The Templars were forbidden to engage in fighting against other Christians. Shockingly, however, the Templar Master Brian le Jay died fighting for Edward I against the Scots in 1298. How was this possible and what did it mean?
Edward I, King of England, was a restless, natural warrior with the potential to become the leader of multiple crusades. He had led an expedition to the Holy Land in 1271-1272, sometimes called the Ninth Crusade. But by 1291, before he could return to the East, Acre and the other Frankish fortresses had fallen into enemy hands. The Latin East was lost.
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This was an unprepossessing backdrop against which to launch another crusade – an already difficult situation was beginning to look as though it had become completely impossible. Edward could not gather momentum to get a new English crusade underway after 1291 – but then neither could any other European ruler.
Portrait in Westminster Abbey, thought to be of Edward I
Instead, Edward turned to war against Scotland. He saw Scotland as a client state, more like one of his northern baronies than an independent kingdom. He claimed the right to act as judge and arbiter in all important Scottish matters. The Templars knew who to favour in this conflict. It is perhaps no coincidence that, at this point, Robert of Turville, the English master and the most senior Templar in the province, began in 1286 to use the title ‘Master of England, Scotland and Ireland’.
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The next two masters, Guy Forest (1291–4) and his successor Brian le Jay (1296–8), both used the provocative title of ‘Master of the Templars in England, to whom the other houses in Scotland, Ireland or in Wales are subject’. William de la More, the last British Templar master, also adopted the title, and he too was at pains to emphasise the dependent relationship of the non-English parts of the Templar province.
This largely mirrored reality. When the order was closed down, there were found to be only two Templars in Scotland, both of whom seem to have been English. The general chapter in England had oversight over the other parts of the province, even down to the level of supervising and confirming relatively small grants of land in Scotland. But it had never felt necessary to emphasise the subsidiary status of the other parts of Britain quite so brutally.
In part this was just a reflection of the power politics of the time. The English king had far more resources than other parts of the British Isles. And Edward was the only monarch in the region capable of launching, funding or leading a crusade. In this context it was not irrational for the Templars to prioritise their relationship with the English crown. Previously, however, they had felt able to do so while maintaining equally good relationships with the Scottish kings – the order had, after all, wide-ranging property assets, extensive privileges and almost 200 years of goodwill to protect in the Scottish realm.
By 1291, as the last Christian fortresses in the East collapsed, matters reached a logical but perplexing conclusion. Brian le Jay (at that point master of the Templars in Scotland), took an oath of fealty to King Edward. In itself this was not unusual. This oath obliged him to raise a certain number of soldiers on the king’s behalf – but again this was entirely normal. It represented Brian’s obligations as a landowner, rather than a more substantial commitment by the Templars as an institution.
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It certainly did not commit Brian or the Templar brethren to fight personally on the king’s behalf. On the contrary, there were strict instructions forbidding any of the military orders from taking up arms against fellow Christians. But the master pushed things further than any of his predecessors. The Templar preceptories in the north were offered as staging posts and logistics depots for Edward’s soldiers heading off on their Scottish campaigns. Finally, in a demonstration of brutal partisanship, Brian (by this time master of the entire British province) followed the king on campaign in Scotland.
Shockingly, the Templar master died fighting alongside Edward at the English victory at the Battle of Falkirk on 22 July 1298.
The matter was not entirely clear cut. When Brian le Jay took his oath of fealty to Edward I he was not alone – he did so alongside the Hospitaller commander in Scotland and many other senior religious figures. Similarly, although he took two companions with him (Peter of Suthchirche and Thomas of Caune) on the Falkirk campaign, which culminated in his death, neither of his two military comrades were Templars – they are not referred to as ‘brothers’ (or fratres).
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Both the Templars and the Hospitallers had previously been involved in Edward I’s wars – and this was perhaps a reflection of Edward’s senior status within the crusading movement as a whole. Richard Poitevin, for instance, a Templar brother and the lieutenant-commander of the Temple in England, seems to have been involved in military action on the king’s behalf in Wales in 1282. So too were the Hospitallers in 1294–5.
Brian le Jay probably just got carried away. He performed personal service for the crown in his capacity as an enthusiastic warrior and a loyal subject. But the fact that the master of the British Templars felt able to do so, even to the extent of fighting in person, was ominous. This was a sign that the ties that bound the order together, and the singular objective that sustained it, were unravelling.
As individuals, the British Templars were predominantly Anglo-Normans and, as the order began to lose its strategic focus after the loss of the Latin East, they increasingly acted like it. They had become biased, particularly with regard to the government of England. While resources were needed to shore up the crusader states on an almost daily basis, such behaviour made sense. Influence at the English court could be converted into tangible benefits for the crusading movement.
With the loss of that central objective, however, the partisan nature of the order’s engagement in the province became more visibly just that – provincial and partisan, with far fewer redeeming features. The British Templars were turning inward and becoming more nationalistically focused.
Dr Steve Tibble is a graduate of Jesus College, Cambridge and London University. He is an Honorary Research Associate at Royal Holloway College, University of London. Steve is a leading authority on warfare and violence in the crusading era.
He is a contributor to ‘The Cambridge History of the Crusades’ and ‘The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades’, both forthcoming in 2023. You can learn more about Steve on his personal website, or follow him on Twitter or Instagram.
Further Reading:
Nicholson, H., ‘The Military Orders in Wales and the Welsh March in the Middle Ages’, in The Military Orders, vol. 5, ed. P. W. Edbury, Farnham, 2012, pp. 189–207
By Steve Tibble
The Templars were forbidden to engage in fighting against other Christians. Shockingly, however, the Templar Master Brian le Jay died fighting for Edward I against the Scots in 1298. How was this possible and what did it mean?
Edward I, King of England, was a restless, natural warrior with the potential to become the leader of multiple crusades. He had led an expedition to the Holy Land in 1271-1272, sometimes called the Ninth Crusade. But by 1291, before he could return to the East, Acre and the other Frankish fortresses had fallen into enemy hands. The Latin East was lost.
This was an unprepossessing backdrop against which to launch another crusade – an already difficult situation was beginning to look as though it had become completely impossible. Edward could not gather momentum to get a new English crusade underway after 1291 – but then neither could any other European ruler.
Instead, Edward turned to war against Scotland. He saw Scotland as a client state, more like one of his northern baronies than an independent kingdom. He claimed the right to act as judge and arbiter in all important Scottish matters. The Templars knew who to favour in this conflict. It is perhaps no coincidence that, at this point, Robert of Turville, the English master and the most senior Templar in the province, began in 1286 to use the title ‘Master of England, Scotland and Ireland’.
The next two masters, Guy Forest (1291–4) and his successor Brian le Jay (1296–8), both used the provocative title of ‘Master of the Templars in England, to whom the other houses in Scotland, Ireland or in Wales are subject’. William de la More, the last British Templar master, also adopted the title, and he too was at pains to emphasise the dependent relationship of the non-English parts of the Templar province.
This largely mirrored reality. When the order was closed down, there were found to be only two Templars in Scotland, both of whom seem to have been English. The general chapter in England had oversight over the other parts of the province, even down to the level of supervising and confirming relatively small grants of land in Scotland. But it had never felt necessary to emphasise the subsidiary status of the other parts of Britain quite so brutally.
In part this was just a reflection of the power politics of the time. The English king had far more resources than other parts of the British Isles. And Edward was the only monarch in the region capable of launching, funding or leading a crusade. In this context it was not irrational for the Templars to prioritise their relationship with the English crown. Previously, however, they had felt able to do so while maintaining equally good relationships with the Scottish kings – the order had, after all, wide-ranging property assets, extensive privileges and almost 200 years of goodwill to protect in the Scottish realm.
By 1291, as the last Christian fortresses in the East collapsed, matters reached a logical but perplexing conclusion. Brian le Jay (at that point master of the Templars in Scotland), took an oath of fealty to King Edward. In itself this was not unusual. This oath obliged him to raise a certain number of soldiers on the king’s behalf – but again this was entirely normal. It represented Brian’s obligations as a landowner, rather than a more substantial commitment by the Templars as an institution.
It certainly did not commit Brian or the Templar brethren to fight personally on the king’s behalf. On the contrary, there were strict instructions forbidding any of the military orders from taking up arms against fellow Christians. But the master pushed things further than any of his predecessors. The Templar preceptories in the north were offered as staging posts and logistics depots for Edward’s soldiers heading off on their Scottish campaigns. Finally, in a demonstration of brutal partisanship, Brian (by this time master of the entire British province) followed the king on campaign in Scotland.
Shockingly, the Templar master died fighting alongside Edward at the English victory at the Battle of Falkirk on 22 July 1298.
The matter was not entirely clear cut. When Brian le Jay took his oath of fealty to Edward I he was not alone – he did so alongside the Hospitaller commander in Scotland and many other senior religious figures. Similarly, although he took two companions with him (Peter of Suthchirche and Thomas of Caune) on the Falkirk campaign, which culminated in his death, neither of his two military comrades were Templars – they are not referred to as ‘brothers’ (or fratres).
Both the Templars and the Hospitallers had previously been involved in Edward I’s wars – and this was perhaps a reflection of Edward’s senior status within the crusading movement as a whole. Richard Poitevin, for instance, a Templar brother and the lieutenant-commander of the Temple in England, seems to have been involved in military action on the king’s behalf in Wales in 1282. So too were the Hospitallers in 1294–5.
Brian le Jay probably just got carried away. He performed personal service for the crown in his capacity as an enthusiastic warrior and a loyal subject. But the fact that the master of the British Templars felt able to do so, even to the extent of fighting in person, was ominous. This was a sign that the ties that bound the order together, and the singular objective that sustained it, were unravelling.
As individuals, the British Templars were predominantly Anglo-Normans and, as the order began to lose its strategic focus after the loss of the Latin East, they increasingly acted like it. They had become biased, particularly with regard to the government of England. While resources were needed to shore up the crusader states on an almost daily basis, such behaviour made sense. Influence at the English court could be converted into tangible benefits for the crusading movement.
With the loss of that central objective, however, the partisan nature of the order’s engagement in the province became more visibly just that – provincial and partisan, with far fewer redeeming features. The British Templars were turning inward and becoming more nationalistically focused.
They were losing their way.
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Yale University Press
Dr Steve Tibble is a graduate of Jesus College, Cambridge and London University. He is an Honorary Research Associate at Royal Holloway College, University of London. Steve is a leading authority on warfare and violence in the crusading era.
His Templars: The Knights Who Made Britain (Yale) is due out in September 2023, and his two most recent books (‘The Crusader Armies’, Yale 2018, and ‘The Crusader Strategy’, Yale 2020) were received to critical acclaim. The latter was short-listed for the Duke of Wellington’s military history award, 2021.
He is a contributor to ‘The Cambridge History of the Crusades’ and ‘The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades’, both forthcoming in 2023. You can learn more about Steve on his personal website, or follow him on Twitter or Instagram.
Further Reading:
Nicholson, H., ‘The Military Orders in Wales and the Welsh March in the Middle Ages’, in The Military Orders, vol. 5, ed. P. W. Edbury, Farnham, 2012, pp. 189–207
Nicholson, H., ‘The Hospitallers’ and Templars’ Involvement in Warfare on the Frontiers of the British Isles in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries’, in Ordines Militares: Colloquia Torunensia Historica: Yearbook for the Study of the Military Orders, 17, Torun, 2012, 105–19
Prestwich, M., Edward I, London, 1997
Tibble, S., Templars – The Knights Who Made Britain, London, 2023
Top Image: Bodleian Library MS. Bodl. Rolls 3
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