What did it take to survive as a medieval king? According to a new study by historian Steven Isaac, brute strength and battlefield glory were only part of the story. From the Norman Conquest to the fall of Normandy in 1204, the kings of England and France waged a century-long struggle not just with swords, but with diplomacy, bureaucracy, and hard cash.
At the heart of the article, which is published in The Routledge Handbook of Medieval Military Strategy, is a broader definition of strategy—one that encompasses more than battles and campaigns. As Isaac explains, medieval rulers “sought first to increase their own power and authority over people around them; in tandem with this personal empowerment, similar growth in power and authority was sought for the dynasty, both as an end result and as a means of furthering the ruler’s own projects.” While modern readers may be tempted to measure medieval leaders by the standards of later nation-states or Napoleonic warfare, Isaac cautions against such assumptions, showing instead how kings pursued flexible and often highly effective plans tailored to their political landscapes.
One of the clearest examples is William the Conqueror’s campaign in 1066. Far from relying on brute force or luck, William orchestrated a carefully planned invasion of England that included diplomatic outreach, financial recruitment, and logistical innovation. Calling it “a masterclass in military recruitment and logistical preparations,” Isaac details how William was methodical in his invasion, which led to his victory at the Battle of Hastings.
Castles, Coins, and Crisis Management
In the wake of Hastings, the new Anglo-Norman kings gained a formidable strategic edge not only from their conquests, but from England’s financial systems and administrative infrastructure. Through institutions like the Danegeld, ship-soke, and scutage, they could raise armies and hire mercenaries at a scale unmatched by their Capetian rivals. Henry I and his successors used these resources to erode French control along the Norman frontier, investing in castles, buying out vassals, and forging advantageous marriages. Meanwhile, Capetian kings like Louis VI had to rely more heavily on personal leadership, daring, and charisma to keep rebellious vassals in check.
The 12th-century Topographica Hiberniae (Topology of Ireland) was dedicated to King Henry II of England, and features a rare contemporary image of the king. – British Library MS Royal 13 B VIII
One turning point in the power struggle came during the revolt of 1173–74, when Henry II faced a coordinated rebellion by his sons, his wife Eleanor of Aquitaine, and several foreign enemies including the kings of France and Scotland. Despite the scale of the threat, Henry’s careful preparations and reliance on mercenaries allowed him to weather the storm. As Isaac describes:
“Henry’s penchant for managing large campaigns stood him in good stead in 1173. Realizing how little the feudal oaths of many vassals mattered, so long as he looked doomed, Henry put his faith in loyalty that he could buy: 20,000 purported Brabançons (the by-word for mercenaries in the later 1100s). While doubtlessly an inflated number, Henry also mortgaged the ceremonial Sword of State to his hired troops in lieu of payments when he ran short of cash. That this gambit, real or not, could be envisioned speaks volumes to Henry’s reliance on such troops.”
Isaac goes on to trace the campaigns of Richard the Lionheart, who is often remembered for his boldness but whose strategic sensibilities were just as important. His construction of Château-Gaillard, management of garrisons, and manipulation of diplomatic marriages all point to a king deeply invested in projecting and maintaining power. But the tide turned with the reign of King John, whose failure to hold Normandy against Philip Augustus in 1204 marked a major shift in European politics. John’s tactical missteps and inability to maintain the loyalty of his vassals ultimately cost him dearly.
Strategy Beyond the Battlefield
While battles played a role in the story, Isaac emphasizes that strategic mastery often came down to more mundane—but powerful—forms of statecraft. “Strategy is a peacetime endeavor as well,” he writes. “And in that respect, despite the ways in which Louis VI or Richard the Lionheart seemed to carry the day tactically, it was the developments nurtured off the battlefield—such as Louis VII and Philip II with their towns, or Henry II and John with the extension of royal justice—that powered real growth and long-term success.”
Detail of a miniature of Philip Augustus receiving an envoy, and Philip Augustus and Henry II taking the cross. British Library MS Royal 16 G VI f. 344v
Philip II Augustus offers a good example of strategic governance rooted in long-term planning, administrative reform, and opportunistic diplomacy. Unlike his predecessors, who struggled to match the financial and military resources of the Anglo-Norman kings, Philip steadily expanded royal authority by cultivating urban support, reorganising revenue collection, and exploiting divisions among his rivals. He effectively used alliances, feudal obligations, and propaganda to isolate King John of England, eventually wresting Normandy and other territories from Plantagenet control. Philip’s success was not just due to battlefield acumen but to his ability to centralise power and reduce his dependence on feudal levies—developments that gave the Capetian monarchy a new strategic advantage by the early 13th century.
By approaching medieval strategy on its own terms, this article challenges long-held assumptions about the supposed irrationality or incompetence of medieval rulers. As Isaac explains, “the myth of medieval warfare as being a chaotic melee wherein knights fought bravely for individual glory but with little strategic vision, and wrecked the homes and lives of hapless peasants out of a petulant delight in destruction, rarely holds up in the face of serious study.”
The article, “Strategy in the High Middle Ages: Anglo-Normans, Capetians, and Plantagenets,” is one of 31 articles appearing in Routledge Handbook of Medieval Military Strategy, edited by John D. Hosler and Daniel P. Franke. This work aims to “enable both medievalists and modernists to better grasp and scrutinize the military histories and strategies therein.” You can learn more at the publisher’s website.
Steven Isaac is a Professor of History at Longwood University and has written extensively about military history during the High Middle Ages.
What did it take to survive as a medieval king? According to a new study by historian Steven Isaac, brute strength and battlefield glory were only part of the story. From the Norman Conquest to the fall of Normandy in 1204, the kings of England and France waged a century-long struggle not just with swords, but with diplomacy, bureaucracy, and hard cash.
At the heart of the article, which is published in The Routledge Handbook of Medieval Military Strategy, is a broader definition of strategy—one that encompasses more than battles and campaigns. As Isaac explains, medieval rulers “sought first to increase their own power and authority over people around them; in tandem with this personal empowerment, similar growth in power and authority was sought for the dynasty, both as an end result and as a means of furthering the ruler’s own projects.” While modern readers may be tempted to measure medieval leaders by the standards of later nation-states or Napoleonic warfare, Isaac cautions against such assumptions, showing instead how kings pursued flexible and often highly effective plans tailored to their political landscapes.
One of the clearest examples is William the Conqueror’s campaign in 1066. Far from relying on brute force or luck, William orchestrated a carefully planned invasion of England that included diplomatic outreach, financial recruitment, and logistical innovation. Calling it “a masterclass in military recruitment and logistical preparations,” Isaac details how William was methodical in his invasion, which led to his victory at the Battle of Hastings.
Castles, Coins, and Crisis Management
In the wake of Hastings, the new Anglo-Norman kings gained a formidable strategic edge not only from their conquests, but from England’s financial systems and administrative infrastructure. Through institutions like the Danegeld, ship-soke, and scutage, they could raise armies and hire mercenaries at a scale unmatched by their Capetian rivals. Henry I and his successors used these resources to erode French control along the Norman frontier, investing in castles, buying out vassals, and forging advantageous marriages. Meanwhile, Capetian kings like Louis VI had to rely more heavily on personal leadership, daring, and charisma to keep rebellious vassals in check.
One turning point in the power struggle came during the revolt of 1173–74, when Henry II faced a coordinated rebellion by his sons, his wife Eleanor of Aquitaine, and several foreign enemies including the kings of France and Scotland. Despite the scale of the threat, Henry’s careful preparations and reliance on mercenaries allowed him to weather the storm. As Isaac describes:
“Henry’s penchant for managing large campaigns stood him in good stead in 1173. Realizing how little the feudal oaths of many vassals mattered, so long as he looked doomed, Henry put his faith in loyalty that he could buy: 20,000 purported Brabançons (the by-word for mercenaries in the later 1100s). While doubtlessly an inflated number, Henry also mortgaged the ceremonial Sword of State to his hired troops in lieu of payments when he ran short of cash. That this gambit, real or not, could be envisioned speaks volumes to Henry’s reliance on such troops.”
Isaac goes on to trace the campaigns of Richard the Lionheart, who is often remembered for his boldness but whose strategic sensibilities were just as important. His construction of Château-Gaillard, management of garrisons, and manipulation of diplomatic marriages all point to a king deeply invested in projecting and maintaining power. But the tide turned with the reign of King John, whose failure to hold Normandy against Philip Augustus in 1204 marked a major shift in European politics. John’s tactical missteps and inability to maintain the loyalty of his vassals ultimately cost him dearly.
Strategy Beyond the Battlefield
While battles played a role in the story, Isaac emphasizes that strategic mastery often came down to more mundane—but powerful—forms of statecraft. “Strategy is a peacetime endeavor as well,” he writes. “And in that respect, despite the ways in which Louis VI or Richard the Lionheart seemed to carry the day tactically, it was the developments nurtured off the battlefield—such as Louis VII and Philip II with their towns, or Henry II and John with the extension of royal justice—that powered real growth and long-term success.”
Philip II Augustus offers a good example of strategic governance rooted in long-term planning, administrative reform, and opportunistic diplomacy. Unlike his predecessors, who struggled to match the financial and military resources of the Anglo-Norman kings, Philip steadily expanded royal authority by cultivating urban support, reorganising revenue collection, and exploiting divisions among his rivals. He effectively used alliances, feudal obligations, and propaganda to isolate King John of England, eventually wresting Normandy and other territories from Plantagenet control. Philip’s success was not just due to battlefield acumen but to his ability to centralise power and reduce his dependence on feudal levies—developments that gave the Capetian monarchy a new strategic advantage by the early 13th century.
By approaching medieval strategy on its own terms, this article challenges long-held assumptions about the supposed irrationality or incompetence of medieval rulers. As Isaac explains, “the myth of medieval warfare as being a chaotic melee wherein knights fought bravely for individual glory but with little strategic vision, and wrecked the homes and lives of hapless peasants out of a petulant delight in destruction, rarely holds up in the face of serious study.”
The article, “Strategy in the High Middle Ages: Anglo-Normans, Capetians, and Plantagenets,” is one of 31 articles appearing in Routledge Handbook of Medieval Military Strategy, edited by John D. Hosler and Daniel P. Franke. This work aims to “enable both medievalists and modernists to better grasp and scrutinize the military histories and strategies therein.” You can learn more at the publisher’s website.
Steven Isaac is a Professor of History at Longwood University and has written extensively about military history during the High Middle Ages.
Top Image: Walters W.106 fol. 19r
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