In the ninth century, Carolingian rulers faced the challenge of defending their realms against Vikings, Muslims, and rival lords. Their solution was a highly organized system of military service that tied obligations directly to wealth and social status.
By David Bachrach
There is general agreement that up through the later eighth century, the Carolingian rulers of the regnum Francorum could summon broad sections of the population for both offensive and defensive military operations. By contrast, there is considerable disagreement among scholars about the survival of military service by militia forces during the ninth century and beyond for offensive campaigns and even for local defense.
Famously, Timothy Reuter argued that the provisions in the Carolingian capitularies in the early ninth century, which commanded poorer men to club together to send one of their number to the army, referred to the obligation for local defense. Reuter asserted that the material well-being of the small landowners in the regnum Francorum had been shattered by the numerous wars undertaken by Charlemagne (768–814) and that only a remnant had the wherewithal to defend the realm against foreign attack.
Less famously, but with much greater insight, Walter Goffart argued that the early ninth-century capitularies showed nothing of the sort. He argued that the sophisticated administrative apparatus of the Frankish realm was capable of sorting men according to their wealth down to the lowest economic levels of society. The clubbing together of men with limited economic means was, for Charlemagne, a mechanism of assuring that all men capable of doing so did their duty to the res publica, and ultimately to God. Rather controversially, however, Goffart argued that there was no distinction in governmental regulations between service in offensive and defensive military operations. Thus, in his view, individuals with income lower than that stipulated in the “clubbing” provisions of Charlemagne’s capitulary were deemed too poor for military service of any sort, including participation in the local defense.
Three documents produced within a few decades of each other in each of the three kingdoms established by Charlemagne’s grandsons Lothair I (840–854), Louis the German (840–876), and Charles the Bald (840–877) indicate that Goffart had the better argument than Reuter. However, Goffart also was mistaken when he claimed that there was no distinction in the eyes of the Carolingian rulers and their advisors regarding the economic requirements for service on campaign and the requirements for service in the local defense.
The Edict of Pîtres and the Benevento Capitulary
Scenes of war from the Stuttgarter Psalter, which was created in the 820s – Württembergische Landesbib Bibl.fol.23 fol.158v
The most famous of these texts is the Edict of Pîtres, issued by Charles the Bald in 864 in the context of intensifying Viking raids on his kingdom. This document, which was issued at a great assembly of magnates and officeholders of the realm at the royal palace Pîtres, contains several chapters (capitula) that deal specifically with the mobilization of militia forces for military service. The first of these (chapter 26) states that Franks who have sufficient wealth to own horses are to go on campaign with the count of their district (pagus) when summoned to do so. The authors of the edict were careful to state that owning a horse was not necessary, but rather that a man simply had to have sufficient wealth to own a horse to fall under this obligation.
The next capitulum (ch. 27) then provides further details about the role of the count in determining, ahead of the need to summon men for military service, just who within the pagus was subject to this obligation. Charles the Bald stated that the counts, as well as special royal officials sent from court (missi), were to undertake an investigation of the wealth of all of the free men within the comital district. On the basis of this investigation, the counts and missi were to compile lists of those men who had sufficient wealth to perform expeditionary military service without support. Then, recapitulating the terms of the edicts issued by Charlemagne in the early ninth century, the officials were to produce lists of men who had sufficient wealth such that two of them could afford to send one man on campaign, men who had sufficient wealth that three could send one, and so on up to five men sending one of their number.
Thus far, it is quite clear that Goffart was correct that the “clubbing” provisions in Charlemagne’s edicts were not evidence of a collapse in the economic well-being of the small landowners, and also that these men were expected to send some of their number on campaign. Indeed, the Edict of Pîtres specifically recalls Charlemagne’s legislation on this point as a model. However, the very next clause in this chapter makes clear that Charles the Bald intended to mobilize even those men who were too poor to perform expeditionary service as part of a club of five men. The text states that those who fell under this last wealth category were to provide labor to build bridges and fortifications and were to serve as guards in these strongholds. The final clause states that all men were required to come to the defense of their homeland, thereby leaving no doubt that local defense was a universal obligation.
Just two years later, Louis II (844–875), the eldest son of Lothair and heir to the Italian portions of his kingdom, issued an edict to prepare his realm for a campaign against Muslim forces in the region of Benevento, and to secure the realm while the royal army was on campaign. The first capitulum of this edict illuminates a very similar wealth-based division of military labor as that seen in the Edict of Pîtres. Any man whose wealth was equal to the highest blood price in the law (Wehrgeld) was required to join the army for the campaign. These were generally men of the highest social and economic status as well as those who had special legal protections on the basis of their service for the king. For those men whose property was valued at a mid-level Wehrgeld, two were to join together and send one of their number on campaign. Poorer people, including those with as little as ten shillings in moveable property, were required to serve in garrison. By contrast with the situation in West Francia under Charles the Bald, no military service was required of individuals with moveable property worth less than 10 shillings.
At first glance, the Benevento Capitulary, as it is known, appears to limit the obligations for military service to a much greater extent than was the case in West Francia, particularly for the very poor. However, these limitations were balanced, at least to a degree, by the fact that often more than one man from each obligated family had to go on campaign. If a father had only two sons, then the more fit one was to join the army. However, if a father had multiple sons, all but one had to go on campaign. The same provision was in force when several brothers jointly held property.
One last point of similarity between the Edict of Pîtres and the Benevento capitulary is that royal officials were in charge of summoning these militia forces for war and for ensuring that no one shirked his duties. Louis II stated emphatically that his missi were to confiscate the property of any man who sought to evade going on campaign. Moreover, he forbade any count to excuse, on his own authority, anyone from the required military service.
Louis the German’s Charter
Wandalbert of Prüm presents his martyrology to a king, probably Louis the German, in a 9th-century illustration – Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Reg. lat. 438, fol. 1v.
The final document is a charter issued by Louis the German two decades earlier (845) for the bishopric of Hildesheim. The purpose of this document was to confirm the rights and privileges of the diocese. From a military perspective, many bishops in the East Frankish realm, including Bishop Altfrid (851–874), desired autonomy from the royally appointed counts in whose districts the diocese held property. This autonomy, denoted in Carolingian charters as an immunity, meant that the bishop rather than the count was responsible for mobilizing the dependents of the bishop for military campaigns. These dependents included members of the bishop’s household as well as tenants living on the lands owned by the diocese. Notably, Louis the German’s charter specifies that the bishop now had the authority delegated from the king to mobilize men of high social status (nobiles), free men (liberi), bound tenants (coloni), and even unfree men (servi). This clause makes clear that the governmental obligation for service on campaign was imposed on men of elite and humble status alike, free as well as unfree, so long as they possessed wealth sufficient to make them liable for service on campaign.
These three documents, all produced within a space of two decades across the great expanse of the lands of the Carolingian Empire, tell the same story. The service of militia forces on campaign remained the norm well into the ninth century. The royal governments in West Francia, Italy, and in East Francia all regulated this service, and their royal officials, particularly counts and missi, took the leading role in assessing men for military duty and assuring that they appeared when summoned.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” in Medieval Politics and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 231-250, originally published in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th series 35 (1985), 75-94.
In the ninth century, Carolingian rulers faced the challenge of defending their realms against Vikings, Muslims, and rival lords. Their solution was a highly organized system of military service that tied obligations directly to wealth and social status.
By David Bachrach
There is general agreement that up through the later eighth century, the Carolingian rulers of the regnum Francorum could summon broad sections of the population for both offensive and defensive military operations. By contrast, there is considerable disagreement among scholars about the survival of military service by militia forces during the ninth century and beyond for offensive campaigns and even for local defense.
Famously, Timothy Reuter argued that the provisions in the Carolingian capitularies in the early ninth century, which commanded poorer men to club together to send one of their number to the army, referred to the obligation for local defense. Reuter asserted that the material well-being of the small landowners in the regnum Francorum had been shattered by the numerous wars undertaken by Charlemagne (768–814) and that only a remnant had the wherewithal to defend the realm against foreign attack.
Less famously, but with much greater insight, Walter Goffart argued that the early ninth-century capitularies showed nothing of the sort. He argued that the sophisticated administrative apparatus of the Frankish realm was capable of sorting men according to their wealth down to the lowest economic levels of society. The clubbing together of men with limited economic means was, for Charlemagne, a mechanism of assuring that all men capable of doing so did their duty to the res publica, and ultimately to God. Rather controversially, however, Goffart argued that there was no distinction in governmental regulations between service in offensive and defensive military operations. Thus, in his view, individuals with income lower than that stipulated in the “clubbing” provisions of Charlemagne’s capitulary were deemed too poor for military service of any sort, including participation in the local defense.
Three documents produced within a few decades of each other in each of the three kingdoms established by Charlemagne’s grandsons Lothair I (840–854), Louis the German (840–876), and Charles the Bald (840–877) indicate that Goffart had the better argument than Reuter. However, Goffart also was mistaken when he claimed that there was no distinction in the eyes of the Carolingian rulers and their advisors regarding the economic requirements for service on campaign and the requirements for service in the local defense.
The Edict of Pîtres and the Benevento Capitulary
The most famous of these texts is the Edict of Pîtres, issued by Charles the Bald in 864 in the context of intensifying Viking raids on his kingdom. This document, which was issued at a great assembly of magnates and officeholders of the realm at the royal palace Pîtres, contains several chapters (capitula) that deal specifically with the mobilization of militia forces for military service. The first of these (chapter 26) states that Franks who have sufficient wealth to own horses are to go on campaign with the count of their district (pagus) when summoned to do so. The authors of the edict were careful to state that owning a horse was not necessary, but rather that a man simply had to have sufficient wealth to own a horse to fall under this obligation.
The next capitulum (ch. 27) then provides further details about the role of the count in determining, ahead of the need to summon men for military service, just who within the pagus was subject to this obligation. Charles the Bald stated that the counts, as well as special royal officials sent from court (missi), were to undertake an investigation of the wealth of all of the free men within the comital district. On the basis of this investigation, the counts and missi were to compile lists of those men who had sufficient wealth to perform expeditionary military service without support. Then, recapitulating the terms of the edicts issued by Charlemagne in the early ninth century, the officials were to produce lists of men who had sufficient wealth such that two of them could afford to send one man on campaign, men who had sufficient wealth that three could send one, and so on up to five men sending one of their number.
Thus far, it is quite clear that Goffart was correct that the “clubbing” provisions in Charlemagne’s edicts were not evidence of a collapse in the economic well-being of the small landowners, and also that these men were expected to send some of their number on campaign. Indeed, the Edict of Pîtres specifically recalls Charlemagne’s legislation on this point as a model. However, the very next clause in this chapter makes clear that Charles the Bald intended to mobilize even those men who were too poor to perform expeditionary service as part of a club of five men. The text states that those who fell under this last wealth category were to provide labor to build bridges and fortifications and were to serve as guards in these strongholds. The final clause states that all men were required to come to the defense of their homeland, thereby leaving no doubt that local defense was a universal obligation.
Just two years later, Louis II (844–875), the eldest son of Lothair and heir to the Italian portions of his kingdom, issued an edict to prepare his realm for a campaign against Muslim forces in the region of Benevento, and to secure the realm while the royal army was on campaign. The first capitulum of this edict illuminates a very similar wealth-based division of military labor as that seen in the Edict of Pîtres. Any man whose wealth was equal to the highest blood price in the law (Wehrgeld) was required to join the army for the campaign. These were generally men of the highest social and economic status as well as those who had special legal protections on the basis of their service for the king. For those men whose property was valued at a mid-level Wehrgeld, two were to join together and send one of their number on campaign. Poorer people, including those with as little as ten shillings in moveable property, were required to serve in garrison. By contrast with the situation in West Francia under Charles the Bald, no military service was required of individuals with moveable property worth less than 10 shillings.
At first glance, the Benevento Capitulary, as it is known, appears to limit the obligations for military service to a much greater extent than was the case in West Francia, particularly for the very poor. However, these limitations were balanced, at least to a degree, by the fact that often more than one man from each obligated family had to go on campaign. If a father had only two sons, then the more fit one was to join the army. However, if a father had multiple sons, all but one had to go on campaign. The same provision was in force when several brothers jointly held property.
One last point of similarity between the Edict of Pîtres and the Benevento capitulary is that royal officials were in charge of summoning these militia forces for war and for ensuring that no one shirked his duties. Louis II stated emphatically that his missi were to confiscate the property of any man who sought to evade going on campaign. Moreover, he forbade any count to excuse, on his own authority, anyone from the required military service.
Louis the German’s Charter
The final document is a charter issued by Louis the German two decades earlier (845) for the bishopric of Hildesheim. The purpose of this document was to confirm the rights and privileges of the diocese. From a military perspective, many bishops in the East Frankish realm, including Bishop Altfrid (851–874), desired autonomy from the royally appointed counts in whose districts the diocese held property. This autonomy, denoted in Carolingian charters as an immunity, meant that the bishop rather than the count was responsible for mobilizing the dependents of the bishop for military campaigns. These dependents included members of the bishop’s household as well as tenants living on the lands owned by the diocese. Notably, Louis the German’s charter specifies that the bishop now had the authority delegated from the king to mobilize men of high social status (nobiles), free men (liberi), bound tenants (coloni), and even unfree men (servi). This clause makes clear that the governmental obligation for service on campaign was imposed on men of elite and humble status alike, free as well as unfree, so long as they possessed wealth sufficient to make them liable for service on campaign.
These three documents, all produced within a space of two decades across the great expanse of the lands of the Carolingian Empire, tell the same story. The service of militia forces on campaign remained the norm well into the ninth century. The royal governments in West Francia, Italy, and in East Francia all regulated this service, and their royal officials, particularly counts and missi, took the leading role in assessing men for military duty and assuring that they appeared when summoned.
David Bachrach is a Professor at the University of New Hampshire, where he researches medieval military history, particularly in England and Germany.
Click here to read more from David Bachrach
Further Readings:
Walter Goffart, “The Recruitment of Freemen into the Carolingian Army, or, How Far May one Argue from Silence?” Journal of Medieval Military History 16 (2018), 17-33.
Timothy Reuter, “The End of Carolingian Military Expansion,” in Medieval Politics and Modern Mentalities, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 231-250, originally published in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 5th series 35 (1985), 75-94.
Subscribe to Medievalverse
Related Posts