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The Warlord Missionary: Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi and the Rise of the Qaramita of Bahrayn

By Adam Ali

Fierce desert tribesmen, united by a sectarian missionary, emerged in Eastern Arabia in the 9th century. Under the leadership of this warlord missionary, they established a powerful predatory polity in Bahrayn that would terrorize the neighboring regions for 150 years. 

The Qaramita, or Abu Sa‘idis, were a sectarian group that dominated the region of Bahrayn for two centuries from the late 9th to 11th centuries. They were radical dissidents who had parted ways with the Fatimid branch of the Isma‘ili movement. The region of Bahrayn, during this period, was much larger than the modern nation-state and encompassed most of Eastern Arabia from Basra to ‘Uman. On the other hand, today the country that carries the name Bahrayn (spelled Bahrain), is a small, encompassing a group of islands in the Persian Gulf, which formed only a very small fraction of medieval Bahrayn.

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The Qaramita left no written accounts of their history. In fact, they are referred to as “Qaramita” (Anglicized as “Qarmatians”) by their critics and enemies. This name/title is a generalization for the branch of the Isma‘ili sectarians that opposed the claims of the Fatimids to the imamate and encompasses several groups of Isma‘ili dissidents. This title was derived from the name of one of the chief Isma‘ili missionaries based in Iraq, Hamdan Qarmat, who opposed the Fatimids.

The Qaramita of Bahrayn were visited in 1051 by the Iranian Isma‘ili scholar, philosopher, writer and traveler, Nasir-i Khusraw. When he asked them how they identified themselves and to what religion they belonged, they responded “we are Abu Sa’idis.” They did not identify themselves as Qaramita, nor did they affiliate themselves with Hamdan Qarmat. Their identification as “Abu Sa‘idis” is derived from the name of their leader and the missionary who converted them, Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi.

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Under his leadership, the tribes that joined his movement were able to create a powerful polity in Bahrayn that lasted from 899 to 1076. In this article and the following article, this group will continue to be referred to as “Qaramita” for consistency and familiarity because most of the primary sources and modern scholarship refer to them as such.

Although they emerged as a regional power in eastern Arabia and lost much of their power, influence, and military potency by the late 10th century, the Qaramita, for more than a century, were major players in the military, economic, and religious struggles of the central regions of the Muslim world. They even seriously challenged the integrity of both the Abbasid and Fatimid caliphates, the most powerful of the Muslim polities at the time, directly threatening and almost taking their capitals, Baghdad and Cairo.

Background: A Double Schism in the Shia Sect

The origins of the Shia sect can be traced back to early Islamic history to the disagreement over the succession to the leadership of the Muslim community after the death of the prophet Muhammad. During this early period the proto-Shias or Alids, were, for the most part, partisans of the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants, hence the term “Shia,” which means “faction,” “party,”, or “supporters.”

This partisanship moved towards sectarianism slowly. Elements of moral and religious fervour were added to this movement after major events such as the killing of al-Husayn ibn Ali (Ali’s son and the prophet’s grandson) at Karbala in 680 or through resistance to what was perceived as the impious rule of the Umayyads (661-750) by some. However, this really started to take its sectarian form, specifically that of Twelver Shiism, during the imamate of the sixth imam, Ja‘far al-Sadiq (702-765).

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It was Ja‘far who propagated the idea of the doctrine of the imamate, which limited the line of succession of imams to the progeny of al-Husayn, excluding the descendants of al-Husayn’s older brother, al-Hasan, and all other members of the prophet’s family, who up to that point, had been considered by most of the proto-Shias as legitimate choices and contenders to the position of imam. For example, Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya was the son of Ali ibn Abi Talib and a concubine/wife (depending on the sources) from the Banu Hanifa tribe. This made him al-Hasan and al-Husayn’s half-brother. Ibn al-Hanafiyya was the head of Ali’s household and considered the imam by his followers, who comprised the majority of the proto-Shia/Alids, who also proclaimed him the mahdi or “savior.”

Similarly, the revolution that toppled the Umayyads and put the Abbasids on the throne can be viewed as a very broad Shia movement. The various elements that made up the revolution supported different Alids as candidates for the throne. It was the descendants of al-Abbas, the prophet’s uncle, who won out as they had a very large “Shia” or faction supporting them, particularly important were the Khurasani soldiers and warriors under Abu Muslim, who bore the brunt of the fighting against the Umayyads during the revolution.

Ja‘far al-Sadiq’s introduction of the doctrine of the imamate and the idea of nass (designation of a successor) put an end to this, as Patricia Crone puts it, “big tent Shiism.” Ja‘far’s doctrines restricted what was considered the legitimate line of succession of imams and gave birth to what would crystalize into the Twelver or Imami sect of Shiism that traced legitimate leadership through a line of twelve imams starting with Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661), then his eldest son al-Hasan (d. 670), and then through his younger son al-Husayn and his descendants to the twelfth and last imam, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Mahdi. Twelver Shias believe that the twelfth imam went into a lesser occultation from 874-941 and into a greater occultation from 941 to the present day and expect his return as the savior at the end of time, much the same way that practicing Christians await Jesus’ second coming.

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During the imamate of Ja‘far al-Sadiq a major schism split the Shia into two groups. Put simply, this schism was a result of Ja‘far’s nass or designation of his eldest son Isma‘il (d. 755) as his successor. However, Isma‘il predeceased his father. Those Shia who would become the Twelver Imamis swore allegiance to Isma’il’s younger half-brother, Musa al-Kazim/Kadhim. Many of the Shia, however, remained loyal to Isma‘il and maintained that he was his father’s rightful successor. These Shia came to be known as the Isma‘iliyya or the Isma‘ilis. Some of them believed that Isma‘il was not dead, had gone into hiding, and would return as the mahdi; these were the Ismailiyya al-Khalisa or “pure” Isma‘ilis. Other Isma‘ilis acknowledged Isma‘il’s death and believed that the imamate belonged to his son, Muhammad ibn Isma‘il (d. 795-796). Most of the early Isma‘ilis regarded Muhammad as the seventh and final imam. They did not acknowledge his death and believed that he remained alive and would return in the future as the mahdi. Another small and obscure group of Isma‘ilis acknowledge Muhammad ibn Isma‘il’s death and traced the imamate in his progeny (not acknowledged by the former group).

The second schism to occur within the Shia sect split the Ismai‘lis into two main competing factions in 899. Little is known about the early Ismai‘ilis until their emergence on the historical stage almost during the latter half of the ninth century as an organized and unified revolutionary sectarian movement. This movement had a central leadership based at its headquarters at Salamiyya in Syria. For years, these leaders organize the Isma‘ili movement in secrecy. Around 873-874 several missionaries or da‘is began to appear in Iraq and other parts of the caliphate propagating the Isma‘ili da‘wa (mission). These da‘is were successful in winning over a growing number of converts and were directed from Salamiyya by the leadership, whose identities were kept secret.

Chief among the Isma‘ili da‘is in Iraq was one Hamdan Qarmat. He was converted by another missionary sent from Salamiyya, al-Husayn al-Ahwazi, but became the chief da‘i and organizer of the Isma‘ili movement in Iraq, based in the region of Kufa. Hamdan’s chief assistant and lieutenant was Abdan, his brother-in-law, and together they grew their following. These converts included the peasants from southern Iraq as well as Bedouin tribesmen from north-eastern Arabia and the Syrian Desert. Those converted to Ismai‘ilism by Hamdan Qarmat and his agents came to be known as Qaramita (anglicized Qarmatians) after their local leader.

The Qarmati leaders of Iraq spread their activities to other areas, including southern Iran. Abdan recruited and trained Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi, a native of Fars, and dispatched him first to his home region to propagate the Isma‘ili da‘wa and then to Bahrayn. We will come back to Abu Sa‘id, as it was he who founded the Qarmati state of Bahrayn, the main subject of this article. By the 880s the Ismai‘ilis in Iraq (not yet “Qaramita”) had grown numerous, partly because the Abbasids could not pay them much attention, distracted as they were by other threats such as the Zanj rebellion in Southern Iraq and Ya‘qub ibn Layth and the Saffarid Empire he had created in the eastern parts of the caliphate.

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In 899, the central leadership of the Isma‘ili da‘wa was assumed by Ubayd Allah (or Abd Allah) ibn al-Husayn, the founder of the Fatimid dynasty and future caliph-imam al-Mahdi (r. 909-934). After his rise to the leadership of the Isma‘ili movement, the written missives that were dispatched from Salamiyya to the da‘is were different in tone and content and aroused the suspicions of some of the leaders, including Hamdan Qarmat and Abdan.

Bowl depicting a Man holding a Cup and a Flowering Branch from 10th-century Iraq – image courtesy The Metropolitan Museum of Art

Until 899, the Isma‘ili missionaries had been preaching the imminent return and mahdiship of Muhammad ibn Isma‘il, the seventh imam of the Isma‘ilis (hence the title “Seveners” is often attributed to them in the sources). However, after Ubayd Allah’s rise to power, he proclaimed himself imam. He claimed that he and his ancestors, who had been the central leaders of the movement, were in fact direct descendants of Ja‘far al-Saidq. He asserted that there had always been a continuity of “hidden” imams (i.e. from Muhammad ibn Isma‘il down to Ubayd Allah through the descendants of Isma‘il’s full brother Abd Allah al-Aftah ibn Ja‘far, according to Farhad Daftary), whose identities had been kept secret through taqiyya in order to protect them from the authorities.

These claims caused a schism in the Isma‘ili movement, with some of the da‘is supporting Ubayd Allah and others, including Hamdan Qarmat, Abdan, and Abu Sa‘id, rejected him. They severed their ties with Salamiyya and suspended all missionary activity in Iraq and the other eastern regions in 899. These Isam‘ilis, who came to be designated in the sources as the Qaramita, refused to acknowledge Ubayd Allah’s claims and maintained their belief in Muhammad ibn Isma‘il and his return as the mahdi. These Qaramita formed a rival faction to Ubayd Allah and his supporters, who would go down in history as the Fatimid Isma‘ilis. Hamdan and Abdan’s supporters comprised the Isma‘ilis of Iraq, Iran, and Bahrayn. Of these communities, the Qaramita (or Abu Sa‘idis) of Bahrayn formed the main opposition and the biggest threat to both the Fatimids and Abbasids.

Abu Sa‘id al-Jannabi and the Foundation the Qarmati Polity in Bahrayn

Abu Sa‘id al-Hasan ibn Bahram al-Jannabi was the founder of the dissident Qarmati state in Bahryan. He was born in Southern Iran (Fars) in the town of Jannabah (or Ganava in Persian). He worked as a flour merchant in Basra and was recruited, converted, and trained by Abdan. He was then sent to his home region of Fars as a da‘i.

Abu Sa‘id was not very successful in his mission and was compelled to go into hiding from the authorities. Hamdan then ordered him to carry out propaganda in Bahrayn, particularly to convert the numerous Arab tribes in the region. Abu Sa‘id began his work in Bahrayn in 886, long before the Isma‘ili schism. An Isma‘ili missionary, Abu Zakariyya al-Zamami (or al-Tamami), had already been operating in the region and may have helped prepare the ground for Abu Sa‘id. Abu Sa‘id and Abu Zakariyya, the founding fathers of Qarmati Isma‘ilism in Bahrayn, were very successful in converting both the townspeople and the tribes of the region. Abu Sa‘id even married into an influential and prominent trading and landowning family, the Banu Sanbar, who would rise to prominence as leaders of the movement in Bahrayn. The local connections he made through this marriage won him many allies and aided him in his mission. He also won converts among the desert tribes, mainly among the Banu Kilab and Banu Uqayl. With a strong following represented by tribal, rural, and urban elements, Abu Sa‘id set out to conquer large parts of Bahrayn, including the coastal port town of Qatif.

Map of eastern and central Arabia in the 9th–10th centuries - image by Ro4444 / WIkimedia Commons

By 899, the year of the schism, Abu Sa‘id was in control of almost the entire region of Bahrayn. Only the capital, Hajar, remained in Abbasid hands, and his forces were already in control of its suburbs and in the process of laying siege to it. The Qaramita were also making forays to the north and were threatening Basra. When Hamdan Qarmat and Abdan rejected Ubayd Allah’s claims to the imamate, Abu Sa‘id followed suit, siding with his mentors. However, that same year shortly after the schism, both Hamdan and Abdan would cease to be key players in the ensuing events. Hamdan simply disappeared. One source states that he was killed in Baghdad, while another insinuates that he switched allegiance and joined the Fatimids, continuing his work as a da‘i for them under a new name, Abu Ali Hasan ibn Ahmad ibn Hawqal. However, it is difficult to determine his fate, as most accounts simply state that he disappeared. Abdan was murdered by Zikrawayh, a da‘i loyal to the Fatimids, at the instigation of one of Ubayd Allah’s relatives.

Abu Sa‘id maintained his position in Bahrayn. In 900 (or 903) he took Hajar, the regional capital, and massacred its population. He then had his partner, Abu Zakariyya, killed. Abu Zakariyya was presumably still loyal to Ubayd Allah and the Fatimids and opposed Abu Sa‘id after the schism. Abu Sa‘id assumed sole control of the Qaramita of Bahrayn. He posed a considerable threat to the Abbasids, as his base of operations, was close to Iraq and the heart of the empire. It also occupied an important commercial position in the Persian Gulf, being on the maritime trade routes from India, China, and Africa to Iraq.

In the meantime, Ubayd Allah was driven out of Salamiyya. A Qarmati army of Syrian tribesmen under the leadership of two brothers who were also da‘is, known by the pseudonyms, Sahib al-Naqa (the Master of the She-camel) and Sahib al-Shama (the One with the Mole) devasted Syria. It was these Qaramita who took Salamiyya, destroying the headquarters of the first Isma‘ili movement. Ubayd Allah fled to a region of North Africa (in modern-day Tunisia), where, with the help of loyal missionaries and converted Berber tribesmen (primarily Kutama), the Fatimid Caliphate was established. In 903 Sahib al-Shama and Sahib al-Naqa besieged Damascus but were repulsed and Sahib al-Naqa was killed. The same year, Sahib al-Shama pillaged northern Syria sacking the cities of Hama, Hims (Homs), Ba‘albak, and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. Sahib al-Shama was defeated and killed in battle by a large Abbasid army in 904. The Syrian tribes continued their pillaging, but by 907, the Qarmati movement among most of the tribes of Syria came to an end.

The Qaramita of Bahrayn survived for much longer than their counterparts in Syria. The Syrian Qaramita did not establish a polity and were content to pillage. They made no effort to occupy any of the cities that they took, indicating that their aims reflected nomadic priorities: to secure wealth through pillage and tribute from settled communities. Loot, pillage, and tribute were also central for Abu Sa‘id and his followers, but they also had a base of operations in Bahrayn. Additionally, Abu Sa‘id was able to create one of the most fearsome fighting forces of his era by combining the desert Bedouins, the farmers, and the inhabitants of the towns and urban centers into a single army under his command.

Opposing the Abbasids

Abu Sa‘id displayed his enmity to the Abbasids from the very outset of his career in Bahrayn. After consolidating his hold on the region, Abu Sa‘id’s attention shifted to the north. His forces started to raid closer to Basra, the largest city in southern Iraq and its most important commercial center. The caliph, al-Mu‘tadid (r. 892-902) sent an army to crush Abu Sa‘id’s movement. This force was dispatched, presumably, to safeguard Basra and perhaps to prevent the occupation of Hajar, the regional capital of Bahrayn, which may have still been holding out against Abu Sa‘id (having fallen to him in 900 or 903). He named al-Abbas ibn Amr al-Ghanawi the commander of this force and the governor of Bahryan. This army was composed of 2,000 professional soldiers and “many” volunteers. The number of the volunteers is not given, but there must have been at least as many as there were professional soldiers, if not more. Adventurers and men desiring a quick path to wealth and glory were not in short supply.

The Abbasid army was utterly defeated in the ensuing encounter. The Abu Sa‘idis, more familiar with the terrain, with effectively fighting in the desert, and buoyed with the confidence of past successes, annihilated the Abbasid army. Few survived to return to Iraq. Those who did not die in battle either perished in the desert or were captured and put to death, a practice that would become a trademark of the Qaramita and increase the terror and fear instilled by them in their enemies. Only rarely did anyone escape death after being captured by them, in this case, the commander of the Abbasid forces was release, according to the sources, to convey a message to the caliph.

Abu Sa‘id sent al-Abbas ibn Amr al-Ghanawi back to Baghdad with a message to the caliph. Among other things, he asked the caliph why he was wasting the lives of his followers. He also states that an attack on his territories in the desert was certain to fail because he and his followers were inured to the rough life in the inhospitable landscapes of Eastern Arabia, whereas the Abbasid soldiers were out of their element in that hostile and unfamiliar terrain.

Abu Sa‘id continued to consolidate his position in Bahrayn and expanded his domains in every direction. His forces continued threatening and raiding southern Iraq but failed to take the city of Basra or to gain control of its important trade route. He also invaded Yamama and Uman. Uman was an especially important target because it occupied an important maritime commercial position in the Persian Gulf region. Abu Sa‘id, ruled his domains from his headquarters at the oasis of al-Ahsa, which was near the former capital, Hajar. Al-Ahsa would become the capital of the Qarmati polity of Bahryan. Abu Sa‘id started to campaign in the district of Basra in 912, but this military action did not result in much gains and was cut short by his untimely death.

Abu Sa‘id died in 913. He was murdered by two slaves. Several other high-ranking leaders of his movement were also killed around the same time, including some of his in-laws from the Banu Sanbar clan, who had been among his staunchest supporters. The sources are vague regarding the reason for Abu Sa‘id’s murder. He had expressed the imminent return of the mahdi on several occasions. His last prophecy stated that he would return in 912, when this did not materialize, some of his followers may have become disillusioned. However, no concrete reason is given in the sources for his killing. Abu Sa‘id was venerated by his followers after his death, who believed that he would return to them as the savior (more on this in the next article).

Abu Sa‘id was survived by seven sons. His first successor was his eldest, Abu al-Qasim Sa‘id. He ruled for a decade, with the aid of a tribal council (among whom the Banu Sanbar were prominent). Abu al-Qasim was a peaceful ruler and maintained good relations with the caliph. He took a conciliatory policy toward his relations with the Abbasids and his followers ceased their raids into the territories of the caliphate. The sources paint a picture of a peaceful, almost passive ruler, who lacked his father’s energy, vision, and aggressive assertiveness. For example, the Abbasid vizier (or wazir), Ali ibn ‘Isa ibn Jarrah, sent a message to al-Ahsa in 913 admonishing the Qaramita and summoning them to obey the caliph. By the time the letter arrived in Bahrayn, Abu Sa‘id was dead, and his successors sent a conciliatory reply and even released those Abbasid captives in Bahrayn who had not yet been killed, as a gesture of goodwill.

The Abbasid vizier dispatched other embassies to al-Ahsa on more than one occasion. This peaceful state of affairs was not to last. In 923, Abu al-Qasim was forced to resign his position of leadership by Abu Sa‘id’s youngest son. This son, Abu Tahir Sulayman, was Abu Sa‘id’s heir designate, but had been a child at the time of his father death. He was, much like his father, militant, energetic, and Charismatic. The Qaramita of Bahrayn would reach the zenith of their power during Abu Tahir’s energetic reign.

See also Part 2: The Scourges of the Desert: The Triumph and Fall of the Qaramita of Bahrayn

Adam Ali is a lecturer at the University of Toronto. Click here to read more from Adam.

Top Image: Ptolemy’s 6th Asian Map depicting Arabia, created in 1467 – Wikimedia Commons

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