

confused natures—at their Council of 754, but their arguments lead to Monophysitism. All the emphasis is placed on the divinity of Christ. Because they thought of Christ mostly as God, they turned and accused the iconophiles of Nestorianism, when the iconophiles told them that He was also a man, and as such He could be circumscribed. There is no doubt that the iconoclastic Christology had Monophysite tendencies. What we cannot say with certainty, due to the lack of the iconoclastic writings, is whether the iconoclasts were Monophysites by intention, or without realizing it they fell into Monophysitism. But again, we must keep in mind that many of the leaders and followers of iconoclasm were of Monophysite origin, Armenians and Syrians. No matter what their true intentions were, however, their attacks on the images forced the Church to define the meaning and the use of the image in Christianity.⁷⁵

In conclusion we can say that the true motives of iconoclasm were religious, based on the arguments of a small segment within the Church opposing the use of the image since antiquity. The main charge of the iconoclasts against the use of the images was that of "idolatry," and it was mainly based on the Old Testament prohibitions. They also made use of the early objections of the Church against the use of the images in worship. As time went on during the controversy, the iconoclastic arguments with Constantine V took Christological character. But again this theology was not something new and original, it was formulated by Eusebius of Caesaria based on Christological arguments. The Eusebian origin of this theology, however, did not help the iconoclasts too much. Being a semi-Arian, Eusebius could not be accepted as an authority of Orthodox theology. Going deeper in the examination of the theology of the iconoclasts, we notice their Monophysitic tendencies. The divinity of Christ is so overemphasized while His humanity is completely overlooked.

So, despite the ancient origin of the iconoclastic theological arguments, iconoclasm was a failure. Its arguments were out-dated, because they came from a small segment opposing the general feeling of the Church. At the same time the icon was associated with the triumph of Christianity and the development of the orthodox theology of the Church. It was looked upon as part of the pure and sacred tradition of the Church, that is why those who attacked it were condemned as heretics.

St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church, Bethlehem Pa.

75. T. Sideris, "The Theological Position of the Iconophiles during the Iconoclastic Controversy," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, 17 (1973), 210-36.

NORMAN TOBIAS (Newark, N.J., U.S.A.)

*The Tactics and Strategy of
Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae, 1078*

The reconstruction of battles in Byzantine history is difficult, for historical information is almost invariably meager. Adrianople (378), Châlons (450), Daras (530), Taginae (552), and Manzikert (1071) are the best known of the rare exceptions to this rule. To this list Calavrytae should be added.¹ It is significant for military history because it provides a glimpse into the state of the "Art militaire" of the empire in the crucial eleventh century and reveals a continuity in the Byzantine art of war that post-dates the collapse of the traditional theme system.²

In this article I shall undertake two things. First, I shall thoroughly analyze the battle for which we have two separate and detailed accounts. One is provided by the *Alexiad* of Princess Anna Comnena, the daughter of the Domestic of the Schools, who led the imperial forces.³ The other is by the eldest

1. Joan M. Hussey, "The Later Macedonians, the Comneni and the Angeli 1025-1204," in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, ed. J.B. Bury, et al., 8 vols. in 9 pts. (Cambridge, Eng.: The Univ. Press, 1924-67), IV, pt. 1, 211, for example, just states that Alexius defeated Bryennius without even mentioning the battle field.

2. For the period of the eleventh century, see C. Neumann, "La situation mondiale dans l'empire byzantin avant les Croisades," *Revue de l'orient latin*, 10 (1905), 57-171; R.J.H. Jenkins, *The Byzantine Empire on the Eve of the Crusades* (London: Published for the Historical Association by G. Philip, 1953); P. Charanis, "The Byzantine Empire in the Eleventh Century," in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K.N. Setton (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1955-), I, 177-219; S. Vryonis, "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*, 2 (1959), 159-75; *idem*, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1971), esp. pp. 70-142.

3. There are two editions of the *Alexiad*: The first is Anna Comnena, *Alexiadis libri XV*, ed. L. Schopen and A. Reifferschied, 2 vols., *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae* (Bonn: Impensis E. Weberi, 1839 and 1878). A more recent edition with a French translation is Anne Comnène, *Alexiade (règne de l'empereur Alexius I Comnène, 1081-1118)*, ed. and trans. B. Leib, 3 vols. (Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles lettres," 1937-45). As the Bonn edition is more readily available, it will be cited first with the Leib edition added after it. All quotes, however, will employ the Leib edition. There is also an English translation by Elizabeth A.S. Dawes, *The Alexiad of the Princess Anna Comnena, Being the History of the Reign of Her Father, Alexius I, Emperor of the Romans, 1081-1118 A.D.* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1928). On Anna Comnena, see W. Miller, "A Byzantine Blue Stocking: Anna Comnena," in *idem*, *Essays on the Latin Orient* (Cambridge, Eng.: The Univ. Press, 1921), pp. 533-50; Naomi Mitchison, *Anna Comnena* (London: G. Howe, Ltd., 1928); Georgina Buckler, *Anna Comnena: A Study* (Oxford: At the Univ. Press, 1929); F.J. Foakes-Jackson, "Anna Comnena," *Hibbert Journal*,

son of the leader of the insurgents, Nicephorus Bryennius, also named Nicephorus Bryennius.⁴ By comparing their two accounts, I hope to present some notion of the strategy and tactics employed by the contestants. In addition, the tactics of Calavrytae will be compared with the tactics outlined by Leo the Wise (886-911) in his *Tactica*.⁵ By comparing the empire in its heyday (tenth century) with the eleventh century, one will be able to determine to what degree there was continuity in Byzantine military practice.

The Prelude

The battle of Calavrytae arose from a revolt and advance on Constantinople by Nicephorus Bryennius, the Dux of Dyrrachium.⁶ Sent to this strategic outpost by the Emperor Michael VII Ducas (1071-78), Bryennius' task was to quell the recent rebellions.⁷ According to his eldest son, the success of his mission led to innuendos at court that he was conspiring against the emperor.⁸ Anna Comnena, however, claims that Bryennius already had designs against his former benefactor.⁹ Be that as it may, a rebellion broke out and Michael Ducas displayed his usual ineptitude in dealing with it.¹⁰

The insurgents, on the other hand, acted quickly. While John Bryennius, the pretender's brother, won over the local Thracian nobility, Nicephorus, following the traditional invasion route (the Via Egnatia), marched through the western provinces without meeting resistance.¹¹ Probably statesmanship as well as military strength were factors in his initial success, for Anna Comnena describes his progress with these words: "On his approaching any town, it

33 (1935), 430-42; B. Leib, "L'Alexiade d'Anne Comnène," *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*, NS, 1 (1946), 140-46; C. Diehl, "Anna Comnena," in *idem*, *Byzantine Emperresses* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 194-97; and R. Dalven, *Anna Comnena* (New York: Twayne, 1972).

4. Nicephorus Bryennius came from a distinguished military family and later married Anna Comnena. As a courtier he served both Alexius and John Comnenus. Nicephorus intended to write a history immortalizing his father-in-law, but it was never finished. The work deals briefly with the history of the Comnenian family from the reign of Isaac to the year 1079. The edition used was *Nicephori Bryennii Commentarii*, ed. A. Meineke, 2 pts. in 1 vol., *Corpus scriptorum histotiae byzantinae* (Bonn: Impensis E. Weberi, 1836). There is a French translation of the first four books by H. Grégoire, "Nicéphore Bryennios: Les quatre livres des histoires," *Byzantion*, 23 (1953), 469-530; 25-27 (1955-57), 881-926.

5. Edition used was Leo, *Tactica*, in *Patrologia cursus completus. Series graeco-latina*, ed. J.P. Migne, 161 vols. in 166 (Paris: Lutetiae, 1857-66), CVII.

6. Bryennius, p. 102. 14-16; *Alexiad*, p. 24. 1-2: ἀρχὴν Δυρραχίου ἐπὶ τοῦ βασιλέως Μιχαήλ: p. 17.12-13.

7. Bryennius, pp. 102. 5-22-103. 1-17.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 103. 18-105. 1-5.

9. *Alexiad*, p. 24. 2-6; and p. 17. 13-18.

10. Bryennius, pp. 108. 13-22-109. 1-10.

11. *Alexiad*, p. 24. 6-9; p. 17. 17-21; Bryennius, p. 110. 7-13. On military routes in the vicinity of Constantinople, see J. K. Jireček, *Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe* (Prag: F. Temperley, 1877), pp. 41-50.

would receive him with suppliant hands, and send him on to the next with acclaim."¹² His progress into his native Thrace was, therefore, rapid and unhindered. Only at Trajanopolis did he meet any opposition, although it was in the end the first to actually acclaim him "Emperor of the Romans."¹³ From Trajanopolis he advanced to his home town—Adrianople. All along his march he was hailed as "Emperor" by the local populace.¹⁴ At Adrianople, the strategy of the campaign was decided. The decision was not to advance with the entire army against Constantinople but to send a general with sufficient forces to negotiate with Michael Ducas.¹⁵ This task was entrusted to John Bryennius, the *Curopolates* and Domestic of the Schools for the insurgents.¹⁶ The emperor refused to negotiate. Instead, he put his trust in the city's impregnable walls and in the ability of his generals. A siege ensued, but it was indecisive and the insurgents withdrew. The siege and the proximity of the insurgents, however, toppled Michael Ducas, and Nicephorus Botaniates (1078-81) succeeded him.¹⁷

From Bryennius' first attempt to win the capital, one can divine some idea of his strategy. Basically, it was a direct approach with a single geographic objective—Constantinople. And in this lies the reason for his failure. As a modern theorist, Liddell Hart says, "A direct move on an opponent consolidates an enemy's balance, physical and psychological, and by consolidating it increases his resisting powers."¹⁸ The imperial forces, therefore, easily parried Bryennius' first effort. Undaunted by this setback, he turned to achieve his objectives through a slower and more methodical strategic dislocation. His first step was, therefore, to consolidate his gains, especially in Thrace. By this strategy, Bryennius hoped to upset the emperor's dispositions, separate him from his forces, endanger his supplies (now that Thrace was the empire's bread basket),

12. *Alexiad*, p. 24. 19-21; p. 18. 2-4: καὶ γὰρ ἐπιόντα τοῦτον αἱ πόλεις ἅπασαι ὑπταίαι χέρσῳ ὑπεδέχοντο, καὶ ἄλλη πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν μετὰ κρότου παρέπεμπεν. κρότου παρέπεμπεν.

13. Bryennius, pp. 111. 3-21-112. 1-16: . . . καὶ βασιλέα Ῥωμαίων τὸν Νικηφόρον εὐφημεῖν ἐκέλευον.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 113. 16.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 113. 19-114. 1-7.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 114. 8-11. On the office of the *Curopolates*, see J.B. Bury, *The Imperial Administrative System in the Ninth Century, With a Revised Text of the Kletorologion* (London: Pub. for the British Academy by H. Frowde, 1911), pp. 33-35.

17. Bryennius, pp. 115-21. 1-21.

18. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 340-41. Basically, the aim of any aggressor is always to take his rival's capital. If that aim, however, is too direct, it seldom is successful. Because of her unique geographical position, an attack on Constantinople was almost invariably direct. Perhaps this is the reason why Constantinople defied her enemies for over a thousand years. In modern warfare one can draw a similar analogy and attribute Germany's failure in World War I by her direct strike via the low countries. In World War II, however, Germany avoided a direct thrust through the low countries and instead made an indirect attack via the Ardennes. Because of the indirectness of her approach, victory was achieved over France in only thirty-nine days.

and secure his own base within striking distance of the capital. Psychologically, this move added to the discomfiture of all in the city, with Turks on one side and insurgents on the other. Hence, Bryennius changed his strategy from a direct to an indirect approach. The occupation of Thrace with its material and psychological effect was calculated to dislocate the emperor's balance.

Botaniates' situation deteriorated daily. "The treasury was void of money," says the historian Bryennius.¹⁹ "The Army," adds Anna Comnena, "was in ferment."²⁰ In response, Botaniates sought to buy popularity. He filled the offices of the state with sycophants. The historian Bryennius describes this inane policy with these words: "He trusted the highest dignities of the empire not to valiant warriors or heroic soldiers, or to members of the senatorial class or still to those who showed some zeal, but to all those who asked or begged him."²¹

Finally, alarmed by the news that Bryennius was massing all the available forces of Thrace and Macedonia against him, Botaniates took two decisive steps. First, he appointed Alexius Comnenus to the post of Domestic of the Schools.²² Second, he sought military aid from the Turkish Princes Mansur and Sulayman, who responded with 2,000 men and assurance of more to come.²³ Meanwhile, he sought to delay the insurgents through negotiations. Perhaps in this way Botaniates hoped to buy some vital time. On the other hand, he may have genuinely been seeking to avert an open conflict by means of some compromise. The avoidance of battle was always a cardinal principle of Byzantine strategy, which found an early proponent in Belisarius²⁴ and which is repeated in the *Strategicon* of Maurice, the *Tactica* of Leo and the

19. Bryennius, p. 129. 9-10: *καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας μετὰ βραχὺν τινα χρόνον τῶν χρομάτων ἐκκλειοιπτόων*. . .

20. *Alexiad*, pp. 24. 24-25. 1; p. 18. 5-7: *ἔξεκῦκα δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν στρατεύμα καὶ εἰς ἀμνηχανίαν τὴν βασιλείαν ὅλην ἐνέβαλλε*.

21. Bryennius, pp. 128. 5-129. 1-8.

22. *Alexiad*, p. 25. 2-4; p. 18. 7-10: *τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα τὸν Κομνηνὸν Ἀλέξων κατὰ τοῦ βρυεννίου δομέστικον τῶν σχολῶν ἄρτι προχειρισθέντα*; Bryennius, p. 130. 7-9. On Alexius, see F. Chalandon, *Les Comnène. Etudes sur l'Empire byzantin aux XI^e et XII^e siècles*, vol. I: *Essai sur le règne d'Alexis I^{er} Comnène (1081-1118)*, 2 vols. (Paris: A. Ricard et Fils, 1900-12).

23. Bryennius, p. 130. 9-15: *... δισχιλίων*. . .

24. *Procopius*, trans. H.B. Dewing, 7 vols., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954-), 1. xviii. 17-20: "men believe that there is only one victory which is unalloyed, namely to suffer no harm of the enemy. . ."; also 1. xiv. 1-3: "The first blessing is peace. . . the best general, therefore, is that one who is able to bring about peace from war. . ."

Tactica of Nicephorus Phocas.²⁵

To carry out this diplomatic maneuver Botaniates selected the veteran diplomat, the *Proedros*, Constantine Choïrosphactes²⁶ and his kinsman, Stavroromanus.²⁷ These delegates met the pretender at Theodoropolis in Thrace, where he was marshalling his army. They greeted Bryennius according to the custom demanded by protocol. He, in turn, responded with cordiality, for "he was anxious to learn the reason for the mission."²⁸ Stavroromanus in the capacity of chief ambassador spoke first followed by Constantine Choïrosphactes. In return for a suspension of hostilities Bryennius was offered the title of Caesar with the assurance that he would succeed Botaniates.²⁹

Bryennius responded that he too wished peace and concord and was ready to accept the honor which the emperor had offered him. But, he added, that it was not for himself that he desired the benefits of peace. "It is also for all those who were associated with the enterprise: generals, soldiers, and notables,"³⁰ Bryennius, however, agreed to accept the emperor's offer with the following provisions: 1.) The emperor should confirm all that he had promised his supporters; 2.) The coronation should take place in Damocrania (Thrace) in the church of the Archangel Michael.³¹ Obviously Bryennius was concerned about his safety for he said: "I fear no one but God, but I have no confidence

25. Maurice, *Strategicon*, ed. H. Mihăescu (București, 1970), pp. 166-68, emphasizes that battles are to be avoided; instead, one is to obtain one's objective by the maximum use of one's intellect. He urges the use of spies, scouts (p. 168), to gather intelligence. Then the enemy is to be countered by tricks, ambushes, raids and scorched earth policy (p. 252). Leo, *Tactica*, XX. 12, col. 1017, aptly captures the essence of this, as his words illustrate: "To master the enemy by wisdom and generalship is preferable to an open attack." See also ch. XII. 3-4, cols. 805-08; XIV. 2-3, cols. 848-49; and XX. 8-20, cols. 1017-22. This is repeated by Nicephorus Phocas in his *Στρατηγητὴ ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ Σύνταξις*, ed. by J. Kulakovskii, *Mémoires de l'Académie Imperiale des Sciences de St. Pétersbourg*, VIII^e série, Classe historico-philologique, 8, no. 9 (1908), 17-18.

26. Bryennius, p. 130. 15-17: "He is described as a cultivated and intelligent man who possessed all the qualities of a political sage." On the title of *Proedros*, see C. Diehl, "De la signification du titre de 'Proèdre' à Byzance," in *Mélanges offerts à M. Gustave Schlumberger à l'occasion du quatre-vingtième anniversaire de sa naissance, 17 octobre 1924*, 2 vols. (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1924), I, 105 ff.

27. Bryennius, p. 130. 17-18: He is described as native of Pentapolis in Phrygia who is also a clever and able man.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 130. 20-131. 1-14.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 131. 21-132. 1-8. Below is a translation of the exact words of the offer: "For a long time I have known your father, an able general, who had gained many victories over the Scythians. I have been his companion in arms and his colleague at the head of the companions. I know equally well that you are the worthy son of such a father. That is why since God has elevated me to the empire, I wish to serve you as a father, and an affectionate father. In return, be an obedient son to me and not a rebellious one. Support and prop me in my old age. For today, I offer you the dignity which comes immediately after that of the emperor, I mean to say, that of Caesar; soon you will be my successor, the heir of the Emperor of the Romans."

30. *Ibid.*, p. 132. 13-15: *ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐνμετασχόντας αὐτῷ τοῦ ἔργου, στρατηγούς τε καὶ στρατιώτας καὶ ἄρχοντας*.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 132. 19-20-133. 1-5.

in those who constitute the entourage of the emperor."³² With these counter-proposals from Bryennius, the ambassadors returned to the capital.

When the report was given to Botaniates, he doubted the possibility of an accord.³³ Instead, he decided to waste no more time, but to send Alexius Comnenus with all available forces against the insurgents. Thus the previous policy of pursuing a totally defensive strategy was abandoned. Such a policy had been the salvation of the empire in the past, for many an enemy had dashed itself against the impregnable walls of the city. Botaniates, however, recalled what had happened to his predecessor. With his position deteriorating daily, perhaps he sought to gain from the moral value of an offensive.

The Battle: Phase One

Alexius Comnenus left with all available forces, consisting of the Chomates which had come with Botaniates from Asia Minor;³⁴ a detachment of Frankish mercenaries who had come from Italy (Anna Comnena notes that this group had shrunk considerably in size);³⁵ the 2,000 Turks; and the Immortals.³⁶ The latter were created by the *Logothete* Nicephoritzes during the reign of Michael Ducas and had been designed to serve as the nucleus of a new army.³⁷ They were supposed to be an elite unit, although not seasoned veterans. Anna Comnena describes them as "having only recently grasped spear and sword."³⁸ Alexius' orders (from the emperor's council) were to engage the enemy.³⁹

As speed was of the essence, he did not wait for the arrival of additional Turkish reinforcements which had been promised earlier.⁴⁰ Perhaps by the rapidity of his march he hoped to gain his ends. Leo in his *Tactica* mentions the need of speed in an anecdote concerning Alexander the Great: "When he was asked how he was able to accomplish so much in so short a time, he said, 'By not

32. *Ibid.*, p. 133. 7-8: φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἔφησεν οὐδένα πλὴν τὸν θεόν, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ τῶν περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τοῖς πλείστοις.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 133. 14-15.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 133. 17-18: Τοὺς χωματηνοὺς λεγομένους. οἱ μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐληλύθεισαν τοῦ Βοτανειάτου; *Alexiad*, p. 25. 16; p. 18. 22: καί τινες ἐκ τοῦ χώματος στρατώται, ολίγοι . . .

35. Bryennius, p. 133. 18: καὶ φρόγγων τῶν ἐξ Ἰταλίας; *Alexiad*, p. 25. 17, 18, 22-23: καὶ κελτικὴ τις στρατὶα εἰς ολίγους τῶν περὶ ἱσταμένη.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 25. 19; 18. 25; Bryennius, p. 130. 12-15, mentions 2,000 with the promise of more to come.

37. On the reference, *ibid.*, p. 133. 20: ἀθάνατοι; *Alexiad*, p. 25. 14; p. 18. 20. On Nicephoritzes, see R. Guiland, "Les eunuques dans l'empire byzantin," *Etudes byzantines*, 1 (1943), 197-238, esp. 230-31. On the immortals and how they derived their name, see Bryennius, pp. 133. 20-134. 1-20.

38. *Alexiad*, pp. 25. 14-16; 18. 21: . . . χθές καὶ πρῶν ξίφος ἡμμένοι καὶ δόρατος. . .

39. *Ibid.*, p. 25. 19-20; p. 18. 25-26: ἐξείναι οἱ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα προσέταττον καὶ ἐμμῆσαι. τῷ Βρυεννίῳ. . .

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 26. 2; 18. 28-29: ὁ δὲ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν μὴ περιμεύας. . .

putting off for tomorrow what I could do today.'"⁴¹

Advancing into Thrace, Alexius pitched camp on the Halmyrus River (not far from the fortress of Calavrytae). Curiously he did not take precautions to fortify his camp with either a trench or a palisade.⁴² This was a violation of one of the cardinal principles of camp security. Leo's *Tactica*, the *Anonymous Vari*, and the manual of Nicephorus Phocas all emphasize security.⁴³ An encampment is imperative, say Nicephorus Phocas and the *Tactica* of Leo, even if it is for a single night.⁴⁴ According to the *Anonymous Vari*, the camp is to be protected by both an inner and outer trench.⁴⁵ The *Tactica* of Leo adds that the proper way to fortify a camp is to dig a trench, five or six feet wide and seven or eight feet deep, and to heap the earth from the trench outside in order to make an encampment.⁴⁶ If time prevents this or the terrain is unsuitable, caltrops are recommended.⁴⁷ As a further precautionary measure, leg-breaking pits with wooden stakes in each are also mentioned by Leo in his *Tactica*.⁴⁸ For reasons not mentioned the precautions ordained in the manuals were not taken by Alexius. Perhaps he did not want to fatigue his men with the enemy so dangerously near or to reduce their morale. Leo's *Tactica* allows for this in his XIVth Constitution.⁴⁹

His next step was to gather intelligence. Intelligence gathering was a characteristic feature of the Byzantine art of war and is recommended by all Byzantine military manuals.⁵⁰ From his scouts and spies Alexius learned that

41. Leo, *Tactica*. XX. 88, col. 1037: καὶ γὰρ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρόν ποτε τὸν βασιλέα ἐρωτῶμενον, πῶς ἐν ολίγοις ἔτεσι τοσαῦτα καὶ τηλικαῦτα μεγάλα κατάρθωσε πράγματα, λέγεται εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὐδὲν δεόμενον τῇ σήμερον ὑπερεθέμην εἰς τὴν αὔριον.

42. *Alexiad*, p. 26. 5-6; p. 19. 3-4: περὶ τὸν Ἀλμυρὸν ποταμὸν στρατοπεδεύει ἄνευ τάφρων καὶ χάρακος; Bryennius, p. 135. 2-5 (at Calavrytae) καλοβρύη.

43. On the Byzantine camp, see Leo, *Tactica*, XIII: Περί ἀπλίκτων, cols. 792-805 (the most detailed); Nicephorus Phocas, pp. 11-20; *Anonymous Vari*, ed. R. Vari (Leipzig, 1901), pp. 1-17—all these manuals emphasize site, layout of site, fortifications, and provisions for security.

44. Nicephorus Phocas, p. 19; Leo, *Tactica*, XI. 1-2, cols. 792-93.

45. *Anonymous Vari*, p. 4. 15-17: ὁ δὲ χάραξ βάθος μὲν ἐχέτω ποδῶν ἑπτὰ ἢ ὀκτὼ κάτωθεν εἰς σπενὸν ἀπολήγων εὖρος δὲ ἐχέτω πόδας πέντε ἢ καὶ ἕξ.

46. Leo, *Tactica*, XI. 2, cols. 793: ὅταν τοῖσιν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν χώρα στρατοπεδεύῃς περιβάλλον τάφρον βαθεῖαν . . . ; and XV, col. 796: καὶ ἐξωθεν τάφρον ποιεῖν πλάτους μὲν ποδῶν ε' ἢ σ'. ἐξωθεν βάθους δὲ σ' ἢ η' . . .

47. *Ibid.*, XI, chs. 26-27, col. 800. See also J. A. de Foucault, "Douze chapitres inédits de Nicéphore Ouranos," *Travaux et Mémoires*, 5 (1973), 216-311, esp. 299. 11. Here all the precautionary measures are briefly summarized, including caltrops and foot traps: εἰς δὲ τὸν καστροπόλεμον . . . ὀφείλει δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐξωθεν τῶν πεζῶν σοῦδα, καὶ ἐξωθεν τῆς σοῦδας πάλιν ὕψος ῥιπτῶνται τριβόλια καὶ τρισκέλια μετὰ τζιπάτων, ἃν ἄρα καὶ βαστάξῃ αὐτὰ ὁ λαός.

48. Leo, *Tactica*, VI, ch. 15, col. 796.

49. *Ibid.*, XIV, ch. 2, cols. 848-49: Σὲ δὲ πολλὰ πονεῖν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς συμβολῆς. ὥνα μὴ τῷ πολλῷ κόπῳ καὶ τῇ συντριβῇ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιλανθάνῃς. μηδὲν καταλιγερῶν σε ἀπὸ τῆς φροντίδος. . .

50. Bryennius, p. 135. 12; Leo, *Tactica*, XVIII. 28-29, col. 953; Nicephorus Phocas, p. 20. 10-21; and Nicephorus Ouranos, pp. 287. 1-2 and 289. 4.

the enemy was encamped in the plain of Cedoctus.⁵¹ According to the historian Bryennius, Alexius' spies seemingly slipped in and out of the insurgents' camp at will.⁵² Only on the eve of the battle were some of them caught. This carelessness on the part of Bryennius is difficult to understand. Perhaps the size of the army made him a bit overconfident.

Gathering these intelligence reports, Alexius laid his plans. As he was inferior in men and his army lacked experience, he resolved to seek victory by what can be described as a strategy of the indirect approach. This is confirmed by both Anna Comnena and the historian Bryennius. The former writes of Alexius' plans: "Because he was on the point of fighting with inexperienced [troops] against seasoned veterans, and with a few against many, he abandoned the idea of making a bold and direct attack, but decided to gain his victory by cunning."⁵³ Bryennius corroborates this: "For this reason the Domestic of the Schools, inferior in numbers, wished to defeat the enemy, not by daring but by the preparation of a plan and cunning."⁵⁴ Alexius was, therefore, continuing a tradition outlined centuries earlier. Note the words of Leo the Wise: "To master the enemy, wisdom and generalship [i.e., strategy] are preferable to open attack."⁵⁵

With Alexius blocking his advance, the insurgent leader had no choice but to prepare for battle.⁵⁶ He marshalled his forces in the following manner. He posted on his right wing his brother John. This wing consisted of Frankish mercenaries,⁵⁷ Thessalian cavalry,⁵⁸ and a detachment (*moira*) of Companions (*Heterioi*).⁵⁹ In all, it had 5,000 men.⁶⁰ The left wing was entrusted to the able strategist *Catacalon* Tarchaniotes with 3,000 Macedonian and Thracian forces.⁶¹ In the center—the usual position of honor—the pretender himself commanded the elite of Thrace and Macedonia and the Thessalian cavalry.⁶² The size of Bryennius' division is not known, but it could not have been smaller than that of Tarchaniotes. We note that Leo in his XVIIIth Constitu-

51. Bryennius, p. 135. 13: κηδόκτου πεδίου; *Alexiad*, p. 26. 4-7; p. 19. 3-5.

52. Bryennius, pp. 135. 14-20–136. 1.

53. *Alexiad*, p. 26. 12-14; p. 19. 10-13.

54. Bryennius, p. 135. 9-11: ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτη καὶ ἀγλῶϊα καταστρατῆσαι τῶν πολεμίων.

55. Leo, *Tactica*; XX. 12, col. 1017: Τὸ διὰ βουλῆς μάλλον καὶ στρατηγίας κρατεῖν τῶν ἐχθρῶν . . .

56. *Alexiad*, p. 27. 9-10; pp. 19. 30–20. 1-2: ἐπειδὴ τὰς ἐφόδους αὐτοῦ προὔποτέμνεσθαι τὸν Κομνηνὸν Ἀλέξιον μεμαθήκει καὶ περὶ καλαύρην στρατοπεδεύειν . . .

57. Bryennius, p. 136. 4-5; *Alexiad*, p. 27. 14-15; p. 20.6 (she calls them Italians, Ἰταλοί).

58. Bryennius, p. 136.5; *Alexiad*, p. 27.7 (θετταλίας ἀνδρες ἰππεῖς).

59. *Ibid.*, p. 27.16; p. 20.8: μοῖρα τις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑταιρίας . . . ; Bryennius, p. 136.6.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 136.7; πεντακισχιλίων; *Alexiad*, p. 27. 13; p. 20. 5: πεντακισχιλιοι.

61. Bryennius, p. 136.9: ἀνὴρ καὶ βίῳ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ στρατηγικαῖς. On the size of the forces, *ibid.*, p. 136. 10-11; *Alexiad*, p. 27. 16-19; p. 20. 8-10.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 27. 19-23; p. 20. 11-16; and Bryennius, p. 136. 11-14.

tion of the *Tactica* recommends that an army should be divided into three equal divisions.⁶³ Outside the main division, circling on the extreme left was a detachment of Scythian (Pecheneg) forces. They marched about one-fourth of a mile (two *stadēs*) distant from the main army.⁶⁴ In all, Bryennius' army numbered about 12,000 men.

The tactics which Bryennius chose were in keeping with standard Byzantine practice, according to which the main army would advance in an extended line and fix their adversaries. Then when a signal was given, the Scythians (Pechenegs) would fall upon the rear of Alexius' army and harass it with a continuous shower of arrows.⁶⁵ According to the *Tactica* of Leo, such a unit was called the *Hyperkerastoi* (ὑπερκεράσται) or outflanking wing.⁶⁶ Such movements and ambushes were traditional practices of the Byzantine army. Leo's *Tactica* gives a fine example in which Arab raiders passing the Tarsus range were intercepted by just such a maneuver.⁶⁷

While leaving his troops concealed in a valley not far from the enemy's camp Alexius personally reconnoitered the field.⁶⁸ First hand knowledge of the terrain by the commander is recommended by Leo also.⁶⁹ At the same time Alexius did his utmost to conceal the view of the enemy from his men. Perhaps he feared their morale would be affected if they saw the enemy's superior forces. On the other hand, Leo urges this sort of precaution until the enemy's dispositions are known.⁷⁰ As the moment of battle approached, an order arrived from Botaniates to avoid battle and to wait for additional Turkish reinforcements which were on the way.⁷¹ According to Bryennius' account, this was easier said than done. He writes: "It was impossible to remain in that place without fighting, for the enemy was already dangerously close and ready to fight."⁷² Alexius, therefore, ignored the orders and decided to challenge the insurgents.

From his scouts as well as from his own personal observation, he was able

63. Leo, *Tactica*, XVIII. 143, col. 981.

64. *Alexiad*, p. 28. 7-9; p. 20. 22-23.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 28. 9-14; p. 20. 25-30.

66. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 28, col. 813: καὶ βάνδον ἔν ἢ δύο βάνδα τοξότας τοὺς λεγομένους ὑπερκεράστας ἡγούν ἐτοίμους ὄντας εἰς κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων.

67. *Ibid.*, XVIII, chs. 134-35, cols. 977-80. On ambush and ruses, see above, n. 25.

68. Bryennius, p. 136. 22-23: Τὸ μὲν στράτευμα ἅπαν ἐν κοιλάδι κατέκρυψεν. Bryennius notes that Alexius climbed a hill to observe the field: αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ λόφον ἀνελθὼν κατεσκόπει τὰ ἐκείνων.

69. Leo, *Tactica*, XIV. 30, col. 857; also XIV. 110, col. 884. See also Nicephorus Ouranos, p. 289. 4: . . . τοῦ στρατηγοῦ . . . πρὸς τὸ ἀποστεῖλαι καὶ κρατῆσαι γλῶσσαν καὶ δι' αὐτῆς μαθεῖν βεβαίως περὶ τῆς χώρας.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 137. 1-5; Leo, *Tactica*, XIV. 5, col. 849, warns that one should not reveal oneself to the enemy until one has learned of his dispositions.

71. Bryennius, p. 137. 5-9.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 137. 9-10: μένεω μὲν οὐχ οἶόν τε τῇ μὴ συνῶσαντα πόλεμον, τῶν πολεμίων εἰς χεῖρας ἤδη λόντων. ὑποχωρεῖν δὲ ἄνευ πολέμου ἀνάξιον ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ.

to ascertain the nature of the terrain. The field before him was partly open and partly broken. There were many valleys and hollows.⁷³ Such a terrain was ideal for concealing a force which could strike suddenly at an enemy's flank and rear. The *Tactica* of Leo again recommends the selection of such a battleground.⁷⁴ With this information, Alexius proceeded to marshall his forces. The main army was divided into two divisions or wings. The left wing was retained by him. It consisted of the "Immortals" and the Frankish mercenaries.⁷⁵ The right wing was entrusted to Constantine Catacalon. It was made up of the Chomates and Turks.⁷⁶ The Turkish forces, say Anna Comnena, were to pay special attention to the incursion of the Scythian (Pecheneg) force.⁷⁷ The *Tactica* of Leo calls such a unit a *plagiophylakes* (Πλαγιοφύλακες) or flank guard.⁷⁸ Their role tactically was to prevent the turning action of the enemy. To the extreme left of Alexius' wing, hidden in a hollow, was placed a detachment with the express orders to fall on the insurgents right wing.⁷⁹ Leo's *Tactica* calls such a division of troops, the *enedroi* (ἐνέδροι)—the lying-in-wait or ambushing wing⁸⁰ (see Fig. 1).

Since Alexius was outnumbered by the insurgents, he remained on the defensive and awaited their attack. The *Tactica* of Leo recommends such an initial posture.⁸¹ When John Bryennius' wing reached the hollows, Alexius gave a signal and the *enedroi* attacked. The suddenness of their assault momentarily threw John's troops into disorder. Anna Comnena describes the scene in the following manner: "The men lying in ambush jumped out on them with shouts and war cries and by the suddenness of their attack, each striking and killing those whom he chanced to meet they threw the enemy into a panic."⁸² Discipline and experience, however, saved the wing from disaster. John Bryennius rallied his forced and parried the blow. The historian Byrennius describes how this occurred: "They were almost put to flight, when their commander, John Bryennius drew his sword, and followed by some men, cut down the first of the "Immortals" who attacked him. Others were killed by

73. *Ibid.*, p. 137. 13-14: κατασκοπήσας οὖν τὸν τόπον ἐπεὶ εἶδε τὸ μὲν ἀναπεπταμένον τὸ δὲ λῶφους καὶ κοιλάδας ἔχον.

74. Leo, *Tactica*, XIV. 42, col. 862.

75. Bryennius, p. 137. 16-17; *Alexiad*, p. 29. 1-3; p. 21. 9-11;

76. Bryennius, p. 137. 17-19; *Alexiad*, p. 29. 3-4; p. 21. 11-12.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 29. 5-6; p. 21. 12-14.


78. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 28, col. 813B: Παρατάξεις δὲ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τάξει οὕτως. Εἰς μὲν τὸ ἀριστερόν' μέρος, εἰς ὑμάλιστα καὶ κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐναντίων εὐκόλως γίνονται, δὴ ἢ τρία βάνδα. ἵνα εἰσι πλαγιοφύλακες ἱστάμενοι ἴσοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους.

79. Bryennius, p. 137. 15-16; *Alexiad*, p. 29. 6-12; p. 21. 14-20. Earlier, *ibid.*, p. 28. 9-14; p. 20. 25-30, their tactics in battle are examined.

80. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 34, col. 816: ἐπὶ τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι κελεύομέν σοι ὥστε καὶ τρία ἢ τέσσαρα βάνδα, τοὺς λεγομένους ἐνέδρους . . .

81. *Ibid.*, XIV. 39 and 40, cols. 860-61.

82. *Alexiad*, p. 29. 6-12; p. 21. 14-20.



other men. Finally Bryennius rallied his forces and folded up the enemy."⁸³ Anna Comnena repeats this with only a minor variation, "And John Bryennius, the brother of the general, knowing of his impetuous strength and courage, turned his horse with his curb and cut down with a single blow an immortal coming at him, halted the confusion in his wing, rallied his men, and drove off the enemy."⁸⁴ Alexius' left wing, thereupon panicked. Many of the "Immortals" who fled in disorder were cut down by those behind them."⁸⁵ The historian Bryennius states that the "Immortals" were cut down almost to a man.⁸⁶ This, however, is clearly an exaggeration, for Alexius later rallied some of them when the battle was renewed.

In the meantime Alexius' right wing was faring no better. Here Catacalon's Chomates, engaged face to face with Tarchaniotes wing, were taken in the rear by the Scythian (Pecheneg) flanking wing.⁸⁷ How this occurred is not completely clear; for the Turkish flank guards were supposed to prevent it. Perhaps they posted themselves too far to the right and were simply unable to come to their aid. Be that as it may, the insurgents' flanking wing apparently, simply slipped in between Catacalon's wing and the Turkish flank guard (see Fig. 2). The Chomates like the "Immortals" were routed. The Scythian (Pecheneg) flanking wing, however, threw away a golden opportunity to put the victory in the bag at this point. For, instead, of pursuing the routed force of Catacalon to prevent their regrouping, they turned to loot the insurgent's own camp where horses and booty were kept.⁸⁸ The attack on Bryennius' camp threw the whole baggage train or *touldon* into disorder.⁸⁹ Panic ensued as refugees fled the camp and ran out on to the battlefield. Anna Comnena wisely notes that this was a turning point in the battle, with these words: "They turned their minds to looting, and went off on their own devices, for such is the Scythian nation. Before they had even entirely routed their opponents or consolidated their gain they spoiled their victory by looting."⁹⁰ Leo's *Tactica* and Nicephorus Ouranos emphasize the importance of pursuit in order to achieve victory.⁹¹

83. Bryennius, p. 138. 3-6.

84. *Alexiad*, p. 29. 12-16; p. 21. 20-25.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 29. 17; p. 21. 25-26.

86. Bryennius, p. 138. 6-7: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀθάνατοι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πάντες ἔρχοντο.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 139. 3-9; *Alexiad*, p. 30. 12-17; p. 22. 15-21.


88. Bryennius, p. 139. 8-9.

89. *Alexiad*, pp. 30. 20-22-31. 1-3; p. 22. 23-29. Anna notes that the impact threw the standards into disorder: τῶν σημαιῶν ἀναμειχθεῖσιν ἀλλήλαις. Bryennius agrees, see p. 139. 9-12. On the *touldon*, see A. Dain, "Touldos et Touldon dans les traités militaires," in Παγκάρπεια. *Mélanges H. Grégoire*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1950), II, 161-69.

90. *Alexiad*, p. 30. 16-20; p. 22. 19-12.

91. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 78, col. 829: This is also emphasized in the *Tactica* of Nicephorus Ouranos, p. 295. 7: . . . ἀρμόζει καταδιώκειν αὐτοὺς ἕως οὗ τελείως καταλυθῶσι, πλὴν οὕτως ἵνα καταδιώκωνται. ὥς ἀνωτέρω εἵπομεν λεπτομερῶς. ἵνα δὲ διώκωνται ἕως τότε ἕως οὗ, ὥς εἴρηται, τελείως παραλυθῶσι πρὸς τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τοὺς διασωθέντας ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τότε συσταθῆναι καὶ ὑποστρέψαι.

FIGURE 2



As these events were taking place, the Frankish mercenaries who made up Alexius' center were totally enveloped by the wings of John Bryennius and Tarchaniotes. They probably turned inwards after their respective opponents were driven off the field (see Fig. 3). Alexius himself was in grave difficulty: for he had plunged into the middle of the *melée*. His bravery is vividly portrayed by both his daughter Anna and the historian Bryennius.⁹² As he saw the battle take a sudden unfavorable turn, he momentarily thought of risking his life in an attempt to kill the insurgent leader. Although this seems like a wild gesture, actually it has merit as a last-ditch effort. In ancient and medieval warfare the general was the army's moral dynamo and also its brain—its general staff. That is why it was imperative to kill him. Leo's *Tactica* notes the dramatic effect this can have on an army.⁹³ Alexius, however, was dissuaded from this effort by his loyal servant Theodore.⁹⁴ Instead, he and six of his companions decided to retire and try to regroup their broken forces. As they were withdrawing, they chanced to see the "Imperial" horse of Bryennius adorned with all the royal regalia and bearing the two swords of state. Quick to see in this an opportunity, Alexius and his companions charged the royal escort guarding it and rode off with the royal stallion.⁹⁵ With all the confusion about them, they escaped probably via the avenue cut by the Scythian horse (see Fig. 3).

From the first phase of the battle one can see that the tactics of the two contestants were basically the same. Each side sought to fix its opponents with his main body while an out-flanking wing (in the case of Bryennius) or an ambushing wing (in the case of Alexius) would determine the fate of the battle. If one compares this with the *Tactica* of Leo, one can clearly see that Byzantine traditional practices, as far as tactics, are concerned, were adhered to into the closing period of the eleventh century. This becomes even more obvious on closer scrutiny. According to Leo, in a cavalry contest the army should be divided into three lines. The first line should be divided into three *moira* or *drungai*.⁹⁶ Leo notes elsewhere that if the army was 4,000 strong, the first line ought to consist of 500 men divided into three equal parts.⁹⁷ The

92. *Alexiad*, pp. 29. 18-22-30. 1-2; pp. 21. 27-22. 1-4; Bryennius, p. 138. 7-10.


93. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 65, cols. 823-25.

94. *Alexiad*, p. 30. 2-9; p. 22. 4-12; Bryennius, pp. 138. 10-22-139. 1-2, hints that Alexius desired to throw away his life because he had disobeyed the emperor's order to wait for Turkish reinforcements: ἡ τὸ παρακούσαντα βασιλέως δίκας εἰσπραχθήσεται τῆς παρακοῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 139. 12-20; *Alexiad*, p. 31. 4-16; pp. 22. 29-23. 1-12.

96. Leo, *Tactica*, XII. 26, col. 812.

97. *Ibid.*, XVIII. 143, col. 981: ποιήσεις παράταξιν ποικίλην ὡς ἐν τυπῷ εἰπεῖν ἀπὸ ἁνορέων, δ' ἐπιλέκτων, οὕτως· πρώτη μὲν ἔστω παράταξις, ἡ λεγομένη πρόμαχος, ἂν δ' ῥῶν, ἀφ' καὶ εἰς τρία διαιρήσεις ἴσα μέρη, δεξιὸν, ἀριστερόν, μέσον, ὥστε εἶνα καὶ ταῦτα ἀπὸ ἀνδρῶν φ', ἐγγιστα ἀλλήλων τῶν τριῶν τούτων ταξέων παρατεταγμένων, ὡς δοκεῖν μὴ εἶναι τὴν τάξιν. . .



ὑποστράτεγος would take his position in the middle with the Turmarchs to the left and right.⁹⁸ To the left of this line where there was danger of envelopment, Leo states that two or three bands should be placed to act as a flank guard (πλαγιοφύλακες).⁹⁹ To the right you should have one or two bands of archers who will act as your flanking wing (ὑπερκεράσαι).¹⁰⁰ Its function was to fall on the enemy's left flank and rear.

Following the first line came the second auxiliary line of four bands, a bow shot apart.¹⁰¹ According to the XVIIIth Constitution of Leo, it was to consist of 1,000 men if the army equalled 4,000. Each band consisted of 250 men.¹⁰² To give this line a sense of solidarity a group of men (250 or 300 perhaps) were to be placed in the intervals between each band.¹⁰³ This second line was to support the first. The intervals between the bands were to provide avenues of retreat in case the first line was routed. It is from behind this auxiliary line that a rally would be initiated. Some distance behind the second line, on its flanks, were placed two bands to serve as a reserve.¹⁰⁴ Finally, far out from the line of battle, to the left and right, were two groups of two bands called the *enedroi*—those lying-in-wait or ambushing wing. They were to circle the field, hide in the woods, hollows or hills, and strike the enemy's flank and rear.¹⁰⁵

One can see from the description above that for most part the main characteristics of the system described by Leo were still in use in this battle. Only with respect to how they fought is there silence in our sources, for neither Anna Comnena nor her husband Bryennius mentions an auxiliary force or a reserve. However, this may be just an oversight or an oversimplification of what took place. If there were an auxiliary and a reserve, it would certainly better explain how John Bryennius rallied his men. For example, as Alexius' *enedroi* struck John's wing as planned, the impact threw back his first line. Escaping through the intervals in the secondary, John then rallied his men and counter-attacked with his reserve.

The Regrouping of the Imperial Forces

Returning to a hill not far from the battlefield, Alexius resolved to rally his scattered forces. He sent a herald to announce to them that Bryennius, the insurgent leader, was dead, with the imperial stallion bearing the two swords of

98. *Ibid.*, XII. 26, col. 812: καὶ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ μέρει τάξεις τὸν ὑποστρατηγὸν σου. . .

99. *Ibid.*, XII. 28, col. 813: δύο ἢ τρία βάνδα, ἵνα εἰσι πλαγιοφύλακες ἱστάμενοι ἴσοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους. . .

100. *Ibid.*, XII. 28., col. 813: Καὶ βάνδον ἐν ἡ δόμοι βάνδα τοξότας τοὺς λεγομένους ὑπερκεράσας. . .

101. *Ibid.*, XII. 29, col. 813: τὴν δὲ δευτέραν παράταξιν τὴν λεγομένην βοηθὰν τάξεις, ἵνα ἔχῃ τὸ τρίτον ποσὸν τοῦ παντὸς στρατοῦ. . .

102. *Ibid.*, XVIII. 143, col. 981.

103. *Ibid.*, XII. 31, col. 813; and XVIII. 147, col. 985.

104. *Ibid.*, XII. 30, col. 813.

105. *Ibid.*, XII. 34, col. 816: . . . τοὺς λεγομένους ἐνέδρους.

state as evidence. Within a short time his men were collected at which point a detachment of Turkish allies arrived.¹⁰⁶ The historian Bryennius says that they had been sent by the emperor.¹⁰⁷ The morale of the army was suddenly uplifted by these turn of events, and Alexius decided immediately to survey the battlefield situation. He and his captains climbed a nearby hill.¹⁰⁸ What they saw, gave them hope. Bryennius' army was in total confusion. Lines had not been reformed and regimental standards were all disarrayed.¹⁰⁹ The effect of the Scythian raid (Pecheneg) on the insurgent camp could be witnessed. Alexius' Frankish mercenaries, surrounded by the enemy, had dismounted and offered to surrender.¹¹⁰ To the insurgents the battle appeared to have been won.

The Battle: Second Phase

The battle, however, was far from over. Alexius quickly formulated a new plan. He divided his force into three divisions. Two were to lie in wait until a signal was given, while a third was to advance against the enemy. Anna Comnena adds: "The whole plan was conceived by Alexius."¹¹¹ The attacking arm was divided up into small groups, perhaps for greater effect. The Turkish horse archers were to open the attack.¹¹² Their orders were to let loose a shower of arrows. Following the Turks came Alexius with the support group of rallied units (Fig. 4). The ability of Alexius to rally his broken forces in such a short time and to re-engage the enemy illustrates that this heterogeneous army had a good deal of discipline. For this phase of the battle the commentary of Anna Comnena is clearer. What ensued were skirmishing tactics on the part of Alexius' forces, with some of his men naturally focusing their attention on killing Bryennius. Both Anna and the grandson of the pretender describe in vivid detail how Bryennius beat off repeated attempts to kill him.¹¹³

At first the suddenness of Alexius' attack stymied Bryennius' forces; but, his

106. *Alexiad*, pp. 31. 16-23-32. 1-8; 23. 12-29; Bryennius, pp. 139. 20-140. 1-7; τοῦτο πολλοὺς τῶν φευγόντων μένειν ἔπειθε, τοὺς δὲ καὶ παλῶσσειν; *Alexiad*, p. 32. 18-19; p. 27. 8-10: ἀπόμοιρά τις ἐκ τῆς συμμαχίας τῶν τούρκων καταλαμβάνει τὸν δομέστικον τῶν σχολῶν. . . Anna is, however, not specific as to where they came from. Was it the flankguard?

107. Bryennius, p. 140. 8-9. He says sent by the emperor: Τούρκων οὐκ ἐλαχιστὴν μοῖραν πρὸς συμμαχίαν ἔρρι. πρὸς βασιλέως ἀπεστάλθαι.

108. *Alexiad*, p. 32. 22-23; p. 24. 12-13: ἐπὶ λόφου τινὸς συνεληλυθότες τῷ Κομνηνῷ Ἀλεξίῳ; Bryennius, p. 140. 13-16.


109. *Ibid.*, p. 140. 16-19; *Alexiad*, p. 33. 1-4; p. 24. 15-17; they both agree that the lines had not been reformed: Συνοκεχυμένοι. τε γὰρ ἦσαν μὴπω συντάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς. . .

110. *Ibid.*, p. 33. 7-10; p. 24. 20-23; she adds that they offered their right hand according to custom (δεξιὰς δίδόντων); Bryennius, pp. 140. 20-141. 1-2.

111. *Alexiad*, p. 33. 16-17; p. 24. 30-31: καὶ τὸ ἐξυμῶν τῆς τοιαύτης διαταγῆς ἐς τὸν ἐμὸν πατέρα Ἀλέξιον ἀνεφέρετο. On Alexius' dispositions. *Ibid.*, p. 33. 14-16; p. 24. 28-30.

112. *Ibid.*, pp. 33. 17-23-34. 1; 24. 31-25. 1-7: . . . μεμερισμένως καὶ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων κατὰ τινας ὁμίλους. . .

113. Bryennius, pp. 141. 20-142. 1-3; *Alexiad*, p. 34. 11-16; p. 25. 16-21.



veterans regained their balance and charged the Turkish horsearchers. For a short time Alexius and his Turks held their ground.¹¹⁴ Then they retired as planned in an orderly fashion in order to lure the insurgents into a pre-arranged ambush (see Fig. 4). When the appointed spot was reached, they turned suddenly and met the enemy face to face.¹¹⁵ At that moment, those lying-in-wait struck Bryennius' army. Anna Comnena describes the scene: "Thereupon, at a given signal, those lying-in-wait rode through them like a swarm of wasps from different directions, and with loud shouts and war cries, and continued shooting; they filled the ears of those around Bryennius with a great noise and they darkened their eyes with the thickness of the arrows which came on them from all sides."¹¹⁶ The historian Bryennius states that the pretender's brother John tried valiantly to rally the insurgents, but the army broke into flight.¹¹⁷ Nicephorus and John tried their best to fight a rear-guard action, but eventually they were worn down and forced to surrender.¹¹⁸ So ended the Battle of Calvrytae. As in the early phase of battle, the second phase drew much from the traditional practices laid down earlier. As a matter of fact, an identical description to Alexius' tactics can be seen in Chapter 42 of the XIVth Constitution of Leo's *Tactica*.¹¹⁹

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can say that, while the Battle of Calvrytae was fought at a time when the Byzantine armies were undergoing a tremendous change following the collapse of the traditional theme system, by and large the state of the *Art militaire* remained virtually intact. With respect to the strategy employed by the two contestants both adhered to the traditional practices of the past. Alexius, for instance, resolved to defeat his rival by the strategy of the indirect approach. I noted earlier this method had its roots going back to Belisarius in the sixth century. Bryennius' strategy was no different. He sought to win by strategic dislocation.

A more striking example of a continuity in the *Art militaire* can be witnessed in the tactics used in this battle. Both generals endeavored to win by flanking movements; and the tactics which were laid down by Leo the Wise in the tenth century were used by both.

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114. Bryennius, pp. 141. 20–142. 1–3; *Alexiad*, p. 34. 11–16; p. 25. 16–21.

115. *Alexiad*, p. 34. 16–20; p. 25. 21–26: ἐξ υποστροφῆς κατὰ μέτωπον τοῦτοις εἰστήκεισαν.

116. *Ibid.*, pp. 34. 20–35. 1–3; pp. 25. 26–27. 1; Bryennius, p. 142. 4–8.

117. *Ibid.*, p. 142. 8–14; *Alexiad*, p. 35. 6–10; p. 26. 5–8.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 35. 10–23–36. 1–18; 26. 8–27. 1–10.

119. Leo, *Tactica*, XIV. 42, col. 861: "Ἄλλοι δὲ μέρος τοῦ στρατοῦ ἔταξαν εἰς ἔγκρυμμα, καὶ αὐτοὶ μείζον μέρος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὀλιγότερον, τῆς δὲ συμβολῆς γενομένης ἐκουσιῶς τῶν προταγέντων εἰς φυγὴν ὀρμησάντων, καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὴν διώξιν ἀτάκτως ποιουμένων, μετὰ τὸ παρελθεῖν αὐτοὺς τὸν τόπον τῆς ἐνέδρας ἐξελθόντες οἱ τὸ ἔγκρυμμα ποιήσαντες κατὰ τοῦ νώτου ὅπισθεν τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐπέστησαν· εἶτα καὶ οἱ φυγόντες ἀντίστροφον γινόμενοι πρὸς τὸ σύνθημα ὑπὲρ προόρισαν ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἀπέλαβον αὐτούς."