in Medieval Germany, c. 1000: On the Variety of Our Times by Alpert of Metz, translation and commentary by David S. Bachrach (Toronto, 2012).
David S. Bachrach, “Civilians and Militia in Ottonian Germany: Warfare in an Era of Small Professional Armies,” in Civilians and Warfare in World History, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (London, 2017), 110–131.
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