In 777–778, Charlemagne launched an ambitious campaign into Muslim-controlled Spain, hoping to expand Frankish power south of the Pyrenees. Instead, the expedition ended in failure and culminated in the famous ambush at Roncevaux Pass.
By David Bachrach
Charlemagne (768-814) enjoyed consistent, indeed, almost uniform military success throughout his 46-year-reign. Even in his decades of wars in Saxony, each stage of the conflict ended with a Carolingian military victory and the submission of various Saxon factions. One campaign, however, stands out as an abject failure in which Charlemagne achieved none of his military goals and suffered significant losses. This was the failed effort during the spring and summer of 778 to secure control over the fortress cities along the Ebro River valley in Spain, including Pamplona, Saragossa, Huesca, and Lérida. This campaign gained enduring fame from the romantic legend that grew up around the annihilation of the Frankish baggage train by Basque forces. Among the commanders of the rearguard of Charlemagne’s army was Roland, praefectus of the Breton March, the eponymous hero of the Song of Roland.
Charlemagne had gone from strength to strength in the decade before the Ebro campaign. He secured Carolingian rule in Aquitaine following the death of his father Pippin I in 768, conquered the Lombard Kingdom, and gained what he thought was a decisive victory over the Saxons. However, Charlemagne, like his father before him, was concerned about the southwestern frontier of the regnum Francorum along the Pyrenees.
The establishment of the Umayyad caliphate in exile by Abd al-Rachman I (756-788) had the potential to reignite the Muslim effort to conquer the lands north of the Pyrenees that had been lost to Pippin and his father Charles Martel in the two decades following the Frankish victory at the battle of Poitiers (732) and the death in battle of the Muslim governor in Spain, Abd ar-Rachman al-Ghafiqi.
The Political Landscape in al-Andalus
Map of Europe in 771 – image by Richard Ishida / Wikimedia Commons
Abd al-Rachman faced significant challenges in his effort to establish his rule, facing opposition from Yusuf ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri, who had been the Umayyad governor in Spain and seized control in his own name following the massacre of most of the Umayyad family by the Abbasids in 750. However, following the death of al-Fihri in 759, Abd al-Rachman gradually extended his control, and began to threaten the Muslim ruling elite in the cities of northern Spain, which had gained de facto autonomy.
It is in this context that a delegation of Muslim leaders, headed by Sulayman ibn Yaqzan al-A‘rabi, ruler of the cities of Girona and Barcelona, and al-Husayn ibn Yahya ibn Sa‘d ibn ‘Ubada, the governor of Saragossa, travelled to Charlemagne’s Christmas court at Paderborn in the winter of 776-777. Sulayman, al-Husayn, and their fellow leaders offered Charlemagne the opportunity to extend his rule to the fortress cities of the Ebro valley as well as those on the Mediterranean coast, including Girona, Barcelona, and Tarragona in return for allowing them to maintain their autonomy.
Charlemagne, who was well informed about the success of Abd al-Rachman in uniting southern Spain under his rule, saw this invitation as an opportunity to extend his power south of the Pyrenees and also to deny the resources of the wealthy northern cities to the Umayyad ruler, thereby blunting any effort to restore the Muslim position as it had existed before 732. The Carolingian ruler immediately began planning for the campaign that would involve two separate armies.
The first of these, which included soldiers mobilized from many regions of the regnum Francorum, including Austrasia in the northeast, Bavaria in the southeast, Northern Italy, Burgundy as well as Provence and Septimania along the southern coast of modern France. The second army, under Charlemagne’s direct command, included forces from Neustria, Aquitaine, and Gascony.
The Frankish March into Spain
The Spanish March and surrounding regions during the time of Charlemagne. Roncevaux Pass (labeled Roseida Vallis on this map) is to the northeast of Pamplona (Pampilona) – image by Janitoalevic / Wikimedia Commons
The first army successfully marched along the old Roman Via Augusta, through the cities of Ampurias, Gerona, Barcelona, and finally Tarragona, located at the mouth of the Ebro River into the Mediterranean Sea. During this first stage of the campaign, Sulayman kept to the terms of the agreement at Paderborn and facilitated the march of the Christian army. Following the plan that had been developed during 777, this first army then began its march from Tarragona up the Ebro valley.
In the meantime, the army under Charlemagne’s direct command mobilized at Bayonne, located on the Bay of Biscay, and then marched along the coast to San Sebastian, following the old Roman road. When Charlemagne reached Pamplona, the city leaders surrendered to him, consistent with the terms of the Paderborn agreement. From Pamplona, Charlemagne marched down the Ebro valley and joined forces with the first army at Saragossa.
Up to this point, the spring campaign had been an unqualified success. The two Carolingian armies had achieved all their objectives, receiving the surrender of numerous fortress cities along the Mediterranean coast and up and down the valley of the Ebro. However, once the two forces were united, al-Husayn refused to honor his obligations and opened the gates of Saragossa to Charlemagne.
Late 15th-century tapestry depicting the Battle of Roncevaux Pass – photo by Sailko / Wikimedia Commons
At this point, Charlemagne had several options, none of which were appealing. He could prepare to storm the walls of Saragossa, after preparing the appropriate equipment including ladders and various types of engines. Such an attack likely would have been successful given the size of the Carolingian army. However, the losses almost certainly would have been very heavy, likely running to the thousands of killed and wounded.
A second option was to settle in for a lengthy siege of the fortress city, which could easily have lasted for a year, or longer. Such an operation posed considerable risks, as the Carolingian army was at the end of an extended supply line that ran through potentially hostile territory. This option could prove particularly problematic if other Muslim leaders also decided to renege on their agreements with Charlemagne.
Ultimately, Charlemagne decided on the third option, which was to withdraw. The forces that had marched up the Ebro valley from Tarragona returned home without incident, as Sulayman appears to have decided against following the lead of al-Husayn and treacherously abandoning his agreement with Charlemagne. By contrast, the rear-guard and baggage train of the army under Charlemagne’s direct command was ambushed by Basques at the Roncevaux pass through the Pyrenees, about 45 kilometres northwest of Pamplona. Among the dead, as discussed above, was Roland.
The campaign of 778, although highlighting many of the strengths of Carolingian military organization, including excellent planning and a very effective logistical system, also revealed the dangers of relying on the support of a foreign ruler. Charlemagne’s decision to take this risk can perhaps be understood as resulting from his numerous military successes over the previous decade and his belief that God was on his side.
The highly risky choice of deploying large armies beyond the frontier on the basis of promises offered by a coterie of rulers with their own interests, was utterly out of character with Carolingian military doctrine up to this point. Charlemagne, following in the tradition of his father and grandfather, had focused during the previous decade on methodical operations and the assimilation of conquered lands before moving on to the next target.
Charlemagne’s strategy in the two decades following the debacle at Saragossa makes clear that he learned his lesson. He immediately put into place an administrative apparatus in the southwest of his realm to organize military resources within Aquitaine and Gascony for sustained military operations against Muslim-held cities and other strongholds south of the Pyrenees. This new system included the establishment of a new military march, with its headquarters at Toulouse.
The numerous military operations, which included blue-water naval actions that resulted in the capture of the Balearic islands, led ultimately to the capture of the fortress city of Barcelona in 801, and subsequently to the capture of numerous strongholds inland, laying the foundation for the new march of Catalonia south of the Pyrenees.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
David S. Bachrach and Bernard S. Bachrach, Warfare in Medieval Europe c. 400-c.1453, second revised and expanded edition (London, 2021), particularly chapter 8.
In 777–778, Charlemagne launched an ambitious campaign into Muslim-controlled Spain, hoping to expand Frankish power south of the Pyrenees. Instead, the expedition ended in failure and culminated in the famous ambush at Roncevaux Pass.
By David Bachrach
Charlemagne (768-814) enjoyed consistent, indeed, almost uniform military success throughout his 46-year-reign. Even in his decades of wars in Saxony, each stage of the conflict ended with a Carolingian military victory and the submission of various Saxon factions. One campaign, however, stands out as an abject failure in which Charlemagne achieved none of his military goals and suffered significant losses. This was the failed effort during the spring and summer of 778 to secure control over the fortress cities along the Ebro River valley in Spain, including Pamplona, Saragossa, Huesca, and Lérida. This campaign gained enduring fame from the romantic legend that grew up around the annihilation of the Frankish baggage train by Basque forces. Among the commanders of the rearguard of Charlemagne’s army was Roland, praefectus of the Breton March, the eponymous hero of the Song of Roland.
Charlemagne had gone from strength to strength in the decade before the Ebro campaign. He secured Carolingian rule in Aquitaine following the death of his father Pippin I in 768, conquered the Lombard Kingdom, and gained what he thought was a decisive victory over the Saxons. However, Charlemagne, like his father before him, was concerned about the southwestern frontier of the regnum Francorum along the Pyrenees.
The establishment of the Umayyad caliphate in exile by Abd al-Rachman I (756-788) had the potential to reignite the Muslim effort to conquer the lands north of the Pyrenees that had been lost to Pippin and his father Charles Martel in the two decades following the Frankish victory at the battle of Poitiers (732) and the death in battle of the Muslim governor in Spain, Abd ar-Rachman al-Ghafiqi.
The Political Landscape in al-Andalus
Abd al-Rachman faced significant challenges in his effort to establish his rule, facing opposition from Yusuf ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Fihri, who had been the Umayyad governor in Spain and seized control in his own name following the massacre of most of the Umayyad family by the Abbasids in 750. However, following the death of al-Fihri in 759, Abd al-Rachman gradually extended his control, and began to threaten the Muslim ruling elite in the cities of northern Spain, which had gained de facto autonomy.
It is in this context that a delegation of Muslim leaders, headed by Sulayman ibn Yaqzan al-A‘rabi, ruler of the cities of Girona and Barcelona, and al-Husayn ibn Yahya ibn Sa‘d ibn ‘Ubada, the governor of Saragossa, travelled to Charlemagne’s Christmas court at Paderborn in the winter of 776-777. Sulayman, al-Husayn, and their fellow leaders offered Charlemagne the opportunity to extend his rule to the fortress cities of the Ebro valley as well as those on the Mediterranean coast, including Girona, Barcelona, and Tarragona in return for allowing them to maintain their autonomy.
Charlemagne, who was well informed about the success of Abd al-Rachman in uniting southern Spain under his rule, saw this invitation as an opportunity to extend his power south of the Pyrenees and also to deny the resources of the wealthy northern cities to the Umayyad ruler, thereby blunting any effort to restore the Muslim position as it had existed before 732. The Carolingian ruler immediately began planning for the campaign that would involve two separate armies.
The first of these, which included soldiers mobilized from many regions of the regnum Francorum, including Austrasia in the northeast, Bavaria in the southeast, Northern Italy, Burgundy as well as Provence and Septimania along the southern coast of modern France. The second army, under Charlemagne’s direct command, included forces from Neustria, Aquitaine, and Gascony.
The Frankish March into Spain
The first army successfully marched along the old Roman Via Augusta, through the cities of Ampurias, Gerona, Barcelona, and finally Tarragona, located at the mouth of the Ebro River into the Mediterranean Sea. During this first stage of the campaign, Sulayman kept to the terms of the agreement at Paderborn and facilitated the march of the Christian army. Following the plan that had been developed during 777, this first army then began its march from Tarragona up the Ebro valley.
In the meantime, the army under Charlemagne’s direct command mobilized at Bayonne, located on the Bay of Biscay, and then marched along the coast to San Sebastian, following the old Roman road. When Charlemagne reached Pamplona, the city leaders surrendered to him, consistent with the terms of the Paderborn agreement. From Pamplona, Charlemagne marched down the Ebro valley and joined forces with the first army at Saragossa.
Up to this point, the spring campaign had been an unqualified success. The two Carolingian armies had achieved all their objectives, receiving the surrender of numerous fortress cities along the Mediterranean coast and up and down the valley of the Ebro. However, once the two forces were united, al-Husayn refused to honor his obligations and opened the gates of Saragossa to Charlemagne.
At this point, Charlemagne had several options, none of which were appealing. He could prepare to storm the walls of Saragossa, after preparing the appropriate equipment including ladders and various types of engines. Such an attack likely would have been successful given the size of the Carolingian army. However, the losses almost certainly would have been very heavy, likely running to the thousands of killed and wounded.
A second option was to settle in for a lengthy siege of the fortress city, which could easily have lasted for a year, or longer. Such an operation posed considerable risks, as the Carolingian army was at the end of an extended supply line that ran through potentially hostile territory. This option could prove particularly problematic if other Muslim leaders also decided to renege on their agreements with Charlemagne.
Ultimately, Charlemagne decided on the third option, which was to withdraw. The forces that had marched up the Ebro valley from Tarragona returned home without incident, as Sulayman appears to have decided against following the lead of al-Husayn and treacherously abandoning his agreement with Charlemagne. By contrast, the rear-guard and baggage train of the army under Charlemagne’s direct command was ambushed by Basques at the Roncevaux pass through the Pyrenees, about 45 kilometres northwest of Pamplona. Among the dead, as discussed above, was Roland.
The campaign of 778, although highlighting many of the strengths of Carolingian military organization, including excellent planning and a very effective logistical system, also revealed the dangers of relying on the support of a foreign ruler. Charlemagne’s decision to take this risk can perhaps be understood as resulting from his numerous military successes over the previous decade and his belief that God was on his side.
The highly risky choice of deploying large armies beyond the frontier on the basis of promises offered by a coterie of rulers with their own interests, was utterly out of character with Carolingian military doctrine up to this point. Charlemagne, following in the tradition of his father and grandfather, had focused during the previous decade on methodical operations and the assimilation of conquered lands before moving on to the next target.
Charlemagne’s strategy in the two decades following the debacle at Saragossa makes clear that he learned his lesson. He immediately put into place an administrative apparatus in the southwest of his realm to organize military resources within Aquitaine and Gascony for sustained military operations against Muslim-held cities and other strongholds south of the Pyrenees. This new system included the establishment of a new military march, with its headquarters at Toulouse.
The numerous military operations, which included blue-water naval actions that resulted in the capture of the Balearic islands, led ultimately to the capture of the fortress city of Barcelona in 801, and subsequently to the capture of numerous strongholds inland, laying the foundation for the new march of Catalonia south of the Pyrenees.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
Click here to read more from David Bachrach
Further Readings:
David S. Bachrach and Bernard S. Bachrach, Warfare in Medieval Europe c. 400-c.1453, second revised and expanded edition (London, 2021), particularly chapter 8.
Cullen J. Chandler, “Between Courts and Counts: Carolingian Catalonia and the Aprisio Grant, 778-897,” Early Medieval Europe 11.1 (2002), 19-44.
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