The First Crusade brought tens of thousands of people across Byzantine territory, creating an immense challenge of supply and organisation. Marek Meško explains how the Byzantine Empire fed, transported, and supported the crusaders—and why this contribution deserves greater recognition.
By Marek Meško
When the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) began sending urgent appeals for help to the Latin West in 1088 to combat the onslaught of the Seljuk Turks, he hoped for the swift arrival of hundreds, or at best, thousands of well-armed and militarily skilled Western knights. With their assistance, he intended to form new mercenary units and gradually push the Turks back into the interior of Asia Minor. However, his appeals—further amplified by the authority of the new spiritual leader of the Latin West, Pope Urban II (1088–1099)—were answered not by hundreds or thousands, but by tens of thousands of people. The Pope’s call resonated not only with knights and barons but also with the common folk, women, children, and the elderly. Without waiting for the main crusader armies, they abandoned their homes in the spring of 1096 and set out on a march to the Holy Land.
At the Byzantine imperial court in Constantinople, the first reports regarding the march of numerous crusader hordes evoked mixed feelings. Emperor Alexios I Komnenos was, of course, aware of the conclusions of the Council of Clermont, where on November 27, 1095, Pope Urban II called upon the entirety of Western Christendom to participate in an expedition aimed at liberating the Holy Sepulcher from the hands of the infidels. He also possessed reliable intelligence that real, well-armed, and well-equipped crusader armies were assembling and preparing to march across various parts of Western Europe. The emperor’s daughter, Anna Komnene, recorded the measures taken by her father to ensure the undisturbed transit of these armies through Byzantine territory. The emperor summoned the commanders of the Byzantine army and “commanded them to welcome the newcomers in a friendly manner and to provide them with abundant provisions from all regions along the way.”
The gears of the Byzantine bureaucratic state apparatus then spun into full motion. In accordance with the aforementioned imperial decree, supply depots containing food and water were prepared along the projected marching routes of the crusader armies. Despite this, the first two large gatherings of pilgrims, led by Peter the Hermit and the knight Walter the Penniless, presented a massive problem and a troublesome complication. These groups thoroughly tested the efficacy of the Byzantine “logistical” system even before the arrival of the actual crusader army.
The Byzantine “Logistical” System
Map by Amitchell125 / Wikimedia Commons
It goes without saying that the modern term logistics (derived from the Greek word logistike, meaning calculation) did not carry the same meaning in the Middle Ages as it does today, and no similar, independent activity existed that would correspond conceptually to this term—not even within the Byzantine Empire. However, precisely because of a centuries-old bureaucratic apparatus that had, since the days of the ancient Roman Empire, managed to collect taxes fairly efficiently year after year and subsequently redistribute them according to the needs of the state, Byzantine officials possessed relatively decent organizational skills. Naturally, the army, upon whose shoulders rested the defense of Byzantine territory, received its share of the collected taxes. Sustaining the army with financial resources, agricultural products, weaponry, and equipment underwent extensive transformations over the centuries; nevertheless, it always served as a model for new generations of imperial officials in times of need.
At the time of the crusaders’ arrival on Byzantine territory, the entire Byzantine “logistical” system was based on the existence of select imperial estates called episkepseis (pertinentiae in Latin), which were managed by specific officials known from Byzantine sources as episkeptitai. These large estates were typically situated along major transportation routes, road junctions, or in strategically advantageous locations, and they always consisted of extensive pastures near water sources (rivers, lakes). They also included farms where draft animals (horses, mules, hinnies, oxen) as well as various livestock were bred by the tens of thousands. Furthermore, agricultural products from the wide surrounding area were accumulated on these estates so that they could be available at any moment to Byzantine military units marching into battle. Some of these estates also served as assembly points for the Byzantine army prior to major field campaigns.
In the western (European) part of the empire, there were naturally several such assembly points—for instance, near Thessalonica (Thessaloniki), Adrianople (Edirne), Tzouroulon (Çorlu), and near the town of Choirobakchoi (close to the present-day locations of Büyükçekmece and Küçükçekmece). Where episkepseis were not present, nearby towns and villages usually provided the necessary supplies for the army in the form of markets. These markets were organized by local imperial officials, and product prices were strictly regulated.
The First Severe Test
Peter the Hermit shows the crusaders the way to Jerusalem. French illumination (about 1270)
As is generally known, the first encounter between the Byzantine officials tasked with supplying the incoming pilgrims and the undisciplined crowds of the “popular” segment of the crusade under the leadership of the knight Walter the Penniless and Peter the Hermit did not proceed in the friendliest manner. The crusaders arrived on Byzantine territory from an unexpected direction, through the Hungarian Kingdom (rather than across the Adriatic Sea to the port of Dyrrachium, modern-day Durrës in Albania), and their numbers were far greater than what the Byzantines had anticipated. The written sources, however, do not state exactly how many of them marched through the Balkans. Albert of Aachen, one of the later chroniclers of the First Crusade, writes that the pilgrims were “innumerable as the sand in the sea.” Moreover, they lacked unified leadership and were bound together only by a general respect for the person of Peter the Hermit.
Upon their arrival on Byzantine territory, the supplies were not yet ready due to the reasons mentioned above. Consequently, groups of famished and impatient crusaders besieged the Byzantine border fortress of Veligrada (Belgrade) on June 26, 1096, and after a brief siege, captured and burned it. Eventually, Byzantine officials managed to gather the necessary supplies in the city of Naissos (Niš), toward which the crusader hordes headed after plundering Belgrade. Their subsequent journey through Sardica (Sofia) and Philippopolis (Plovdiv) to Constantinople, where the crusaders arrived during August 1096, then proceeded without major incidents. From this, it can be inferred that their food supply operated smoothly and in sufficient quantities. When the Byzantines later transported the crusaders to the Asian shore of the Bosporus, their ongoing regular supply was secured by Byzantine ships, which delivered wine, grain, oats, cheese, and oil to the crusader camp in Civetot.
The March of the Crusader Armies through the Balkans
Map by Miki Filigranski / Wikimedia Commons
The march of the individual crusader contingents across the Balkans, led by Hugh of Vermandois (brother of King Philip I of France), Godfrey of Bouillon, the Norman Duke Robert Curthose, Count Raymond of Toulouse from Aquitaine, Bohemond (son of the Norman Duke Robert Guiscard), and others—and their arrival beneath the walls of Constantinople between the autumn of 1096 and the spring of 1097 proceeded in a much more orderly fashion. Their contingents did not march together but rather along three separate routes. The first route essentially replicated the path taken by the crowds under Peter the Hermit (this was chosen by Godfrey of Bouillon and his retinue). The second route passed through modern-day Croatia and Bosnia to Dyrrachium, and from there along the old Roman road, the Via Egnatia, through Thessalonica, Rhousion (Rusköy), and Rhaidestos (Tekirdağ) to Constantinople (the contingent of Raymond of Toulouse). The third route led through southern Italy and, after crossing the Strait of Otranto, reached Dyrrachium, where it merged with the second route (the contingents of Hugh of Vermandois, Bohemond, Robert Curthose, and Count Robert of Flanders).
On Byzantine territory, wherever they went (with a few exceptions), markets organized by Byzantine officials awaited them, where they could purchase necessary provisions at fixed prices. Despite the fact that these armies advanced separately—thereby, in a way, easing the work of the Byzantines who oversaw their provisioning—the performance of the Byzantine administration must be evaluated as outstanding, given that the total number of crusaders assembled in the spring of 1097 is estimated to be as high as 60,000 (with the lowest estimate being 30,000 crusaders).
Inhospitable Anatolia
Siege of Nicaea – Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Français 22495 fol. 30r
Before a wave of Turkish nomads poured across the eastern Byzantine border during the 1070s, Asia Minor (Anatolia) belonged to the core territory of the Byzantine Empire. Despite the hot and dry climate, river valleys were lined with strips of agriculturally cultivated land, and just as in the European half of the empire, here too, at various places and intersections of important roads, episkepseis existed and functioned—the previously mentioned imperial estates intended for supplying units of the Byzantine army. However, a mere quarter-century following the Battle of Manzikert (1071) was enough for extensive and irreversible changes to take place in this region.
By the time the crusader contingents arrived, the Seljuk seizure of Asia Minor was already consolidated. Except for a narrow coastal strip lining the Marmara and Aegean Seas, all former eastern Byzantine provinces were in the power of the Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan ibn Suleiman ibn Qutalmish (1092–1107) and his rivals, the Turkish Danishmend emirs. Mobile Turkish horsemen controlled all important communication routes, and more importantly, their nomadic way of life based on extensive cattle breeding, as well as constant raids on the settled Byzantine population living under their dominance, contributed significantly to the reduction of agriculturally cultivated land in the Anatolian interior. During the late spring and especially the hot summer months, this region transformed into an arid and inhospitable steppe.
For these reasons, it is evident that supplying the crusader contingents during their transit across Asia Minor represented an insurmountable problem for the Byzantines. Up to Nicaea, the necessary provisions were prepared along the crusaders’ marching route. After that—that is, after crossing into Seljuk territory—the marching crusader ranks and a small detachment of the Byzantine army led by General Tatikios managed to subsist on their own provisions for approximately 20 days (according to 10th-century Byzantine military manuals, this was the duration a Byzantine army was supposed to be capable of operating in enemy territory without the possibility of obtaining any supplies from local sources).
However, the march across arid Anatolia ultimately took the crusaders roughly twice as long. The Turks systematically destroyed almost everything that could serve as food for the crusaders. An exception to this difficult supply situation was the area around the city of Ikonion (Konya), which the crusaders captured on August 15, 1097, finding plenty of food as well as much-needed water. It is therefore no wonder that chroniclers of the First Crusade consistently report on the immense hardship and deprivation (especially of water) that plagued the crusader contingents on their march through Anatolia.
Typical in this regard is the testimony contained in the chronicle Gesta Francorum by an anonymous author: “Hunger and thirst pinched us on all sides, and there was nothing for us to eat, except by chance we could pluck and grind grain with our hands, and thus continue our wretched existence as best we could.” Many participants of the expedition died of thirst, but the horses and draft animals suffered the most. As a result of these losses, the crusaders then faced such a severe shortage of animals that many knights had to fight on mules, donkeys, or as infantrymen instead of on horseback.
The Siege of Antioch
The Battle for Antioch – BnF MS Français 9084, fol. 53
As soon as the crusader contingents passed through the gates of the Taurus Mountains and descended into Cilicia and the plains of northern Syria, their supply situation improved once more. On one hand, this area was rich in agricultural products and stocks of various foods, and on the other, the crusaders found themselves near the Mediterranean coast again, which enabled their supply by sea. The Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos ensured that the crusaders were regularly supplied by cargo and merchant ships, which transported necessary provisions from nearby Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the larger part of the crusader army (except for the detachment of Baldwin of Boulogne, who set off to occupy Edessa, today Urfa) proceeded to besiege Antioch on October 21, 1097. Concurrently, even before the start of the siege, the crusaders seized the port of St. Symeon, located at the mouth of the Orontes River and at a distance of only about 27 km from Antioch. They thereby secured a permanent influx of provisions, which ships brought daily from Cyprus. To fully satisfy the 60,000-strong crusader army, it was entirely sufficient for one cargo ship with a displacement of approximately 100 tons to sail into the port of St. Symeon each day. In the port, these provisions were either loaded onto river barges or onto large four-wheeled horse-drawn wagons, which then transported them upriver into the crusader camp.
Initially, the crusader army did not suffer from want. The surrounding area of Antioch was very intensively cultivated agriculturally, and at the time of the crusaders’ arrival in late October 1097, plenty of food supplies were accessible everywhere because the growing season had recently ended. The crusader army had an abundance of grain, wine, oil, and other provisions.
Around Christmas, however, according to the chronicle Gesta Francorum, the situation changed radically: “Before the birth of the Lord, grain and all food became incredibly expensive. We did not dare to venture out (from the camp); in the territory of the Christians, we could find absolutely nothing, and no one dared to enter the territory of the Saracens without the escort of a large army.” A similar scarcity in the crusader camp is mentioned by other Western chronicles and was also recorded by the Arab historian Ibn al-Athir, who writes that “the rich fed on their horses and the poor on carcasses and leaves from the trees.” Such a severe state of affairs could have had only one cause—the maritime supply line was interrupted.
The reason for the interruption was not hostile naval operations (the naval fleet of the Egyptian Fatimids, the only Muslim naval force capable of threatening the crusaders’ supply, was not yet at war with them at that time), but the fact that during the winter period (i.e., from roughly the beginning of November to the beginning of March), medieval navigation across the Mediterranean Sea completely ceased due to violent winter storms and dangerous swells. When shipping resumed in the spring of 1098, the crusaders ceased to have fundamental supply problems and finally captured Antioch on July 3, 1098. The subsequent route of the crusader contingents—who basically advanced in close proximity to the Mediterranean coast during their renewed march on Jerusalem in the spring of 1099—likewise shows that the main provisioning of the crusaders with food took place by sea, and that despite the rift between the crusader commanders and the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos over the rule of Antioch, Byzantine ships (alongside Genoese, Venetian, and other fleets from the Latin West) still held a decisive share in it.
Why the Crusaders Needed Byzantium
In view of the misunderstandings and disputes that gradually fractured the original agreement between the crusader commanders and Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, as well as the general mistrust of the rank-and-file participants of the First Crusade toward the Byzantines, Western chroniclers deliberately avoid mentioning the Byzantine “logistical” support, and thus also their significant contribution to the success of the entire campaign. On the contrary, most sources consistently describe the Byzantine emperor as an untrustworthy and cunning politician of a “Machiavellian” type, who, despite agreements concluded in Constantinople at the turn of 1096 and 1097, tended to try to sabotage the progress of the expedition. According to Western chroniclers, proof of this was, for instance, the fact that during the time of the greatest threat to the crusader army in the spring of 1098 beneath the walls of Antioch, he did not come to their aid at the head of the Byzantine army and left them at the mercy of the Seljuks.
Therefore, even in the rare mentions found in the sources regarding the supplying of the crusader army during its march to Jerusalem, but mainly during the siege of Antioch, references occur regarding the arrival of ships with provisions from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, or even from Denmark, Norway, or England, but not a single one from Byzantium. At the same time, it is evident that the main burden of “logistical” support rested precisely on Byzantine officials who organized the loading of food and provisions onto Byzantine ships in Cyprus, as well as onto various ships arriving in the spring of 1098 from the Latin West. Although ships from Venice, Pisa, and Genoa transported their own supplies during their initial voyages to the Eastern Mediterranean, once they became involved in transporting supplies between the island of Cyprus and the crusader contingents, they were under the jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperor, and likewise, the provisions they transported were provided to the crusaders by the Byzantines.
It is quite clear that without the Byzantine “logistical” support provided to the crusaders throughout their entire march to the Holy Land, the crusaders would likely have been unable to conquer Antioch or gain control over the rest of the Levantine coast. They would also likely have failed to capture Jerusalem, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, created to protect Christendom’s holy sites in Palestine, would never have become a reality.
Marek Meško is a historian and researcher specializing in Byzantine warfare during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. His research has examined Byzantium’s conflicts with Turkic nomadic groups, including the Pechenegs and Cumans, before expanding to the military and naval history of the Komnenian dynasty (1081–1185) and the challenges it faced from external enemies. He is the author of Alexios I Komnenos in the Balkans, 1081–1095 and co-author of a comprehensive study on the evolution of the Byzantine navy during the Crusades. His work focuses on the military institutions, campaigns, and strategic developments that shaped the medieval Byzantine Empire. You can follow Marek on Academia.edu and LinkedIn.
Top Image: An army on the First Crusade – BnF MS Français 9084, fol. 20v
The First Crusade brought tens of thousands of people across Byzantine territory, creating an immense challenge of supply and organisation. Marek Meško explains how the Byzantine Empire fed, transported, and supported the crusaders—and why this contribution deserves greater recognition.
By Marek Meško
When the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) began sending urgent appeals for help to the Latin West in 1088 to combat the onslaught of the Seljuk Turks, he hoped for the swift arrival of hundreds, or at best, thousands of well-armed and militarily skilled Western knights. With their assistance, he intended to form new mercenary units and gradually push the Turks back into the interior of Asia Minor. However, his appeals—further amplified by the authority of the new spiritual leader of the Latin West, Pope Urban II (1088–1099)—were answered not by hundreds or thousands, but by tens of thousands of people. The Pope’s call resonated not only with knights and barons but also with the common folk, women, children, and the elderly. Without waiting for the main crusader armies, they abandoned their homes in the spring of 1096 and set out on a march to the Holy Land.
At the Byzantine imperial court in Constantinople, the first reports regarding the march of numerous crusader hordes evoked mixed feelings. Emperor Alexios I Komnenos was, of course, aware of the conclusions of the Council of Clermont, where on November 27, 1095, Pope Urban II called upon the entirety of Western Christendom to participate in an expedition aimed at liberating the Holy Sepulcher from the hands of the infidels. He also possessed reliable intelligence that real, well-armed, and well-equipped crusader armies were assembling and preparing to march across various parts of Western Europe. The emperor’s daughter, Anna Komnene, recorded the measures taken by her father to ensure the undisturbed transit of these armies through Byzantine territory. The emperor summoned the commanders of the Byzantine army and “commanded them to welcome the newcomers in a friendly manner and to provide them with abundant provisions from all regions along the way.”
The gears of the Byzantine bureaucratic state apparatus then spun into full motion. In accordance with the aforementioned imperial decree, supply depots containing food and water were prepared along the projected marching routes of the crusader armies. Despite this, the first two large gatherings of pilgrims, led by Peter the Hermit and the knight Walter the Penniless, presented a massive problem and a troublesome complication. These groups thoroughly tested the efficacy of the Byzantine “logistical” system even before the arrival of the actual crusader army.
The Byzantine “Logistical” System
It goes without saying that the modern term logistics (derived from the Greek word logistike, meaning calculation) did not carry the same meaning in the Middle Ages as it does today, and no similar, independent activity existed that would correspond conceptually to this term—not even within the Byzantine Empire. However, precisely because of a centuries-old bureaucratic apparatus that had, since the days of the ancient Roman Empire, managed to collect taxes fairly efficiently year after year and subsequently redistribute them according to the needs of the state, Byzantine officials possessed relatively decent organizational skills. Naturally, the army, upon whose shoulders rested the defense of Byzantine territory, received its share of the collected taxes. Sustaining the army with financial resources, agricultural products, weaponry, and equipment underwent extensive transformations over the centuries; nevertheless, it always served as a model for new generations of imperial officials in times of need.
At the time of the crusaders’ arrival on Byzantine territory, the entire Byzantine “logistical” system was based on the existence of select imperial estates called episkepseis (pertinentiae in Latin), which were managed by specific officials known from Byzantine sources as episkeptitai. These large estates were typically situated along major transportation routes, road junctions, or in strategically advantageous locations, and they always consisted of extensive pastures near water sources (rivers, lakes). They also included farms where draft animals (horses, mules, hinnies, oxen) as well as various livestock were bred by the tens of thousands. Furthermore, agricultural products from the wide surrounding area were accumulated on these estates so that they could be available at any moment to Byzantine military units marching into battle. Some of these estates also served as assembly points for the Byzantine army prior to major field campaigns.
In the western (European) part of the empire, there were naturally several such assembly points—for instance, near Thessalonica (Thessaloniki), Adrianople (Edirne), Tzouroulon (Çorlu), and near the town of Choirobakchoi (close to the present-day locations of Büyükçekmece and Küçükçekmece). Where episkepseis were not present, nearby towns and villages usually provided the necessary supplies for the army in the form of markets. These markets were organized by local imperial officials, and product prices were strictly regulated.
The First Severe Test
As is generally known, the first encounter between the Byzantine officials tasked with supplying the incoming pilgrims and the undisciplined crowds of the “popular” segment of the crusade under the leadership of the knight Walter the Penniless and Peter the Hermit did not proceed in the friendliest manner. The crusaders arrived on Byzantine territory from an unexpected direction, through the Hungarian Kingdom (rather than across the Adriatic Sea to the port of Dyrrachium, modern-day Durrës in Albania), and their numbers were far greater than what the Byzantines had anticipated. The written sources, however, do not state exactly how many of them marched through the Balkans. Albert of Aachen, one of the later chroniclers of the First Crusade, writes that the pilgrims were “innumerable as the sand in the sea.” Moreover, they lacked unified leadership and were bound together only by a general respect for the person of Peter the Hermit.
Upon their arrival on Byzantine territory, the supplies were not yet ready due to the reasons mentioned above. Consequently, groups of famished and impatient crusaders besieged the Byzantine border fortress of Veligrada (Belgrade) on June 26, 1096, and after a brief siege, captured and burned it. Eventually, Byzantine officials managed to gather the necessary supplies in the city of Naissos (Niš), toward which the crusader hordes headed after plundering Belgrade. Their subsequent journey through Sardica (Sofia) and Philippopolis (Plovdiv) to Constantinople, where the crusaders arrived during August 1096, then proceeded without major incidents. From this, it can be inferred that their food supply operated smoothly and in sufficient quantities. When the Byzantines later transported the crusaders to the Asian shore of the Bosporus, their ongoing regular supply was secured by Byzantine ships, which delivered wine, grain, oats, cheese, and oil to the crusader camp in Civetot.
The March of the Crusader Armies through the Balkans
The march of the individual crusader contingents across the Balkans, led by Hugh of Vermandois (brother of King Philip I of France), Godfrey of Bouillon, the Norman Duke Robert Curthose, Count Raymond of Toulouse from Aquitaine, Bohemond (son of the Norman Duke Robert Guiscard), and others—and their arrival beneath the walls of Constantinople between the autumn of 1096 and the spring of 1097 proceeded in a much more orderly fashion. Their contingents did not march together but rather along three separate routes. The first route essentially replicated the path taken by the crowds under Peter the Hermit (this was chosen by Godfrey of Bouillon and his retinue). The second route passed through modern-day Croatia and Bosnia to Dyrrachium, and from there along the old Roman road, the Via Egnatia, through Thessalonica, Rhousion (Rusköy), and Rhaidestos (Tekirdağ) to Constantinople (the contingent of Raymond of Toulouse). The third route led through southern Italy and, after crossing the Strait of Otranto, reached Dyrrachium, where it merged with the second route (the contingents of Hugh of Vermandois, Bohemond, Robert Curthose, and Count Robert of Flanders).
On Byzantine territory, wherever they went (with a few exceptions), markets organized by Byzantine officials awaited them, where they could purchase necessary provisions at fixed prices. Despite the fact that these armies advanced separately—thereby, in a way, easing the work of the Byzantines who oversaw their provisioning—the performance of the Byzantine administration must be evaluated as outstanding, given that the total number of crusaders assembled in the spring of 1097 is estimated to be as high as 60,000 (with the lowest estimate being 30,000 crusaders).
Inhospitable Anatolia
Before a wave of Turkish nomads poured across the eastern Byzantine border during the 1070s, Asia Minor (Anatolia) belonged to the core territory of the Byzantine Empire. Despite the hot and dry climate, river valleys were lined with strips of agriculturally cultivated land, and just as in the European half of the empire, here too, at various places and intersections of important roads, episkepseis existed and functioned—the previously mentioned imperial estates intended for supplying units of the Byzantine army. However, a mere quarter-century following the Battle of Manzikert (1071) was enough for extensive and irreversible changes to take place in this region.
By the time the crusader contingents arrived, the Seljuk seizure of Asia Minor was already consolidated. Except for a narrow coastal strip lining the Marmara and Aegean Seas, all former eastern Byzantine provinces were in the power of the Seljuk Sultan Kilij Arslan ibn Suleiman ibn Qutalmish (1092–1107) and his rivals, the Turkish Danishmend emirs. Mobile Turkish horsemen controlled all important communication routes, and more importantly, their nomadic way of life based on extensive cattle breeding, as well as constant raids on the settled Byzantine population living under their dominance, contributed significantly to the reduction of agriculturally cultivated land in the Anatolian interior. During the late spring and especially the hot summer months, this region transformed into an arid and inhospitable steppe.
For these reasons, it is evident that supplying the crusader contingents during their transit across Asia Minor represented an insurmountable problem for the Byzantines. Up to Nicaea, the necessary provisions were prepared along the crusaders’ marching route. After that—that is, after crossing into Seljuk territory—the marching crusader ranks and a small detachment of the Byzantine army led by General Tatikios managed to subsist on their own provisions for approximately 20 days (according to 10th-century Byzantine military manuals, this was the duration a Byzantine army was supposed to be capable of operating in enemy territory without the possibility of obtaining any supplies from local sources).
However, the march across arid Anatolia ultimately took the crusaders roughly twice as long. The Turks systematically destroyed almost everything that could serve as food for the crusaders. An exception to this difficult supply situation was the area around the city of Ikonion (Konya), which the crusaders captured on August 15, 1097, finding plenty of food as well as much-needed water. It is therefore no wonder that chroniclers of the First Crusade consistently report on the immense hardship and deprivation (especially of water) that plagued the crusader contingents on their march through Anatolia.
Typical in this regard is the testimony contained in the chronicle Gesta Francorum by an anonymous author: “Hunger and thirst pinched us on all sides, and there was nothing for us to eat, except by chance we could pluck and grind grain with our hands, and thus continue our wretched existence as best we could.” Many participants of the expedition died of thirst, but the horses and draft animals suffered the most. As a result of these losses, the crusaders then faced such a severe shortage of animals that many knights had to fight on mules, donkeys, or as infantrymen instead of on horseback.
The Siege of Antioch
As soon as the crusader contingents passed through the gates of the Taurus Mountains and descended into Cilicia and the plains of northern Syria, their supply situation improved once more. On one hand, this area was rich in agricultural products and stocks of various foods, and on the other, the crusaders found themselves near the Mediterranean coast again, which enabled their supply by sea. The Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos ensured that the crusaders were regularly supplied by cargo and merchant ships, which transported necessary provisions from nearby Cyprus.
Meanwhile, the larger part of the crusader army (except for the detachment of Baldwin of Boulogne, who set off to occupy Edessa, today Urfa) proceeded to besiege Antioch on October 21, 1097. Concurrently, even before the start of the siege, the crusaders seized the port of St. Symeon, located at the mouth of the Orontes River and at a distance of only about 27 km from Antioch. They thereby secured a permanent influx of provisions, which ships brought daily from Cyprus. To fully satisfy the 60,000-strong crusader army, it was entirely sufficient for one cargo ship with a displacement of approximately 100 tons to sail into the port of St. Symeon each day. In the port, these provisions were either loaded onto river barges or onto large four-wheeled horse-drawn wagons, which then transported them upriver into the crusader camp.
Initially, the crusader army did not suffer from want. The surrounding area of Antioch was very intensively cultivated agriculturally, and at the time of the crusaders’ arrival in late October 1097, plenty of food supplies were accessible everywhere because the growing season had recently ended. The crusader army had an abundance of grain, wine, oil, and other provisions.
Around Christmas, however, according to the chronicle Gesta Francorum, the situation changed radically: “Before the birth of the Lord, grain and all food became incredibly expensive. We did not dare to venture out (from the camp); in the territory of the Christians, we could find absolutely nothing, and no one dared to enter the territory of the Saracens without the escort of a large army.” A similar scarcity in the crusader camp is mentioned by other Western chronicles and was also recorded by the Arab historian Ibn al-Athir, who writes that “the rich fed on their horses and the poor on carcasses and leaves from the trees.” Such a severe state of affairs could have had only one cause—the maritime supply line was interrupted.
The reason for the interruption was not hostile naval operations (the naval fleet of the Egyptian Fatimids, the only Muslim naval force capable of threatening the crusaders’ supply, was not yet at war with them at that time), but the fact that during the winter period (i.e., from roughly the beginning of November to the beginning of March), medieval navigation across the Mediterranean Sea completely ceased due to violent winter storms and dangerous swells. When shipping resumed in the spring of 1098, the crusaders ceased to have fundamental supply problems and finally captured Antioch on July 3, 1098. The subsequent route of the crusader contingents—who basically advanced in close proximity to the Mediterranean coast during their renewed march on Jerusalem in the spring of 1099—likewise shows that the main provisioning of the crusaders with food took place by sea, and that despite the rift between the crusader commanders and the Byzantine Emperor Alexios I Komnenos over the rule of Antioch, Byzantine ships (alongside Genoese, Venetian, and other fleets from the Latin West) still held a decisive share in it.
Why the Crusaders Needed Byzantium
In view of the misunderstandings and disputes that gradually fractured the original agreement between the crusader commanders and Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, as well as the general mistrust of the rank-and-file participants of the First Crusade toward the Byzantines, Western chroniclers deliberately avoid mentioning the Byzantine “logistical” support, and thus also their significant contribution to the success of the entire campaign. On the contrary, most sources consistently describe the Byzantine emperor as an untrustworthy and cunning politician of a “Machiavellian” type, who, despite agreements concluded in Constantinople at the turn of 1096 and 1097, tended to try to sabotage the progress of the expedition. According to Western chroniclers, proof of this was, for instance, the fact that during the time of the greatest threat to the crusader army in the spring of 1098 beneath the walls of Antioch, he did not come to their aid at the head of the Byzantine army and left them at the mercy of the Seljuks.
Therefore, even in the rare mentions found in the sources regarding the supplying of the crusader army during its march to Jerusalem, but mainly during the siege of Antioch, references occur regarding the arrival of ships with provisions from Genoa, Pisa, Venice, or even from Denmark, Norway, or England, but not a single one from Byzantium. At the same time, it is evident that the main burden of “logistical” support rested precisely on Byzantine officials who organized the loading of food and provisions onto Byzantine ships in Cyprus, as well as onto various ships arriving in the spring of 1098 from the Latin West. Although ships from Venice, Pisa, and Genoa transported their own supplies during their initial voyages to the Eastern Mediterranean, once they became involved in transporting supplies between the island of Cyprus and the crusader contingents, they were under the jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperor, and likewise, the provisions they transported were provided to the crusaders by the Byzantines.
It is quite clear that without the Byzantine “logistical” support provided to the crusaders throughout their entire march to the Holy Land, the crusaders would likely have been unable to conquer Antioch or gain control over the rest of the Levantine coast. They would also likely have failed to capture Jerusalem, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, created to protect Christendom’s holy sites in Palestine, would never have become a reality.
Marek Meško is a historian and researcher specializing in Byzantine warfare during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. His research has examined Byzantium’s conflicts with Turkic nomadic groups, including the Pechenegs and Cumans, before expanding to the military and naval history of the Komnenian dynasty (1081–1185) and the challenges it faced from external enemies. He is the author of Alexios I Komnenos in the Balkans, 1081–1095 and co-author of a comprehensive study on the evolution of the Byzantine navy during the Crusades. His work focuses on the military institutions, campaigns, and strategic developments that shaped the medieval Byzantine Empire. You can follow Marek on Academia.edu and LinkedIn.
Top Image: An army on the First Crusade – BnF MS Français 9084, fol. 20v
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