Retreats are seldom orderly affairs. And on 10 March 1387 the army leaving behind the hamlet of Cerea was all but a shambles, the hungry, wet, tired and dispirited troops of Francesco Novello da Carrara, son of Padua’s ruling lord, having only one objective: reaching their logistical base at Castelbaldo, fifteen miles away on the other side of the Adige river. For the last twelve days they had lacked bread and meat, surviving on turnips and the few victuals captured by raiding far and wide, always with the enemy biting their heels. As the distance between the retreating army and Castelbaldo decreased, few Paduan units retained any form of discipline, as the wanting soldiers tried to outpace each other as to whom would reach the base first.
In the meantime, a huge and well-organized army was closing in from the rear, the commanders and soldiers of Antonio della Scala, ruling lord of Verona, gleefully anticipating the moment when many a score would be settled in a final showdown between the two rival polities.
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The previous fifteen months had witnessed a flurry of military activities, as the war for the Patriarchy of Aquileia – originally a local affair between two rival factions, each striving for territorial hegemony– had spread across northern Italy, awakening many dormant animosities. Venice, alarmed by Paduan expansionism towards the east, had struck an alliance with Verona, also concerned with its neighbour’s growing power.
Northern Italy in the 15th century – detail from Muirs historical atlas: medieval and modern (1874)
Padua, on the other hand, could rely on Gian Galeazzo Visconti, ruling lord of Milan – “rely” was in reality too generous a verb when Visconti was involved, Gian Galeazzo always moving in accordance with his own, always shifting agenda. All these events fell squarely within the European-wide struggle between the pope in Rome and the pope in Avignon (the Great Schism of the West), and the succession crisis in the kingdoms of Naples and Hungary.
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Verona had started hostilities in November 1385 with a raid into Paduan territory. Francesco Novello had responded swiftly the following month with a counter-raid. From then onwards the conflict escalated in size and scope. In February 1386 the Veronese attempted to cut off the water supply from Padua’s grain mills by erecting dams on the Bacchiglione river. And the following Spring, they launched a full-scale invasion of Francesco’s lands, taking a number of strongholds, with the ultimate objective of capturing the rival’s capital. It was just as an astrologer had told a gleeful Antonio della Scala, that his troops would soon enter Padua.
Scala had rather more reasons than the stars to be optimistic. Thanks also to Venetian money, he had managed to put together a massive army, fully equipped with all the necessary instruments to successfully fight in the field and conduct a prolonged siege if necessary. Near-contemporary Veronese documents give us an idea of this array’s size. Just the professional fighting complement amounted to 8,500 horse and 2,500 foot, plus some 14,000 auxiliaries and sappers. Thousands of carts accompanied the army, carrying all necessities from bread to prostitutes.
After thoroughly raiding the Paduan countryside, around the 23rd of June the Veronese host under Cortesia da Serego was near Padua’s outskirts, the next day managing to force its outer defences at le Brentelle. Busy shadowing the enemy, the Paduan commander Giovanni degli Ubaldini rushed to the city’s relief with a force of 2,000 horse and hastily put together some 6000 citizens and local peasantry as defenders. The following morning Serego rode out of camp to deliver – or at least so he thought – the final blow to the Paduans, unaware that Ubaldini lay awaiting nearby with his dismounted cavalry and about 1,800 professional infantry hidden among the tall grass below the levee of the Brentella canal, which he had reached in the morning by silently marching from the Porta San Marco.
The Veronese repulsed the Paduan levies despite their fierce resistance, chasing them to the city gates; however, in doing so the victorious troops lost order. Seeing his chance, Ubaldini ordered his cavalry to mount and swung it round the rump of the Veronese array near the camp, one mile and a half from Padua’s walls – while the infantry blocked the retreat across the canal, at the back of the attacking army. In two hours the fight was over, the defeated Veronese were on the run or captured. Virtually all the Scala command was taken prisoner, including Serego, together with about 4,460 cavalry and infantry, 3,450 auxiliaries, 6,350 horses, 120 merchants with 240 cartloads of merchandise, 52 gunpowder artillery pieces, 172 trebuchets and 211 prostitutes – the latter being richly feted by the victorious Paduans. In addition, 821 Veronese were killed, many of them drowned while attempting to flee.
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The disaster at le Brentelle did not stop Antonio della Scala, who now – always with Venice’s financial aid – engaged the services of Lutz von Landau, one of the foremost German condottieri in Italy. Landau managed to restore order among Scala’s surviving forces, also containing to an extent the Paduan counteroffensive during the summer and autumn months. Still, he could not stop the Paduans from regaining lost territory although he did manage to rebuild the dams on the Bacchiglione, destroyed by the Paduans after Le Brentelle. However, as the Veronese commanders taken at le Brentelle ransomed themselves to freedom – agreeing not to wage war against Padua in the two months following their liberation – military progress became increasingly difficult for the Paduans and by December 1386 a strategic stalemate had been reached.
Francesco il Vecchio da Carrara tried to break the impasse by offering Landau a 10,000 ducat bribe for switching sides. The German commander dutifully reported the offer to his employer, but Antonio della Scala decided not to renew his contract. Financial straits may have motivated the lord of Verona’s decision, although it is equally possible that the long-standing rivalry between German and Italian mercenaries could have played a part, or, even more so, the influence on Scala of his brother-in-law Ostasio da Polenta, just returned from Paduan captivity.
Hiring the Englishman
Francesco il Vecchio may not have hired Landau, but in January 1387 he landed a major coup by enlisting one of the most celebrated mercenary captains in Italy: Sir John Hawkwood. The second son of a wealthy landowner from the village of Sible Hedingham, in Essex, Hawkwood had learnt his trade and, possibly, earned his spurs in France during the early stages of the Hundred Years War. Descending into Italy after the 1360 Peace of Brétigny, for over a quarter of a century he had fought for and against practically every polity on the map, alternating bouts of legitimate employment with frequent freebooting spells. A master at making money, by contractual means or through extortion, Hawkwood also possessed a solid reputation as a commander and a tactician, having been defeated only once in the field, at Cascina in 1364, and even then managing to extricate himself from the debacle.
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Since 1384 he had been living in semi-retirement on his Tuscan estates, and it was probably through Florence’s good offices that Francesco il Vecchio came to employ the famous captain – the English condottiere having a semi-official agreement with Florence, despite having also signed a contract in aspetto (on demand) with Gian Galeazzo Visconti, who had also agreed to a treaty with Padua for the partitioning of Veronese territory. Hawkwood, in any case, needed little encouragement and was soon on his way to Padua at the head of 500 English men-at-arms and as many longbowmen.
He arrived in mid-February, after the Paduan army under Ubaldini had already crossed into Veronese territory and pitched camp at Cerea, 21 miles south of Verona. Hawkwood was met at Monselice by Francesco Novello da Carrara who then accompanied the Englishman and his company to Castelbaldo, on the Adige. The pontoon bridge connecting to the Veronese side of the river had been disabled, but, despite the rain of the previous days, the low level of the waters allowed the Paduan army to ford them – although Hawkwood had misgivings about the venture and had to be egged on by Francesco Novello. Indeed, the English captain would have preferred moving back to Padua, his experience telling him that trouble was brewing. A Veronese covering force tried to impede the Paduans from crossing, but retreated to the bastida (fort) of the Castagnaro when realizing it was facing superior numbers, increased by the arrival of Ubaldini’s troops sent to Hawkwood’s aid.
The bastida itself is a minor mystery. We know of its existence, but its size, quality and position elude us. Most probably it stood more or less in the place of the current village of Castagnaro and may simply have been an earthwork-reinforced stockade at the junction between the Adige river and the Castagnaro canal, to control the water traffic and the Paduan-Veronese border running on the other side of the Adige, at the so-called Fossa Imperiale. Whatever it was, or whomever it held, it was not sufficiently powerful to stop Hawkwood and his associates, who continued to Cerea unimpeded.
Hawkwood’s presence created a somewhat awkward situation, being unclear how well he would take to serving under Ubaldini, his junior in age and former pupil. Luckily, Ubaldini himself openly deferred to Hawkwood’s authority by publicly relinquishing the baton of command, which the English captain accepted with a manifest show of gratitude. Hawkwood, however, knew that he would have to rely on Ubaldini – an old colleague and friend – to liaison with the other Italian commanders in the Paduan army, as resentment against forestieri (foreigners) was a constant source of tension among professional soldiers in Italy. Yet, from a Northern Italian political standpoint Florence’s support meant that Hawkwood was in a stronger position than Ubaldini when dealing with the Francesco Novello, and therefore less likely to be bullied by him into making strategic mistakes.
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Outside Verona
Once the leadership matter was solved, at the insistence of Francesco Novello, it was agreed to take the war to Verona’s gates. The Paduans raided as far as Cavaion, fifteen miles north-east from Verona, looting, burning and taking prisoners among the country folk. The Veronese appeared to be doing little except engaging the enemy in skirmishes; however, Giovanni degli Ordelaffi and Ostasio da Polenta, in command of Scala’s forces, had developed a waiting strategy, allowing the Paduans to penetrate deep while cutting off their supply routes. As the days passed, Francesco Novello found it increasingly difficult to receive victuals sent from Padua due to the Veronese controlling most of the roads from Padua’s territory, while the countryside in winter provided little in terms of food and other necessities. Soon the entire Paduan army was reduced to eat turnips, meat, bread and wine long since finished. As the days passed, even these vegetables became scarce, reducing some Paduan soldiers to kill their horses to have something to eat.
Knowing time was on his side, Antonio della Scala sent an envoi to the Paduan camp: ostensibly to negotiate a peace deal, but in reality to judge the extent of the Paduans’ difficulties and discover if, by any chance, there existed a deal between the Carrara and Gian Galeazzo Visconti. Scala must have got wind that something of the kind was in the works but certainty eluded him, since the Milanese – despite having offered Padua an alliance treaty the previous January – had been busy negotiating an agreement with Verona, the amoral Gian Galeazzo keeping every option open.
Portait of Gian Galeazzo Visconti (1351-1402) by Giovanni Ambrogio de Predis – Wikimedia Commons
Scala did not discover any diplomatic secrets but realized in full the Paduans’ dire straits. By then his military preparations were well advanced. In particular, he was relying on a “wonder weapon”, described as three large carts on which stood a square rotating turret equipped with three layers of small gunpowder artillery pieces capable of shooting a stone ball “the size of a chicken’s egg”. The objective of these contraptions was to disrupt enemy lines with concentrated and continuous fire, allowing the rest of the Veronese forces to close in for the kill. Wishing to finish the job interrupted at le Brentelle, Scala put together a sizeable artillery train and abundant victuals: his intention was to march on Padua after the enemy army had been destroyed or broken up by sheer logistic attrition.
The latter possibility clearly loomed large at the beginning of March, when a demoralized Paduan army slowly started retreating south with the intention of crossing the Adige at Castelbaldo. The Veronese followed at a distance, counting on the fact that, once the Paduans neared their objective, the rush for food and refreshments would cause the breakup of the enemy forces and a cheap, bloodless victory for Scala. They had not miscalculated, for the Paduans were becoming ever more a rabble by the day, their condition increased by finding the wells and springs en route poisoned by the enemy (Hawkwood is supposed to have saved the day by using a magic ring or a unicorn’s horn to purify the waters). As predicted by the Veronese leaders, once Castelbaldo came into view, discipline all but collapsed, the Paduans abandoning their banners to fill their bellies on the supplies stored there, victuals supposed to last ten days nearly gone within hours.
Hawkwood and Ubaldini managed to keep their companies together, taking up position behind a ditch originally dug by the Veronese as an advanced defence of their already mentioned nearby bastida. With great effort, Francesco Novello rallied a number of his troops and joined his senior commanders at the ditch. A frantic war-council followed, with Hawkwood and Ubaldini offering to keep the Veronese engaged while Francesco made good his escape with the rest of the army. But the younger Carrara would hear nothing of it, adamantly stating that he intended to stay and fight. Francesco’s stance was motivated both by personal honour and political expediency, knowing that on his behaviour and bravery depended the survival of his father’s regime.
Hawkwood and Ubaldini agreed, but insisted that the troops should be well-fed and in order before they returned to fighting. Somehow the other Paduan commanders regrouped enough of their soldiers to form a line, aided in this by Francesco distributing much-needed pay. Having managed to create a battle array of sorts, Francesco sat down for a well-deserved meal.
Funerary Monument to Sir John Hawkwood, made by Paolo Uccello – Wikimedia Commons
It did not take long for the approaching Veronese to receive intelligence about the awaiting Paduans. Consequentially, Giovanni degli Ordelaffi and Ostasio da Polenta divided their army into six mounted units, totalizing 5,200 men, plus a few thousand infantry, professionals and peasant levy, bringing up the rear together with the artillery carts.
Against these forces, the Paduans could deploy only 2,900 men-at-arms in three units, plus a reserve of 200 horsemen guarding the banners “of the cart” (many have interpreted this as being the carroccio – the traditional war-wagon of Italian cities; in reality, the passage refers to the Carrara standard, sporting a red cart on a white field). On the far left of the Paduan line stood 1,200 infantry, spearmen and crossbowmen, under the veteran leader Cermisone da Parma. Hawkwood had commanded about 200 infantry to occupy the levee on the Adige, thus giving extra protection to the Paduan right flank, the left protected by the swamp created by the Castagnaro canal.
“Flesh, Flesh”
It must have been around noon when Giovanni degli Ubaldini burst into Francesco Novello’s tent shouting that the enemy was at hand and that he better go to his command position. Unfazed, an already armed Francesco put on his crested bascinet and rode to the Paduan line in time to see the Veronese starting to deploy, the sight causing much unease among the Paduans. To boost his men’s spirit, Francesco there and then knighted five individuals, mostly close kin but also the Florentine mercenary, Bernardo degli Scolari, whose company was among the units in the main division. Once again Hawkwood and Ubaldini tried to convince Francesco to leave the field, once again getting a refusal in reply.
Hawkwood had his own, purely military, reasons to want Francesco Novello out of the way. He knew his presence would become a magnet for enemy attackers and it would only be a matter of time before the main division collapsed under the pressure of the Veronese superior numbers. Still, he intended also to turn this to his advantage and had the section of the ditch in front of his own troops filled in, counting on his English men-at-arms to resist long enough, hoping the Veronese would get into an unfavorable position. He also needed the enemy to close in before the artillery contraption could be put into effect; Hawkwood had his own plan to draw that attack.
The Veronese deployed about 150-200 meters in front of the Paduan lines, dismounting for combat – the width of the ditch (about eight feet) not allowing for a mounted charge. The distance also kept Scala’s troops safe from crossbow bolts, but not from the English longbows. Around 3:30 p.m. a flurry of arrows hit the Veronese left division under Ordelaffi. They did not inflict much damage on the heavily equipped Veronese, but their action proved galling enough to provoke a reaction. Almost instinctively Ordelaffi’s troops started moving forward towards the centre in a makeshift column to escape the raining arrows. Da Polenta’s units quickly followed and soon the whole Veronese line was seen advancing towards the ditch.
As Hawkwood had predicted, Francesco Novello’s division took the brunt of the attack. The Veronese charge into the Paduans quickly developed into a slogging match. Both sides carried lances, spanning the ditch’s length and certainly long enough to have increased the difficulty of the Veronese soldiers climbing out of the ditch while carrying theirs into the Paduan lances held by unmoving soldiers pointed down towards them. But the Veronese had the greater numbers. Many on both sides were killed, with many more wounded. Francesco himself had his armour stabbed, although the protection it and the padding he wore under it allowed him to escape with nothing more than an ugly bruise. On the Veronese side Ostasio da Polenta received a lance thrust strong enough to throw him to the ground, although his armour too proved its worth, as he rose again unscathed.
As the Paduan line began to waver under the constant attack of the Veronese, Ugolotto Bianciardo ordered the Paduan infantry on the Adige levee to join the fight in the centre, these reinforcements stiffening those under intense attack. Also observing the Paduan plight, Hawkwood rode to his position and begged Francesco to retreat to safety, joined in his pleading by Ubaldini, Scolari and other Paduan captains. Francesco, however, again refused, angrily telling his commanders in a sense to “mind their own business”. Frustrated, Hawkwood threw away his baton of command and pulled out his sword, returning to his own division at the shout of “Carne, Carne” (“Flesh, Flesh”).
Lances broken or discarded and the melee become close combat, the Veronese tried again to pass over the ditch by filling it with bundles of sticks. Fighting now with axes and other sharp-edged weapons, Francesco Novello and his troops engaged the Veronese in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, as the dead and the wounded started to pile up in the ditch. However, in their effort to attack and capture Francesco, the Veronese had concentrated all their effort at the centre of the line, leaving Hawkwood forgotten and outside the fighting. It was the moment the English captain had been awaiting. Under the covering shot of his archers, he launched his soldiers in a charge against the enemy’s left flank and rear, the filled-in portion of the ditch allowing the English an unimpeded passage.
14th century coin of Francesco II da Carrara – Wikimedia Commons
Completely caught by surprise, the Veronese found themselves pushed away from the Paduans and against the swamp by Hawkwood’s assault, the limited space causing them to bunch together without a chance to regroup or manoeuvre. The attackers went straight for the Scala banner, held by Francesco Visconti, pulling him from his horse and casting the standard into the mud. Seeing their insignia fall, the Veronese attempted to break loose, but too late did they turn to flee and were instead forced to surrender in droves.
Outside of the battle, the Veronese foot under Giovanni dell’Ischia (o dell’Isola) had taken up position on a canal-lined meadow near the Adige. Whether it had become too late to join the fight or because of orders to stay put, the Veronese foot soldiers had waited patiently for the outcome. Now, sunset approaching, they found themselves surrounded by the victorious Paduans and ordered to throw down their arms. Defiantly, dell’Ischia chose instead to fight, his stand, however, lasting only a short time in the face of the Paduans’ brutal assault. Those peasant levies not killed in the fighting were forced to cross the Adige in an attempt at escape; many drowned. Dell’Ischia, his honour preserved, surrendered.
The battle ended, the entire Veronese camp fell into Paduan hands, including the cart-mounted gunpowder artillery that never had a chance to fire a shot. Ransomable prisoners amounted to 3,284, including several citizens of Verona. The total number of men-at-arms captured amounted to an impressive 4,620, with eighty senior and junior Veronese commanders being taken. The killed totalled 716, a number inflated by dell’Ischia defiance, while the seriously wounded among the Veronese peasants alone came to 846. These were all freed by Francesco il Vecchio’s generosity — although relieving himself from providing medical assistance sounds somewhat less generous — while the other prisoners were taken to Padua in triumph. Francesco Novello was, of course, lionized for his performance, even if everyone recognised that the battle had been won “thanks to the efforts of Sir John Hawkwood”.
As overwhelming as the victory at the battle of Castagnaro was, it did not decide the war, which would continue for some time; the results of their great victory against the Veronese would be negated by the vagaries of Italian politics. Within the space of eighteen months, both Verona and Padua would cease to exist as independent polities. In April 1387 Carrara and Visconti agreed on partitioning Verona’s lands among themselves and the following October, bowing to Milanese and Paduan military pressure, Antonio della Scala abandoned his capital to Gian Galeazzo’s troops. However, performing a ruthless about face, the lord of Milan refused to give Vicenza or Treviso to Padua, instead ceding the latter to the Venetians. Milan and Venice then joined forces against the Carrara, Visconti entering Padua at the end of 1388 the two victors partitioning the defeated polity’s territory among themselves. All of Francesco and Scala’s political and military manoeuvring had come to naught, the ultra-Machiavellian Milan and Venice emerging as the ultimate victors.
By Niccolò Capponi and Kelly DeVries
Retreats are seldom orderly affairs. And on 10 March 1387 the army leaving behind the hamlet of Cerea was all but a shambles, the hungry, wet, tired and dispirited troops of Francesco Novello da Carrara, son of Padua’s ruling lord, having only one objective: reaching their logistical base at Castelbaldo, fifteen miles away on the other side of the Adige river. For the last twelve days they had lacked bread and meat, surviving on turnips and the few victuals captured by raiding far and wide, always with the enemy biting their heels. As the distance between the retreating army and Castelbaldo decreased, few Paduan units retained any form of discipline, as the wanting soldiers tried to outpace each other as to whom would reach the base first.
In the meantime, a huge and well-organized army was closing in from the rear, the commanders and soldiers of Antonio della Scala, ruling lord of Verona, gleefully anticipating the moment when many a score would be settled in a final showdown between the two rival polities.
The previous fifteen months had witnessed a flurry of military activities, as the war for the Patriarchy of Aquileia – originally a local affair between two rival factions, each striving for territorial hegemony– had spread across northern Italy, awakening many dormant animosities. Venice, alarmed by Paduan expansionism towards the east, had struck an alliance with Verona, also concerned with its neighbour’s growing power.
Padua, on the other hand, could rely on Gian Galeazzo Visconti, ruling lord of Milan – “rely” was in reality too generous a verb when Visconti was involved, Gian Galeazzo always moving in accordance with his own, always shifting agenda. All these events fell squarely within the European-wide struggle between the pope in Rome and the pope in Avignon (the Great Schism of the West), and the succession crisis in the kingdoms of Naples and Hungary.
Verona had started hostilities in November 1385 with a raid into Paduan territory. Francesco Novello had responded swiftly the following month with a counter-raid. From then onwards the conflict escalated in size and scope. In February 1386 the Veronese attempted to cut off the water supply from Padua’s grain mills by erecting dams on the Bacchiglione river. And the following Spring, they launched a full-scale invasion of Francesco’s lands, taking a number of strongholds, with the ultimate objective of capturing the rival’s capital. It was just as an astrologer had told a gleeful Antonio della Scala, that his troops would soon enter Padua.
Scala had rather more reasons than the stars to be optimistic. Thanks also to Venetian money, he had managed to put together a massive army, fully equipped with all the necessary instruments to successfully fight in the field and conduct a prolonged siege if necessary. Near-contemporary Veronese documents give us an idea of this array’s size. Just the professional fighting complement amounted to 8,500 horse and 2,500 foot, plus some 14,000 auxiliaries and sappers. Thousands of carts accompanied the army, carrying all necessities from bread to prostitutes.
After thoroughly raiding the Paduan countryside, around the 23rd of June the Veronese host under Cortesia da Serego was near Padua’s outskirts, the next day managing to force its outer defences at le Brentelle. Busy shadowing the enemy, the Paduan commander Giovanni degli Ubaldini rushed to the city’s relief with a force of 2,000 horse and hastily put together some 6000 citizens and local peasantry as defenders. The following morning Serego rode out of camp to deliver – or at least so he thought – the final blow to the Paduans, unaware that Ubaldini lay awaiting nearby with his dismounted cavalry and about 1,800 professional infantry hidden among the tall grass below the levee of the Brentella canal, which he had reached in the morning by silently marching from the Porta San Marco.
The Veronese repulsed the Paduan levies despite their fierce resistance, chasing them to the city gates; however, in doing so the victorious troops lost order. Seeing his chance, Ubaldini ordered his cavalry to mount and swung it round the rump of the Veronese array near the camp, one mile and a half from Padua’s walls – while the infantry blocked the retreat across the canal, at the back of the attacking army. In two hours the fight was over, the defeated Veronese were on the run or captured. Virtually all the Scala command was taken prisoner, including Serego, together with about 4,460 cavalry and infantry, 3,450 auxiliaries, 6,350 horses, 120 merchants with 240 cartloads of merchandise, 52 gunpowder artillery pieces, 172 trebuchets and 211 prostitutes – the latter being richly feted by the victorious Paduans. In addition, 821 Veronese were killed, many of them drowned while attempting to flee.
The disaster at le Brentelle did not stop Antonio della Scala, who now – always with Venice’s financial aid – engaged the services of Lutz von Landau, one of the foremost German condottieri in Italy. Landau managed to restore order among Scala’s surviving forces, also containing to an extent the Paduan counteroffensive during the summer and autumn months. Still, he could not stop the Paduans from regaining lost territory although he did manage to rebuild the dams on the Bacchiglione, destroyed by the Paduans after Le Brentelle. However, as the Veronese commanders taken at le Brentelle ransomed themselves to freedom – agreeing not to wage war against Padua in the two months following their liberation – military progress became increasingly difficult for the Paduans and by December 1386 a strategic stalemate had been reached.
Francesco il Vecchio da Carrara tried to break the impasse by offering Landau a 10,000 ducat bribe for switching sides. The German commander dutifully reported the offer to his employer, but Antonio della Scala decided not to renew his contract. Financial straits may have motivated the lord of Verona’s decision, although it is equally possible that the long-standing rivalry between German and Italian mercenaries could have played a part, or, even more so, the influence on Scala of his brother-in-law Ostasio da Polenta, just returned from Paduan captivity.
Hiring the Englishman
Francesco il Vecchio may not have hired Landau, but in January 1387 he landed a major coup by enlisting one of the most celebrated mercenary captains in Italy: Sir John Hawkwood. The second son of a wealthy landowner from the village of Sible Hedingham, in Essex, Hawkwood had learnt his trade and, possibly, earned his spurs in France during the early stages of the Hundred Years War. Descending into Italy after the 1360 Peace of Brétigny, for over a quarter of a century he had fought for and against practically every polity on the map, alternating bouts of legitimate employment with frequent freebooting spells. A master at making money, by contractual means or through extortion, Hawkwood also possessed a solid reputation as a commander and a tactician, having been defeated only once in the field, at Cascina in 1364, and even then managing to extricate himself from the debacle.
Since 1384 he had been living in semi-retirement on his Tuscan estates, and it was probably through Florence’s good offices that Francesco il Vecchio came to employ the famous captain – the English condottiere having a semi-official agreement with Florence, despite having also signed a contract in aspetto (on demand) with Gian Galeazzo Visconti, who had also agreed to a treaty with Padua for the partitioning of Veronese territory. Hawkwood, in any case, needed little encouragement and was soon on his way to Padua at the head of 500 English men-at-arms and as many longbowmen.
He arrived in mid-February, after the Paduan army under Ubaldini had already crossed into Veronese territory and pitched camp at Cerea, 21 miles south of Verona. Hawkwood was met at Monselice by Francesco Novello da Carrara who then accompanied the Englishman and his company to Castelbaldo, on the Adige. The pontoon bridge connecting to the Veronese side of the river had been disabled, but, despite the rain of the previous days, the low level of the waters allowed the Paduan army to ford them – although Hawkwood had misgivings about the venture and had to be egged on by Francesco Novello. Indeed, the English captain would have preferred moving back to Padua, his experience telling him that trouble was brewing. A Veronese covering force tried to impede the Paduans from crossing, but retreated to the bastida (fort) of the Castagnaro when realizing it was facing superior numbers, increased by the arrival of Ubaldini’s troops sent to Hawkwood’s aid.
The bastida itself is a minor mystery. We know of its existence, but its size, quality and position elude us. Most probably it stood more or less in the place of the current village of Castagnaro and may simply have been an earthwork-reinforced stockade at the junction between the Adige river and the Castagnaro canal, to control the water traffic and the Paduan-Veronese border running on the other side of the Adige, at the so-called Fossa Imperiale. Whatever it was, or whomever it held, it was not sufficiently powerful to stop Hawkwood and his associates, who continued to Cerea unimpeded.
Hawkwood’s presence created a somewhat awkward situation, being unclear how well he would take to serving under Ubaldini, his junior in age and former pupil. Luckily, Ubaldini himself openly deferred to Hawkwood’s authority by publicly relinquishing the baton of command, which the English captain accepted with a manifest show of gratitude. Hawkwood, however, knew that he would have to rely on Ubaldini – an old colleague and friend – to liaison with the other Italian commanders in the Paduan army, as resentment against forestieri (foreigners) was a constant source of tension among professional soldiers in Italy. Yet, from a Northern Italian political standpoint Florence’s support meant that Hawkwood was in a stronger position than Ubaldini when dealing with the Francesco Novello, and therefore less likely to be bullied by him into making strategic mistakes.
Outside Verona
Once the leadership matter was solved, at the insistence of Francesco Novello, it was agreed to take the war to Verona’s gates. The Paduans raided as far as Cavaion, fifteen miles north-east from Verona, looting, burning and taking prisoners among the country folk. The Veronese appeared to be doing little except engaging the enemy in skirmishes; however, Giovanni degli Ordelaffi and Ostasio da Polenta, in command of Scala’s forces, had developed a waiting strategy, allowing the Paduans to penetrate deep while cutting off their supply routes. As the days passed, Francesco Novello found it increasingly difficult to receive victuals sent from Padua due to the Veronese controlling most of the roads from Padua’s territory, while the countryside in winter provided little in terms of food and other necessities. Soon the entire Paduan army was reduced to eat turnips, meat, bread and wine long since finished. As the days passed, even these vegetables became scarce, reducing some Paduan soldiers to kill their horses to have something to eat.
Knowing time was on his side, Antonio della Scala sent an envoi to the Paduan camp: ostensibly to negotiate a peace deal, but in reality to judge the extent of the Paduans’ difficulties and discover if, by any chance, there existed a deal between the Carrara and Gian Galeazzo Visconti. Scala must have got wind that something of the kind was in the works but certainty eluded him, since the Milanese – despite having offered Padua an alliance treaty the previous January – had been busy negotiating an agreement with Verona, the amoral Gian Galeazzo keeping every option open.
Scala did not discover any diplomatic secrets but realized in full the Paduans’ dire straits. By then his military preparations were well advanced. In particular, he was relying on a “wonder weapon”, described as three large carts on which stood a square rotating turret equipped with three layers of small gunpowder artillery pieces capable of shooting a stone ball “the size of a chicken’s egg”. The objective of these contraptions was to disrupt enemy lines with concentrated and continuous fire, allowing the rest of the Veronese forces to close in for the kill. Wishing to finish the job interrupted at le Brentelle, Scala put together a sizeable artillery train and abundant victuals: his intention was to march on Padua after the enemy army had been destroyed or broken up by sheer logistic attrition.
The latter possibility clearly loomed large at the beginning of March, when a demoralized Paduan army slowly started retreating south with the intention of crossing the Adige at Castelbaldo. The Veronese followed at a distance, counting on the fact that, once the Paduans neared their objective, the rush for food and refreshments would cause the breakup of the enemy forces and a cheap, bloodless victory for Scala. They had not miscalculated, for the Paduans were becoming ever more a rabble by the day, their condition increased by finding the wells and springs en route poisoned by the enemy (Hawkwood is supposed to have saved the day by using a magic ring or a unicorn’s horn to purify the waters). As predicted by the Veronese leaders, once Castelbaldo came into view, discipline all but collapsed, the Paduans abandoning their banners to fill their bellies on the supplies stored there, victuals supposed to last ten days nearly gone within hours.
Hawkwood and Ubaldini managed to keep their companies together, taking up position behind a ditch originally dug by the Veronese as an advanced defence of their already mentioned nearby bastida. With great effort, Francesco Novello rallied a number of his troops and joined his senior commanders at the ditch. A frantic war-council followed, with Hawkwood and Ubaldini offering to keep the Veronese engaged while Francesco made good his escape with the rest of the army. But the younger Carrara would hear nothing of it, adamantly stating that he intended to stay and fight. Francesco’s stance was motivated both by personal honour and political expediency, knowing that on his behaviour and bravery depended the survival of his father’s regime.
Hawkwood and Ubaldini agreed, but insisted that the troops should be well-fed and in order before they returned to fighting. Somehow the other Paduan commanders regrouped enough of their soldiers to form a line, aided in this by Francesco distributing much-needed pay. Having managed to create a battle array of sorts, Francesco sat down for a well-deserved meal.
It did not take long for the approaching Veronese to receive intelligence about the awaiting Paduans. Consequentially, Giovanni degli Ordelaffi and Ostasio da Polenta divided their army into six mounted units, totalizing 5,200 men, plus a few thousand infantry, professionals and peasant levy, bringing up the rear together with the artillery carts.
Against these forces, the Paduans could deploy only 2,900 men-at-arms in three units, plus a reserve of 200 horsemen guarding the banners “of the cart” (many have interpreted this as being the carroccio – the traditional war-wagon of Italian cities; in reality, the passage refers to the Carrara standard, sporting a red cart on a white field). On the far left of the Paduan line stood 1,200 infantry, spearmen and crossbowmen, under the veteran leader Cermisone da Parma. Hawkwood had commanded about 200 infantry to occupy the levee on the Adige, thus giving extra protection to the Paduan right flank, the left protected by the swamp created by the Castagnaro canal.
“Flesh, Flesh”
It must have been around noon when Giovanni degli Ubaldini burst into Francesco Novello’s tent shouting that the enemy was at hand and that he better go to his command position. Unfazed, an already armed Francesco put on his crested bascinet and rode to the Paduan line in time to see the Veronese starting to deploy, the sight causing much unease among the Paduans. To boost his men’s spirit, Francesco there and then knighted five individuals, mostly close kin but also the Florentine mercenary, Bernardo degli Scolari, whose company was among the units in the main division. Once again Hawkwood and Ubaldini tried to convince Francesco to leave the field, once again getting a refusal in reply.
Hawkwood had his own, purely military, reasons to want Francesco Novello out of the way. He knew his presence would become a magnet for enemy attackers and it would only be a matter of time before the main division collapsed under the pressure of the Veronese superior numbers. Still, he intended also to turn this to his advantage and had the section of the ditch in front of his own troops filled in, counting on his English men-at-arms to resist long enough, hoping the Veronese would get into an unfavorable position. He also needed the enemy to close in before the artillery contraption could be put into effect; Hawkwood had his own plan to draw that attack.
The Veronese deployed about 150-200 meters in front of the Paduan lines, dismounting for combat – the width of the ditch (about eight feet) not allowing for a mounted charge. The distance also kept Scala’s troops safe from crossbow bolts, but not from the English longbows. Around 3:30 p.m. a flurry of arrows hit the Veronese left division under Ordelaffi. They did not inflict much damage on the heavily equipped Veronese, but their action proved galling enough to provoke a reaction. Almost instinctively Ordelaffi’s troops started moving forward towards the centre in a makeshift column to escape the raining arrows. Da Polenta’s units quickly followed and soon the whole Veronese line was seen advancing towards the ditch.
As Hawkwood had predicted, Francesco Novello’s division took the brunt of the attack. The Veronese charge into the Paduans quickly developed into a slogging match. Both sides carried lances, spanning the ditch’s length and certainly long enough to have increased the difficulty of the Veronese soldiers climbing out of the ditch while carrying theirs into the Paduan lances held by unmoving soldiers pointed down towards them. But the Veronese had the greater numbers. Many on both sides were killed, with many more wounded. Francesco himself had his armour stabbed, although the protection it and the padding he wore under it allowed him to escape with nothing more than an ugly bruise. On the Veronese side Ostasio da Polenta received a lance thrust strong enough to throw him to the ground, although his armour too proved its worth, as he rose again unscathed.
As the Paduan line began to waver under the constant attack of the Veronese, Ugolotto Bianciardo ordered the Paduan infantry on the Adige levee to join the fight in the centre, these reinforcements stiffening those under intense attack. Also observing the Paduan plight, Hawkwood rode to his position and begged Francesco to retreat to safety, joined in his pleading by Ubaldini, Scolari and other Paduan captains. Francesco, however, again refused, angrily telling his commanders in a sense to “mind their own business”. Frustrated, Hawkwood threw away his baton of command and pulled out his sword, returning to his own division at the shout of “Carne, Carne” (“Flesh, Flesh”).
Lances broken or discarded and the melee become close combat, the Veronese tried again to pass over the ditch by filling it with bundles of sticks. Fighting now with axes and other sharp-edged weapons, Francesco Novello and his troops engaged the Veronese in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, as the dead and the wounded started to pile up in the ditch. However, in their effort to attack and capture Francesco, the Veronese had concentrated all their effort at the centre of the line, leaving Hawkwood forgotten and outside the fighting. It was the moment the English captain had been awaiting. Under the covering shot of his archers, he launched his soldiers in a charge against the enemy’s left flank and rear, the filled-in portion of the ditch allowing the English an unimpeded passage.
Completely caught by surprise, the Veronese found themselves pushed away from the Paduans and against the swamp by Hawkwood’s assault, the limited space causing them to bunch together without a chance to regroup or manoeuvre. The attackers went straight for the Scala banner, held by Francesco Visconti, pulling him from his horse and casting the standard into the mud. Seeing their insignia fall, the Veronese attempted to break loose, but too late did they turn to flee and were instead forced to surrender in droves.
Outside of the battle, the Veronese foot under Giovanni dell’Ischia (o dell’Isola) had taken up position on a canal-lined meadow near the Adige. Whether it had become too late to join the fight or because of orders to stay put, the Veronese foot soldiers had waited patiently for the outcome. Now, sunset approaching, they found themselves surrounded by the victorious Paduans and ordered to throw down their arms. Defiantly, dell’Ischia chose instead to fight, his stand, however, lasting only a short time in the face of the Paduans’ brutal assault. Those peasant levies not killed in the fighting were forced to cross the Adige in an attempt at escape; many drowned. Dell’Ischia, his honour preserved, surrendered.
The battle ended, the entire Veronese camp fell into Paduan hands, including the cart-mounted gunpowder artillery that never had a chance to fire a shot. Ransomable prisoners amounted to 3,284, including several citizens of Verona. The total number of men-at-arms captured amounted to an impressive 4,620, with eighty senior and junior Veronese commanders being taken. The killed totalled 716, a number inflated by dell’Ischia defiance, while the seriously wounded among the Veronese peasants alone came to 846. These were all freed by Francesco il Vecchio’s generosity — although relieving himself from providing medical assistance sounds somewhat less generous — while the other prisoners were taken to Padua in triumph. Francesco Novello was, of course, lionized for his performance, even if everyone recognised that the battle had been won “thanks to the efforts of Sir John Hawkwood”.
Niccolò Capponi is a leading historian of military warfare in Renaissance Italy. His most recent book is The Day the Renaissance Was Saved: The Battle of Anghiari and da Vinci’s Lost Masterpiece. Kelly DeVries is a professor of history at Loyola University Maryland and Honorary Historical Consultant at the Royal Armouries, UK. You can listen to him on the podcast Bow & Blade.
You can read more in Castagnaro 1387: Hawkwood’s Great Victory, by Niccolò Capponi and Kelly DeVries.
This article was first published in Medieval Warfare magazine.
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