Posts Tagged ‘Maritime Studies’

Dark Age Traffic on the Bristol Channel, UK: A Hypothesis

By Nancy Hollinrake

International Journal of Nautical Archaeology, Vol.36:2 (2007)

Abstract: Exotic pottery from the eastern Mediterranean and southern Gaul in the late 5th to 7th centuries is recognized as the characteristic find from Dark Age sites in Ireland and western Britain. But there is no consensus on the mechanisms by which they arrived. Interpretations range from diplomatic gifts through souvenirs to commerce. This attempt to resolve the issue is based on sites around the Bristol Channel. The quantities of pottery and numbers of sites are used to generate a rough estimate of the number of ships carrying the pottery to the area. It is argued that the estimated volume represents commercial trade.

Introduction: Since the 1960s it has been known that the Bristol Channel area was a major trade route for the importation of goods from the Mediterranean and Gaul in the Dark Ages, the period between the fall of the Roman Empire in Britain and the establishment of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms in the West of Britain. In Somerset this dates roughly from AD 400 to 700, while the same period was extended in Wales until the disruptions of the Viking attacks. During this time the indigenous post-Roman British and Irish populations conducted their own affairs. The evidence for this exotic trade is in the form of pottery, but there may also have been perishable goods for which we now have no evidence. Find-spots of this pottery occur throughout the western parts of the British Isles, chiefly at or near to the coasts of Cornwall, Devon, Somerset, Wales, Ireland and Scotland. The dates of the finds suggest that they were imported into Britain throughout the 5th and 6th centuries.

Excavation of this type of pottery is often the clearest sign of the re-occupation of Iron-Age hillforts, suggesting aristocratic associations, but it is also found on other types of site as well. Sites like Trethurgy Round in Cornwall, for example, appear to show all the signs of being defended farmsteads, while Reask and Whithorn are monastic sites. Although Glastonbury and Carhampton are also monasteries, the imported pottery from both those sites was found in close association with metal-working. No clear pattern of deposition has so far emerged, although the suggestion that the imports should be considered to represent much-sought-after high-status items and commodities is difficult to refute.

Such large quantities of this pottery have been recovered from Tintagel that many scholars suggest this as proof of a commercial basis to the transactions, although other mechanisms have been put forward to account for this importation, such as gift-exchange, the high status of the site, and personal purchases by pilgrims to the Holy Land. Harris has suggested that the Mediterranean imports could have arrived in Britain as diplomatic gifts from the Emperor Justinian, who ruled Byzantium between 527 and 565. Apart from Tintagel, there is general agreement that the volume of the pottery is not great. The quantity of the trade, however, is crucial for its interpretation; only large quantities of imports may be interpreted as the product of commercial trade.

The Bristol Channel lies to the north of Cornwall, between south Wales and the coasts of Devon and Somerset, narrowing at its eastern end in the estuary of the River Severn. Lundy Island lies at its south-western margin. With the publication of the excavations at South Cadbury in Somerset, and other publications of excavated Dark Age sites in that region, it is now possible to quantify the imported pottery found in this part of the seaway.

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Quentovic defined

By David Hill et al.

Antiquity, Vol.64 (1990)

Abstract: Some of the major sea-ports of medieval Europe still continue and flourish as ports; medieval Hamwic became the container port of Southampton. Some have faded away, as their harbours have silted or the pattern of trade has moved away. Some have so completely failed that certain knowledge ofwhat and where they were has been forgotten. Chief of these lost ports of Europe is Quentovic, whose site has been sought in northern France and is here defined in the Canche valley, south of Boulogne.

Introduction: The principal early medieval port in northern France, and perhaps the most important seaport of the Franks, certainly of the Frankish homelands, was Quentovic. The place-name is variously rendered and means ‘the market on the Canche’, a minor river with a large estuary lying some 18 miles (29 km) south of Boulogne. The site was famous throughout the northern world and appears in chronicles, laws, coin inscriptions (both Merovingian and Carolingian), saints’ lives and charters. In recent decades there has been an upsurge in interest in sites of this type, categorized in recent works as ‘emporia’ and in contemporary sources as ‘vicus’ or ‘wik’. Yet the site of Quentovic had not been satisfactorily located.

Many places have been put forward as the site of Quentovic over the past 140 years. These are located mainly, though not exclusively, within the Canche Valley from Montreuil to the sea at Etaples or Le Touquet. Interest in the site is enhanced for British archaeologists by Quentovic being the recognized port of entry for the hosts of Anglo-Saxon pilgrims flooding down the roads to Rome. The site flourished from the 6th century until it disappeared from view in the mid 9th century AD. There is an as yet unexplained epilogue marked by a 10th century coinage issued in the name, and in the types, of the 9th-century Charles the Bald, and struck in the name of a possibly vanished Quentovic. All of the available evidence was admirably summarized by Dhondt but since then the matter has rested.

In 1973 Roman pottery kilns were discovered during road improvements near La Calotterie, south of the Canche and well inland from the present coast. These Roman finds lay in an area which, until then, had not been considered as occupied in antiquity; and therefore it now became another candidate for the site of Quentovic. Soon after this, further accidental finds were made some 350 m to the north of the Roman kiln sites. A farmer cutting ditches unearthed a considerable number of human bones, associated with a wide range of material, worked stone, flints, ironwork and some pottery. Some of these pottery types were clearly Carolingian and a little could have been of Merovingian date. A brief rescue excavation was carried out by Pierre Leman. Although the range of material was confusing, Leman was convinced that this site was associated with Quentovic.

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Byzantium, the Italian maritime powers, and the Black Sea before 1204

By David Jacoby

Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Volume 100, Issue 2 (2008)

Introduction: Genoa was the last among the three major Italian maritime nations of the eleventh-twelfth centuries to obtain commercial and fiscal privileges in Byzantium. These privileges were granted by Emperor Manuel I Komnenos in 1155, yet the emperor severely curtailed them in October 1169. He also introduced a restrictive clause regarding Genoese commercial ships. They were allowed to sail freely to all Byzantine regions, except to Rhosia and Matracha, although exceptional imperial permission was envisaged. This clause was repeated in the agreement concluded in 1192 between Emperor Isaac II Angelos and Genoa.

The suggestion that Rhosia in that context referred to the Black Sea and Matracha to the Sea of Azov has been decisively rejected. It is commonly agreed that the two names applied to specific localities. Matracha or Matrica is identified with Tmutorokan, on the peninsula of Taman on the eastern shore of the Straits of Kerch. The location of Rhosia is unclear. It has been suggested that it was either situated on the eastern or the western shore of the Straits of Kerch. However, no such toponym appears in later nautical guides or atlases.

On the other hand, a late thirteenth-century addition to the “Compasso de Navegare” mentions Casale de Rossi on the western shore of the Sea of Azov, at 30 miles west of Cabardi or Taganrog, thus far removed from Matracha. This locality is called Rosso inthe Catalan atlas of 1375 and in the sixteenth-century atlas of Antonio Millo.

Opinions widely differ as to the nature, scope and implications of the ban imposed in1169 upon the Genoese. The most widely shared view is that the ban reflected a general imperial policy preventing Westeners from trading in the Black Sea, implemented until 1204. This view implies that the citizens of the major Italian maritime powers, Venice, Pisa and Genoa, were eager to trade in the Black Sea in the twelfth century, as suggested by the intense Genoese and Venetian activity in that region after the Byzantine recovery of Constantinople in 1261. Some have contended that the restriction mentioned in the chrysobull of 1169 was limited to the Genoese and to the two localities of Rhosia and Matracha and, therefore, did not apply to the Venetians or the Pisans.

It has also been argued that, on the contrary, the citizens of these two nations were barred from the Black Sea and that Manuel I granted the Genoese a preferential treatment, since the prohibition to trade in the Sea of Azov implies that that they were allowed to operate in the Black Sea. A case has been made for the free access of the Venetians to the Black Sea before 1204, without referring to other nations. A further explanation is that all western ships were free to sail in the Black Sea, yet without enjoying the partial or full tax exemptions granted to their respective nations.

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Constans II and the Byzantine navy

By Salvatore Cosentino

Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Volume 100, Issue 2  (2008)

Introduction: At the beginning of the twentieth century John B. Bury saw in Constans II the creator of the Byzantine navy. Even if this assumption has been contradicted by some authoritative scholars, as H. Ahrweiler, other historians over the last century have agreed with it and this has been re-asserted in a very recent study. Long after Octavianus, Constans II was the sole Roman emperor who participated in a naval battle and he will remain as such in the whole Byzantine history.

Moreover, it is only starting from his reign that the navy began to play a more important role in the Roman/Byzantine military apparatus, or at least to be more visible in our evidence. It seems worth, therefore, to devote a closer analysis to this issue. But before doing that, a preliminary question has to be answered: what was the military fleet before Constans II composed of?

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The origins of intensive marine fishing in medieval Europe: the English evidence

By James H. Barrett, Alison M. Locker and Callum M. Roberts

Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Vol.271 (2004)

Abstract: The catastrophic impact of fishing pressure on species such as cod and herring is well documented. However, the antiquity of their intensive exploitation has not been established. Systematic catch statistics are only available for ca.100 years, but large-scale fishing industries existed in medieval Europe and the expansion of cod fishing from the fourteenth century (first in Iceland, then in Newfoundland) played an important role in the European colonization of the Northwest Atlantic.

History has demonstrated the scale of these late medieval and post-medieval fisheries, but only archaeology can illuminate earlier practices. Zooarchaeological evidence shows that the clearest changes in marine fishing in England between AD 600 and 1600 occurred rapidly around AD 1000 and involved large increases in catches of herring and cod.

Surprisingly, this revolution predated the documented post-medieval expansion of England’s sea fisheries and coincided with the Medieval Warm Period—when natural herring and cod productivity was probably low in the North Sea. This counterintuitive discovery can be explained by the concurrent rise of urbanism and human impacts on freshwater ecosystems. The search for ‘pristine’ baselines regarding marine ecosystems will thus need to employ medieval palaeoecological proxies in addition to recent fisheries data and early modern historical records.

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English seamanship and the Atlantic crossing c.1480-1500

By Susan Rose

Journal for Maritime Research, (2002)

Introduction: Two recent events have focused attention on the Atlantic. On the one hand a young women has crossed from the Canaries to Barbados alone in a rowing boat albeit one specially constructed and equipped. On the other hand last winter’s gales have demonstrated the ferocity of the weather that can occur on the western coasts of these islands. Newspaper reports suggest that what kept the oarswoman going was the support she was conscious of receiving especially from those sending messages to her website. In the gales there were at first no reports of ships wrecked or even in danger. Later only two were reported in difficulties and of these only one was driven ashore. The conclusion we might draw from all this is that a trans-Atlantic voyage is not really a very difficult undertaking especially with all the communication aids available to the modern sailor. Navigation and position finding can safely be left to electronics and the GPS which never makes mistakes and deep depressions can be predicted accurately in enough time to avoid their consequences.

It was, of course, all very different in the fifteenth century, but, given the circumstances of the period, were English seamen at this time actively seeking out new routes and new lands or were they plodding along following well-known paths to well-known destinations, more or less ignoring the activities of the Portuguese and Spanish seamen and pilots which were to lead before the end of the century to the European discovery of the New World?

There would seem to be certain pre-requisites for a long ocean voyage, especially one to an uncertain destination. The seamen must have confidence in their ship; the vessel must be, according to the standards of the time, truly sea-worthy, able to keep close to the wind and to ride out heavy seas. They must have confidence in their master, his navigational and ship-handling skills and his experience. They must also, it seems to me, if the voyage involves venturing outside the usual limits, trust not only their master’s skills but also his vision. Finally, as exemplified by the story of the solo oarswoman, they perhaps need to feel secure in the support of their colleagues, that others see their expedition as not only potentially exciting but also potentially successful and rewarding. Could these pre-conditions be fulfilled in England at any time in the later fifteenth century?

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The King’s Ships and The Keeping of the Seas, 1413-1480

By David Loades

Medieval History, Vol.1 (1991)

Introduction: The medieval English navy, like the parliament, was less an institution than an event.  The king had ships of his own, of varying shapes and sizes, but in small numbers. For the most part they seem to have been modest sized, single masted cogs of between 100 and 200 tons, virtually indistinguishable from the standard merchant vessels of the period. They were used for transporting the kings messengers and officials, and for bringing in wine from Bordeaux or other goods required by the royal household.

A reference from the sixteenth year of king Henry III (1232) makes it clear that when these ships were not required for the king’s purposes, they were rented out to private traders. At the same time, however, Henry had other vessels; a ‘Great Ship’ which seems to have been kept in the Portsmouth region, possibly in the Hamble estuary like later generations of royal ships; and several galleys. These last were specialised oared fighting ships adopted from the Mediterranean by way of the viking longship. We do not know how big Henry III’s galleys were, but in 1243 the Sheriff of Rye was ordered to enlarge the ‘great shed’ in which they were kept, so that it could house seven – which does not suggest great size.

Henry may have had as many as 15 or 16 ships of his own in the early 1240s, but half that number would have been less than a tenth required for a ‘navy royal’. Such a navy was invariably assembled in connection with a major military expedition, usually against France. In 1347, for example, over 700  vessels were commissioned, of which about 50 were fully equipped fighting ships and the remainder transports and barges of various kinds. Some of the vessels were taken up by ship service, and others by special commissions akin to the commissions of array which were used to raise soldiers.

Ship service was a standing arrangement of quasi-feudal nature whereby a port, or a group of ports, was bound to provide ships for the king’s use when called upon, up to a certain number and for a given period. In return the ports received certain commercial and jurisdictional privileges. The best example of this arrangements was the Cinque Ports, who regularly provided a sizeable proportion of the navy royal, and 1339 were called upon for 60 ships, fully manned and equipped.

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In the fifteenth century, a Venetian mariner, Michael of Rhodes, wrote and illustrated a text describing his experiences in the Venetian merchant and military fleets. He included a treatise on commercial mathematics and treatments of contemporary shipbuilding practices, navigation, calendrical systems, and astrological ideas. This manuscript, “lost,” or at least in unknown hands for over 400 years, has never been published or translated in its entirety until now.

In 1966 the manuscript resurfaced, but was bought up by a private collector.  Then, in the year 2000, a new owner allowed unprecedented access to the manuscript to the  Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology.  A special project was started in 2003 with an international team of scholars working on the various subjects and topics raised by the manuscript.  They are led by Dr. Pamela O. Long, an independent historian of Medieval and Renaissance science and technology, Dr. David McGee, Research Director of the Burndy Library, and Dr. Alan M. Stahl, Curator of Numismatics at Princeton University.

In the spring of 2009, we interviewed these three scholars during the International Congress on Medieval Studies:

The outcome of this project is a three-volume book:

Volume 1 is a facsimile of the manuscript, reproduced in full color. The text is written out by hand and beautifully illustrated (probably at least in part by Michael himself), featuring color diagrams and illustrations of naval architecture, original drawings of astrological signs, calendrical charts, and a coat of arms Michael devised for himself.

Volume 2 contains a transcription of the handwritten text in the medieval Venetian dialect of Italian and, on facing pages, its translation into modern English. Michael’s book includes the first extant treatise on naval architecture, a 200-page treatise on mathematics in the tradition of medieval and Renaissance abacus manuscripts, texts on navigation including portolans (sailing directions), and Michael’s autobiographical service record—unique for Venice in this period and noteworthy for being the personal record of a man of non-noble status and foreign birth.

In volume 3, nine experts, including the editors, discuss the manuscript, its historical context, and its scholarly importance. Their essays examine the Venetian maritime world of the fifteenth century, Michael’s life, the discovery of the manuscript, the mathematics in the book, the use of illustration, the navigational directions, Michael’s knowledge of shipbuilding in the Venetian context, and the manuscript’s extensive calendrical material.

Watch our Book Review

See also:

The Michael of Rhodes website – great online resource with portions and images from the manuscript

Michael of Rhodes: A Fifteenth-Century Mariner and His Book –  by Pamela O. Long, from Technology and Culture

Michael of Rhodes: A Fifteenth-Century Mariner and His Book

By Pamela O. Long

Technology and Culture, Vol. 50 No. 1 (2009)

Introduction: The ship on the cover is a galley of the Flanders type used by Venetians during the first half of the fifteenth century for convoys to London and Flanders. It is an image (on fol. 145b) from an extraordinary manuscript—a book by a mariner who began his career as an oarsman on a Venetian galley in 1401. “Michalli da Ruodo,” anglicized as Michael of Rhodes, worked on more than forty voyages in Venetian convoys from 1401 until his death in 1445, advancing from an oarsman—a low-status position at the bottom of the ship’s hierarchy—to the highest position that a nonnoble individual could attain: armiraio. (The armiraio served as the captain and navigator of a convoy, usually made up of three or more ships.) Even more remarkable, Michael wrote a book. In fact, as we discovered, he wrote two books! The first, written mostly around 1435 and 1436, has only now become available for study and is the focus of this essay. The illustration of the Flanders galley is found in the section on shipbuilding within this book.

A three-volume facsimile edition of this manuscript will appear in 2009, published by MIT Press. The codex, which is more than 400 pages (or 200 folios) long, adds significantly to the small body of writings by nonelite persons from the early fifteenth century. It is of intense interest for other reasons as well. It contains an approximately 180-page (90-folio) treatise on commercial mathematics, and it adds significantly to the small number of medieval books on mathematics that have a Venetian provenance. It also contains the above-mentioned treatise on shipbuilding—the earliest extant treatise on the subject in the world. It contains a remarkable autobiographical service record in which Michael records each of his annual voyages. Further, it includes much calendrical and astrological material, charming illustrations of the signs of the zodiac, illustrations pertaining to shipbuilding (including the image of the fully rigged Flanders galley featured here), and other images, including Michael’s own coat-of-arms with an “M” emblazoned in the center. The colors of this coat-of-arms, gold and silver, also appear on the flag flying on the galley illustrated on the cover. Such a flag was permitted only to noble commanders, just as heraldic coats of-arms were considered the exclusive prerogative of the noble class. Michael’s transgressive individuality is much in evidence here.

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See more at our Feature Report on Michael of Rhodes

The Battle of Malta, 1283: Prelude to a Disaster

By Lawrence Mott

The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, edited by Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon (Boydell & Brewer, 1999)

Introduction: On 8 June 1283, a naval battle took place in the Grand Harbor of Malta which would have profound repercussions on the ability of the Angevins to wage war for the rest of the conflict known as the War of the Sicilian Vespers. Not only would the battle bring to prominence for the first time Admiral Roger de Lauria,who would go on to become one of the great admirals of the period, but it would also lay the groundwork for the failure of the French crusade against Aragon two-years later.

The battle of Malta is one of the rare cases in the war where an Aragonese fleet met a fleet composed entirely of Provençal ships and crews. The only other instance occurred at the battle of Las Rosas, but, as will be shown, the quality and type of French units deployed at that battle were to a large extent dictated by the results of the earlier battle at Malta. For the above reasons, thebattle of Malta offers an opportunity to evaluate both the ships and tactics of two homogeneous fleets without the ambiguities that attend the interpretation of abattle in which one of the fleets, composed of units from various city-states, is plagued by the problems of unity of command, differing tactics within the fleet, and less than enthusiastic participation on the part of one or more of the units. Moreover, the results of the battle of Malta suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the ships and tactics used by the fleets in the western Mediterranean were virtually identical, the Catalans and Aragonese employed subtle, but effective, differences in ship design and tactics to become the pre-eminent naval power in the western basin. This paper will analyze the differences in the tactics and ships utilized by both sides in the battle of Malta, and outline the effects the Angevin defeat there would have on the failed crusade of Philip III.

The battle of Malta was not the first naval engagement between the Aragonese fleet and the forces of Charles of Anjou, but the result of an engagementwhich had occurred nine months before. Following the Sicilian revolt against Angevin rule in April 1282, Pedro III of Aragon (1276-1285) laid claim to Sicily based on his wife’s connection to the Hohenstaufen family. He invaded Sicily in June and by late September of 1282, Charles had been forced to abandon the siege of Messina and cross the straits to Reggio on the coast of Calabria. The actual size of the fleet Charles took with him to Reggio is hard to determine based on the chronicles. Neocastro and Desclot are in virtual agreement, with the former putting the number of vessels at fifty-two galleys, while the latter simply states there were a total of seventy vessels, including auxiliaries. Muntaner gives an apparently inflated figure of a total of 120 galleys plusassorted transports. Based on the chronicles, it appears that the Angevin fleetwas composed of twenty-two to twenty-four galleys with an accompanying flotilla of thirty to forty tarides, armed lenys, and barges.

In response to Charles’s retreat to Reggio, Pedro III had a fleet assembled in Messina in order to intercept the Angevin fleet as it attempted to pass north through the straits. Nominal command of the fleet at this time hadbeen given to the natural son of King Pedro, Jaime Perez, but for this operation Pedro de Queralt and Ramon de Cortada were placed in command. Muntaner states that the king wished his son to remain in order to oversee the fleet at Messina, but the appointment of Queralt and Cortada may have signaled a growing lack of faith in the leadership abilities of Perez. In any case the two vice-admirals were placed in command of sixteen galleys.

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