

The state of political feeling in Wales after the death of Llywelyn the last Prince, and then the defeat of his brother David in 1283, is illustrated by the fact that towards the end of the first decade of the new administration Edward I was confronted with rebellion on a large scale. It was only to be expected that national pride should manifest itself in this way for during these early years of the new regime there must have been throughout the country a deep consciousness of the loss of long cherished independence which had been jealously guarded in the past. In many quarters, no doubt, a smouldering resentment and a sense of shame helped to spread the leaven of unrest and dissatisfaction among the native population. The introduction of new legal forms and procedures after the promulgation of the Statute of Rhuddlan in 1284, the presence of new officials modelled on the English pattern, and more especially in the north, the recently founded boroughs like Conway and Caernarvon with their massive castles in course of erection, symbolised subjection and only served to aggravate national feelings more than ever before. Welshmen probably gathered together in remote and secluded places in the mountains to brood over their misfortunes and to consider the chances of repelling the English invader should a favourable opportunity present itself. There must have been many courageous, tough, and resolute patriots, experienced in battle, who felt that they would rather regain their old freedom or perish in a gallant attempt to restore their former independent status.

It is interesting to note that the risings in Wales during 1294-5 in the north, south, and west, were all well-timed and the fact that they broke out almost simultaneously can hardly be attributed to mere coincidence. Plans must have been carefully prearranged, secret meetings held, and messengers dispatched to the different areas of operations to inform all those who were ready to fight for the national cause. One imprudent patriot might well have given the alarm as far as the rebels in the north were concerned, but this was not to be despite his careless talk during Whit week, 1294, in the court held at Llanerch in Denbighshire. This impulsive Welshman, Iorwerth ap Kenewric ap Ririt, is reported in the enrolled court proceedings as 'cursing of his evil will' and swearing 'by the body of Christ that before the middle of the month the constable and other English will hear such rumours that they will not wish to come again to Wales.'<sup>1</sup> Such an untimely outburst does not appear to have aroused suspicion in official circles, but it serves to indicate that preparations were in hand and the signal for action eagerly awaited. The signal, however, did not come until the following September.

The country was ready for revolt. Natural resentment to English domination in Wales was aggravated by the fiscal and administrative pressures of the new regime, and made even worse by

the attitude of some of the newly-appointed officials under the Edwardian administration, many of whom seem to have abused the authority entrusted to them. In Flintshire, for example, their manner did much to alienate the natives because they attempted to administer districts which were in the main Welsh as if they were simply outlying parts of Cheshire.<sup>2</sup> In Anglesey the sheriff, Roger de Pulesdon, likewise incurred hatred by making false extents according to the testimony of some tenants.<sup>3</sup> Feelings were further incensed and injustice felt by the fact that the burgesses of the English boroughs in Wales were granted rights and privileges by charter which the Welsh regarded as an infringement of what was justly theirs, namely freedom to buy and sell at fairs and markets without any restrictions being imposed upon them. The cumulative effect of all this, after nearly ten years of English rule, was probably the underlying cause of the disaffection.

But it was Edward I himself who helped to bring matters to a head. His expeditions to France cost money and the extension of a tax of a fifteenth on moveables to include Wales as well as England aroused immediate opposition.<sup>4</sup> In vain did the king promise that this should not be looked upon as a precedent. Furthermore the Welsh took strong exception to the use of forced levies for service on the continent and this form of compulsory enlistment of troops may perhaps be taken as the immediate cause for the outbreak of hostilities. Even in England Edward's popularity, owing to taxation to finance his French policy, was not high, and so it is not surprising that the Welsh considered themselves aggrieved and harshly treated. The long awaited opportunity now presented itself; their chance had come and they grasped it eagerly hoping thereby to right the wrongs to which they were subjected by the English government. The time was opportune.

In Michaelmas, 1294, Edward I was waiting at Portsmouth for a favourable wind in order to embark for France when he received news of the insurrection in Wales.<sup>5</sup> This new and unexpected turn of events at home forced him to abandon his ideas of a continental campaign and give his thoughts to matters of more serious moment within his own realm. He quickly and rightly appreciated the gravity of the situation and probably realised that his personal intervention was called for if the Welsh outbreak was to be crushed effectively; and so with his usual promptness and energetic thoroughness Edward set his mind to the difficult problem of directing a campaign in the Snowdonian region in the middle of winter.

Though there were actually several risings in Wales at this time, attention will be confined here to the North Wales rebellion

2.—*Flints. Hist. Soc.*, 1911, p. 16.

3.—*Rec. of Carn.*, pp. 216-7; also Waters, W.H., *The Edwardian Settlement of North Wales*, p. 27.

4.—Morris, J. E., *The Welsh Wars of Edward I*, pp. 242-3.

5.—*Ut supra*, p. 241.

in which Caernarvonshire had so conspicuous a share. The leadership of the revolt in North Wales is associated with the name of Madog ap Llywelyn. A distant relative of Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, the last native ruler of Gwynedd, Madog was descended from former lords of Merioneth who had been dispossessed of that lordship as far back as 1256 at the hands of the prince of Gwynedd. After a long exile in England Madog had returned to Wales as a friend and protégé of Edward I, evidently expecting to be restored to his ancestral lordship, but instead, being scantily rewarded, it would appear, with lands in the neighbourhood of the Anglesey manor of Lledwigan Llan.<sup>6</sup> It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that personal grievance and disappointment, thwarted ambition and the circumstances of his descent from Owen Gwynedd, combined to make him the most obvious *available* leader for a rising which was directed towards reviving a native principate of Wales.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately details of the progress of the rebellion in North Wales and the subsequent campaign which can be gleaned from the documents that have survived are not as full as could be wished. It seems certain that the revolt was fairly widespread in view of the number of forfeitures of land which are later recorded.<sup>8</sup> The first move by Madog and his men from Anglesey was to attack and burn the church of Llanfaes and then they proceeded to ravage the island. Crossing the Menai Straits, the rebels fell upon the town of Caernarvon, the centre of local administration where government records were housed in the Exchequer. As might be expected official documents were seized and burnt, the burgesses bemoaning especially the loss of their treasured charter.<sup>9</sup> The town walls and castle defences were destroyed and among the slain was Roger de Pulesdon, the sheriff of Anglesey, whose unpopularity now cost him his life at the hands of Grono, the bailiff of Twrcelyn, and Trahern ap Bleddyn of Talybolion.<sup>10</sup> Roger's executors were later excused debts he had incurred during his tenure of office in consideration of his good service to the Crown.

The rebels then attacked in the Conway valley where they burnt two mills which were not rebuilt for some years as the loss of £26 annually entered in the sheriff's accounts indicates. Conway castle with its garrison commanded by William de Cycouns and the town itself did not, however, suffer the same fate as Caernarvon.

In the vales of the Clwyd and the Dee the boroughs of Denbigh and Overton were threatened by the rebellious tenants of the Earl of Lincoln and lands were laid waste. The Earl led a force against the rebels in this area only to be defeated near Denbigh on 11 November, 1294. The property of Welshmen who remained loyal to

6.—*Trans. Cymm. Soc.*, 1902-3, p. 36.

7.—*B.B.C.S.*, xiii, pp. 207-10. *Y Bywgraffiadur Cymreig*, p. 572.

8.—*Waters, op. cit.*, p. 140.

9.—*B.B.C.S.*, ix, pp. 50, 54.

10.—*Trans. Cymm. Soc.*, *supra*.

the English authorities was looted as Philip Fychan of Llangernyw was soon to discover to his cost.<sup>11</sup> Most of these attacks were so unexpected that much of their initial success depended on the element of surprise, a factor which Madog and his followers had no doubt calculated with some care. Then the main body of the insurgents appear to have withdrawn to Snowdonia to await the next move by the enemy.

From the English point of view the military situation was critical in the extreme. The fall of Caernarvon left the castles of Criccieth and Harlech isolated and these strongholds too might have fallen had they not been situated on the coast, which meant that their communications could be kept open. On 20 October Edward I instructed William de Estdene, the Treasurer in Dublin, to supply both food and stores for Criccieth and Harlech which had now become the main centres of resistance against the enemy in Eifionydd and Merionethshire. The castle of Bere, cut off amid the mountains of Meirionydd, gave further cause for concern and on 27 October the king ordered the Earl of Arundel to organise a relief expedition so that it would not fall into hostile hands.<sup>12</sup> No evidence seems to be extant as to what eventually happened to this fortress during the rest of the campaign. It would appear that John de Havering had been successful in landing seven extra men for Vivian de Staundon's garrison at Harlech on 18 December thus bringing the number of defenders to 26 men who, together with the townsmen who had retired to the safety of the castle, made a total complement of 37 men. The women of the garrison with those from the town numbered 19 while the three small boys and four infants who were already in the castle were joined by 21 children of the burgesses.<sup>13</sup> No doubt the older ones were allocated suitable tasks to perform within the walls. The garrison in Criccieth commanded by the constable, William Haket, comprised in December, 1294, a total male strength of 30 which included three men brought there by John de Havering probably on his way to or from Harlech and seven men from the borough. There were also 13 women and 19 children in the castle.<sup>14</sup>

Thus before the end of 1294 the whole of Gwynedd and Anglesey was, to all intents and purposes, in the hands of the Welsh with the exception of the two castles whose strategic importance was now only too obvious and served to justify the expenses that had been lavished upon them by the Crown. Since the English held command of the sea they had a tremendous advantage over their

11.—*Cal. Ancient Correspondence concerning Wales*, ed.: Edwards, J. G., p. 105.

12.—*Morris, op. cit.*, p. 252.

13.—*B.B.C.S.*, viii, pp. 147-8.

14.—*Ibid.*, iii, pp. 149-51.



opponents. The castles of Rhuddlan and Conway formed important bases for operations and here too speedy relief could be brought up by sea should the need arise. It would seem now that little more could be accomplished until Edward I himself arrived at the scene of operations to take personal command of the army which had been brought together to reconquer the Principality. The large number of troops mustered for this purpose reflects the power and authority which the king exercised in England. It has been estimated that there must have been some 31,000 men on active service in Wales towards the end of the year.<sup>15</sup>

On 5 December, 1294, Edward I arrived at Chester, the principal base, as it had always been in the past, for the coming campaign in North Wales.<sup>16</sup> It was here that the main body of the infantry had been ordered to report for duty. Three days later the king marched with his army into Wales by way of Wrexham where he stayed until 14 December. Then the advance continued westwards passing through Llandegla and into the Vale of Clwyd through the lordships of Ruthin and Denbigh. The probable reason for this apparent diversion was to ensure communications in the rear, for it will be recalled, the rebels in this region had already been successful in defeating the Earl of Lincoln a few weeks earlier. The king does not appear to have come across any opposition and this is not surprising because, from the Welsh point of view, the Snowdonian area was both safer and more congenial to them and offered a better chance of inflicting losses on an enemy column without much harm to themselves. The Earl of Lincoln was left behind at Rhuddlan to guard lines of communication and the king travelled along the coast to arrive at Abergele on 23 December. The next day the army left here for Conway where it arrived on 26 December, where, according to the chroniclers, the Christmas festivities were held.<sup>17</sup>

Hitherto no serious resistance had been encountered and Conway now became the forward operational base. Beyond lay the main force of the enemy. The problem that now faced the king was the reconquest and consolidation of the north-west, a territory which could be both dangerous and fatal to advancing troops, especially in winter time. It was in this region that the rebels waited for the king to make his next move. From the time that Edward I left Chester until he reached Conway on 26 December his movements can be traced with some degree of reasonable accuracy. On 6 January, 1295, he resumed his advance with, it

15.—See *E. H. R.*, xxxix., pp. 1-12, and xlv, pp. 262-5 for the two important papers by Prof. J. G. Edwards which replace the account in Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-8.

16.—Gough, H., *Itinerary of Edward I*, vol. ii.

17.—Hemingburgh, ii, 58-9; *Trivet*, p. 335.

would appear, the vanguard of his army towards Bangor where he remained until 8 January. This march may perhaps be looked upon as a reconnaissance in force but it is unfortunate that the few records that have survived offer no definite solution to the problem as to why there should be a complete silence of ten days (9 to 18 January inclusive) in so far as the king's movements are concerned. This strange and curious break in the routine of administration seems to be inexplicable and any attempts to answer the question must be conjectural in view of the lack of evidence. It would, however, appear likely that Edward I during this period of ten days found himself besieged in Conway castle for the chronicles record this episode in some detail but not with the clarity that could be wished.<sup>18</sup>

How did the king come to find himself in such a plight? It may be suggested that, having advanced to Bangor during the first week in January, Edward stayed there for two days to consider his position. He had with him presumably the advance guard of his troops, the main body, according to the chronicles, having been left on the opposite bank of the river Conway. It seems likely that the king in making his appreciation of the military situation once he had reached Bangor came to realise that his advance along the coast had been somewhat premature and unwise and that to proceed any further into territory held by the enemy would have been to invite disaster. With the realisation of this mistake it is possible that Edward decided to return to Conway and that during this retreat the Welsh surprised the marching column somewhere along the coast between Bangor and Conway, capturing its supplies, with the result that the king fell back hastily on Conway castle which was the only safe refuge near at hand. What stores he had were abandoned to the enemy. Thus for a short space of time Edward's position must have been very serious indeed. The chroniclers say that the Conway river was in flood and hence the main body of the army was prevented from making the crossing for a few days. In the meantime the king, with the help of the castle garrison and the rest of his small force, was able to hold out in the castle. Supplies in the castle were running low and the chroniclers were duly impressed with the report that Edward I drank honey mixed with water like the rest of his men. This must have been an anxious period of waiting for the king but, fortunately for him, the flood waters subsided, and the forces hitherto cut off from the castle, were able to negotiate the crossing and so relieve what had been a very dangerous situation. Assuming that a battle was fought to raise the siege at Conway, then it must have taken place before 19 January, for on that day Edward I was back again at Bangor. Resistance in the Conway region must have been

18.—*Ut supra*.

reduced, or the rebels retired of their own accord, to render the coast road free once more for the king to proceed.<sup>19</sup>

But once again on reaching Bangor, Edward was confronted with the same difficulty as before. With the exception of the castles of Criccieth and Harlech, the country beyond Bangor was in enemy hands, and it would have been futile to attempt any further progress in mid winter and risk the lives of men in an area flanked by high land on one side and the sea on the other and so admirably adapted for defence and surprise attack. It seems reasonable to suppose that Edward now decided to winter in Conway and await the better weather before undertaking the next stage in the campaign. On 20 January he was back once more in Conway castle where he stayed until the beginning of April to regroup his forces and build up supplies for the offensive in the spring.

Meanwhile between the months of January and April, Richard de Havering, who had been specially detailed by the king for this important task, was responsible for the munitioning of the castles of Criccieth and Harlech.<sup>20</sup> Cargoes assembled in Ireland on the orders of William de Estdene were loaded and shipped to North Wales for the two garrisons. For this purpose one ship named 'The Godyer' of Rosponde, County Wexford, and three barges, which were partly manned by men from Waterford and Wexford, were used. Armed protection was provided for the sailors by the presence of 18 crossbowmen and three archers. Richard de Havering himself had the services of two grooms and three boys as personal attendants. The food and stores brought over consisted of corn, coarse and fine barley, herrings, salted and dried fish, salt, canvas, iron, wax and tallow, sea coal, crossbow quarrels, bows and arrows, domestic utensils, and footwear. The two constables, Robert Haket and Vivian de Staundon, were kept well supplied and were able to withstand any attacks that may have been made upon these two castles during the whole period of the war.

In Conway Edward's position was now quite safe and secure. Communications by both land and sea were kept open and the daily business of government continued without any undue interruption. Provisions were accumulated for the next advance and ships sailed to Conway from Ireland, England, and France carrying wine, oats, and various other supplies. Masters of ships from Bayonne which

19.—The advance to Bangor by the way of the coast would mean that the highland at Penmaen Bach and Penmaen Mawr had to be negotiated and it seems reasonable to suppose that this could be accomplished, especially at low water, during the late thirteenth century. An alternative route following the line of the Roman road from Caerhun to Caernarvon via Bwlch-y-Ddeufaen would appear unlikely in view of the obvious dangers to an invading force in an unfamiliar and inhospitable terrain of hills and woods: or the forces might have moved from Conway via Porth Uchaf, along the Sychnant Pass, and then made a southward detour inland by relatively easy gradients to get round Penmaenmawr.

20.—*B.B.C.S.*, viii, pp. 150-9.

had probably brought in shipments of wine were given letters of marque in the king's name licensing them as privateers to share any spoil they might take from the enemy.<sup>21</sup> Merchants too received safe conducts. John le Cupper of Nottingham, who had brought bread, meat, fish, and other foodstuffs to Wales was granted a safe conduct on condition that he sold nothing to the king's enemies or communicated with them in any way. Peter Lamegge, a Gascon merchant, was likewise provided with a safe conduct on similar conditions. A letter from Edward I to William Hamilton dated at Conway on 16 March indicates that supplies of beer were causing some concern. The king commands William and the mayor of Chester to order the brewers in the town to brew as much ale as they can for the king's army and that it be shipped without delay to Conway. They were also to ensure that there would be plenty for future deliveries when the king moved into Anglesey. Supplies of oats and wheat seem to have been adequate for immediate requirements.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to food and fodder, crossbow ammunition and other military equipment were brought together at Conway. James de St. George received orders to bring pontoons there which would be required presumably for bridging the Menai Straits in due course.<sup>23</sup> By the end of March the supplies of all kinds which had been accumulating in Conway were considered sufficient to meet the needs of the army, and the king directed that fairs and markets in England, which had previously been prohibited, could now continue in the usual way.<sup>24</sup> And so while the troops were stationed round Conway Edward I made full and detailed preparations to resume his advance as soon as he should decide that the right time had come.

Meantime, Peckham, the Archbishop of Canterbury, on 6 February instructed Llywelyn, the Bishop of St. Asaph, to excommunicate Madog if the war was not stopped within eight days, but the rebel leader at this time felt that he could confidently ignore the threats of the Church. Within a month, however, his position had been altered very drastically indeed.<sup>25</sup>

While Edward I was actively engaged in Conway during the early weeks of 1295, Madog and his forces seem to have moved to the south towards the end of February or early in March. This manoeuvre was destined to prove disastrous to the rebel cause. In the area round Montgomery William Beauchamp, Earl of Warwick, commanded a field force which he had taken over in December. Madog seems to have been ignorant of the exact position of these troops, he may even have been entirely unaware of their existence,

21.—*Cal. Pat. Rolls*, 1292-1301, pp. 130-133.

22.—*Cal. Anc. Corresp.*, p. 207.

23.—*Cal. Chancery Warrants*, i., p. 53.

24.—*Ibid.*, p. 54.

25.—*Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, ed., Haddan. A.W. and Stubbs, W., i., p. 606.



and as a result Warwick's men took the rebels by surprise on 5 March in Caereinion where the decisive battle of Maes Moydog was fought.<sup>26</sup> The rebels were severely defeated and Madog himself barely escaped from the field. At this single blow the main resistance in North Wales was crushed, and the hitherto victorious Madog became a hunted fugitive among the hills and woods. During the months of January and February Edward I had been forced on the defensive while Madog, on the other hand, was at the height of his prestige; now the Earl of Warwick's victory had shattered the rebels' hopes of success and the initiative passed into the hands of the king.

News of this Welsh disaster was brought to Edward I at Conway by Adam Bernard and later two prisoners from the field of battle were brought in under escort. This must have helped to stimulate the morale of the English forces and to accelerate the preparations already in progress. By the end of the month all was ready, the troops regrouped, and the army equipped to take the field for a spring campaign. On 9 April the king moved forward to Bangor where he stayed until 11th, and then he crossed the Straits, arriving at Llanfaes on the next day. No resistance was offered by the Welsh and Llanfaes became the royal headquarters for some four weeks during the occupation of Anglesey. The king now ordered the construction of a new castle at Beaumaris to safeguard English interests in the island in the future and William de Felton was appointed the first constable. To Henry de Lathom was assigned the task of patrolling the Straits with a small squadron of ships to protect the work in hand. The inhabitants of Anglesey must have realised that any further resistance would have been futile and many of them were received in peace by the king. Edward I was not the man to neglect the usual precautions and 37 hostages were also taken to ensure that there would be no further trouble in the island. These Welshmen were sent first to Chester and later, having been divided into smaller groups, they were moved for safe custody to the castles of Hereford, St. Briavell's, Gloucester, and Bristol.<sup>27</sup>

The day after Warwick's victory Reginald de Grey commanding a force of cavalry and infantry set out from Rhuddlan and advanced southwards in the direction of Penllyn. It is possible that this column was later engaged to track down Madog and his remaining men during March and April. An undated letter, addressed presumably to the king and quite probably sent by Reginald de Grey to headquarters to report his progress states that Madog had been located in a wood in the 'strongest place in the whole of Ardudwy' and that steps were being taken to fell the trees in an effort to reduce this position. The presence of troops in this area had caused a number of Welshmen in the neighbourhood to make their formal submission and the inhabitants of the commote of Talybont had also indicated

26.—Edwards, J. G., *op. cit.*

27.—P.R.O., repaired fragment attached to the Welsh Roll.

their desire to follow the example of their fellow countrymen. It is hoped, the letter concludes, that the whole of Merioneth, with the exception of the commote of Ystumaner, would soon be secured for the king.<sup>28</sup> For the present, however, Madog evaded capture.

Edward I left Anglesey on 6 May and the army marched by way of Bangor and Llanrug, arriving at Dolgelley on the 11th, where the king remained until the next day to receive the homage of the men of Merionethshire. Hostages were demanded from Caernarvonshire and Merioneth and, like their compatriots from Anglesey, they were escorted first to Chester and afterwards to various castles in England.<sup>29</sup> No opposition was encountered and the troops moved to Harlech and Towyn and then on into South Wales. After spending about a month in the south Edward made a speedy return to the Principality to issue orders with regard to its consolidation and future safety. By the end of June he was back again in Conway and from 7—10 July he was present in Caernarvon where he could estimate the damage done for himself. He had already ordered the immediate reconstruction of the town walls and castle defences, instructing his brother Edmund to write on his behalf on 16 June to John de Langton, the Chancellor, ordering him to find 100 stonecutters in England and have them sent without delay to Master Watier of Ambresbury, who was in Caernarvon for this essential work to be undertaken.<sup>30</sup> On 12 July, Edward visited Beaumaris to satisfy himself that the work was proceeding as planned under the supervision of William de Felton, and afterwards he hastened to England by way of Denbigh, Whitchurch, Bridgnorth, Worcester, and Kennington. He arrived at Westminster on 4 August after an absence of nearly eight months in Wales.

John de Havering was now left in charge of the situation. Although his appointment as Justice of North Wales is not dated until 3 September, it appears that Edward I on his departure had made him responsible for carrying out the policy of resettlement after the recent disturbance. There remained too the problem of capturing Madog who was still at large when the king left the Principality for England. Madog remained in hiding and kept to the

28.—*Cal. Anc. Corresp.*, pp. 108—9.

'... Sachet sire qe nus moemes iceo vendirdi derrein passe vers meronith et sumes logez en les bondes de Ardodewey et merionith en un bois qui est apele Ketthlieconhan (unidentified) en le plus fort lieu de tut Ardodewey ou la gent madoc tindrent le setiz a nus et purceo sumes logez deinz purtalir le bois. . . . ' (P.R.O., *Anc. Cor.*, xxi, 151).

29.—*Cal. Close Rolls*, 1288—1296, pp. 425—6. See Appendix to this article.

30.—*Cal. Anc. Corresp.*, p. 150.

woods as his only refuge.<sup>31</sup> The king had offered a reward of 500 marks to anyone who would bring the rebel, alive or dead, to him.<sup>32</sup> Whether any person received this substantial sum cannot be stated but Enyr Fychan a leading tribesman of Trenannau in the commote of Talybont in Merionethshire, according to later evidence, claimed to have been instrumental in effecting Madog's capture. In a petition Enyr Fychan declared that the king made him rhaglaw of Talybont for which he owed no service or revenue because "he himself took Madog ap Llywelyn who made himself Prince of Wales in the last war."<sup>33</sup> An examination of the chronicles leads to the conclusion that Madog in the end either surrendered or was handed over to John de Havering on 31 July or sometime during the first week in August. He was sent to London to spend the rest of his life as a prisoner in the Tower. So ended the rebellion of 1294-5 and with it the dreams of independence which had set it afoot.

Edward I's lenient treatment of the self-styled Prince is rather astonishing when one considers the time, trouble, and especially the expense, which the outbreak in North Wales had occasioned. Apart from the heavy costs of the recent war, the expenses likely to be incurred to ensure the protection of English interests in the Principality in the future were to prove a serious drain on the king's financial resources. Madog's revolt had further complicated Edward's relations with the French who, taking advantage of his preoccupation with Welsh affairs, had attacked the southern coast of England. It was French influence also which caused trouble to break out in Scotland when Balliol renounced his allegiance to the English throne. To make matters even worse, in order to implement his policy at home and abroad, the king had to resort to heavy taxation which caused discontent among his own English subjects. In view of all this it is difficult to explain why Edward I did not, apparently, make Madog pay the supreme penalty of a traitor's death.

31.—P.R.O., S.C. 8, 313, E., 83. 'Derechef prie meismes celui Johan quil pleise a nostre seigneur le Roy comaunder as barons del Eschequer quil lui voillent allouer ses gages de x iour de Juyl lan xxij desques au iij iour de Septembre prochainement suaunt a quel x iour de Juyl le Roy lui bailla la garde de Northgales apres la dreine guere de Gales de sicome il fu et lui coueneit estre en cel meen temps a plus grantz gentz et a plus grauntz coustages par la reson de ceo qe la pees ne fu mie uncore ce teine car celui qui se fist Prince se tint as bois. E pur ceo qe sa commission de la garde de meisme la tere fu fete le iij iour de Septembre les barons del Eschequer ne lui voelent nule allowance fere de cel meen temps saun garaunt.'

32.—P.R.O., S.C. 8, 313, E., 69. 'Derchef prie le dit Johan come la comune crie fust par comaundement le Roy en la prochein guere de Gales qe qui peust mener au Roy Madok ap Lewelin qui se fist prince ou vif ou mort quil eust del doun le Roy cink centz mars qe lui pleise fere de ceo sa bone grace come bon seigneur de sicome il lui mena meismes celui Madok a sa volute saun condicion de couenaunt et grauntz coustages mist de fere le venir et del mener.'

33.—*Rec. of Carn.*, p. 220.

What finally happened to him is not known. He may have been still alive and presumably in prison in 1305 for in that year the Archbishop of Canterbury renewed the sentence of excommunication which he had previously passed against him after he had defied the king and raised the standard of rebellion ten years earlier.<sup>34</sup> However with Madog's capture or submission hostilities in North Wales came to an end and the Welsh submitted to the inevitable. Edward I, on the other hand, decided to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards them and in a further effort to win their confidence and future co-operation he eventually created his son Edward of Caernarvon Prince of Wales in 1301.

JOHN GRIFFITHS.

34.—Haddan and Stubbs., *op. cit.*, p. 606.

## APPENDIX.

The document printed here belongs to a bundle of miscellaneous memoranda relating to the rebellion of Madog ap Llywelyn, 1294-5.<sup>35</sup> It is simply a list of 74 Welsh hostages, men of some social standing no doubt, who were taken from Caernarvonshire and Merionethshire to guarantee the peace after the collapse of the rebel cause.

By August, 1295 Reginald de Grey had returned to Chester to resume his duties as Justice. Assembled there in the castle were 156 Welshmen whom Edward I had 'lately caused to be taken as hostages from divers parts of North Wales' and it seems likely that the men whose names are listed here formed part of that number. On 18 August the king ordered Grey to retain 21 of these hostages in Chester castle while the others, who were split up into small groups at different stages of their journey, were to be sent to various castles in England for safe custody. The sheriffs of the counties concerned were made responsible for their movement and safe arrival at their several destinations. Hostages were not permitted to leave the precincts of a castle and each man received a subsistence allowance of 4d. a day during his period of detention.<sup>36</sup>

The extension of the contracted forms of many Welsh Christian names and surnames as they occur in Anglo-Welsh records during the Middle Ages must always remain a matter of conjecture. Such names are not very often written in a complete form and lists like the present one are rather unusual. In this instance the majority of the names entered in the memorandum have been written in full and where marks of contraction do appear they are in accordance with accepted usage and can thus be extended with confidence. In view of this it is hoped that the transcription given below may prove both interesting and helpful.

35.—P. R. O., K.R., Exch. Accts., 5/18.

36.—Cal. Close Rolls, 1288-1296, pp. 425-6. The castles mentioned here are :—Nottingham, Lincoln, York, Leicester, Richmond, Skipton-in-Craven, Scarborough, Carlisle, Newcastle-on Tyne, Bamburgh, Northampton, and Oxford.



# NOMINA WALLENSIUM OBSIDUM CAPTORUM DE COMITATIBUS DE MERIONYTH ET CAERNERUAN.

Kenewric ap Madoc  
 Daid ap Griffud ap Keyryadok  
 Daid Gogh ap T(r)harn  
 Griffud Vagh(a)n ap Griffud ap Gogan  
 Gronou Dui ap Daid  
 Madoc ap Howel ap Guen  
 Adaf ap Wyon  
 Yerewarth ap M(er)educ Voil  
 M(er)educ ap Daid  
 Gronou ap M(er)educ Gogh  
 Griffud ap Griffud ap Gogan  
 Daid ap Madoc Myn  
 Madyn ap Madoc Glas  
 Focke Beret  
 Adaf Vagh(a)n ap Phelip  
 Tudor ap D(auid) ap Blethin  
 Yerewarth ap Blethin Wyth  
 Eynon Thloit  
 Blethin ap Lewelin  
 Keuenerth ap Daid  
 Rees ap Adaf  
 Traharn ap Lawarth  
 Yerewarth ap Rees  
 Heylyn ap Yeuan  
 Dui Routh  
 Lewelin ap Yerewarth  
 Yeuan Kethyn  
 Cout Ken  
 Eynon ap Gourgen  
 Daid Gogh ap Edeneuet  
 Lewelin Welt  
 Yerewarth Cagh  
 Yerewarth ap Matussalem  
 Gronou Vagh(a)n ap Madoc  
 Lewelyn ap Kenan  
 Eynon ap Blethin  
 Wyn ap Lewelin

Gogan ap Yerewarth  
 M(er)educ Gragh  
 Yeuan ap Gourgen  
 Ririth ap Guen  
 Howel Gogh  
 Daid ap Kenewric  
 Griffud ap Keuenerth ap Cuhelin  
 Wyn ap Cuhelin  
 Griffud ap M(er)educ  
 Partla  
 Lewelin Voil  
 Daid ap Kenythlin  
 Heylyn Vagh(a)n  
 Wyon Eberet  
 Lewelin ap Adaf  
 Llawarth ap Gronou  
 Meuric ap Gronou  
 Daid ap Edeneuet  
 Blethin ap Meyrion  
 Cadegon ap Ithel ap Guen  
 Eynon ap Howel Anat  
 M(er)educ ap Adaf ap Mereduc  
 Madoc ap Gronou  
 Griffud ap Madoc  
 Yerewarth Routh  
 Wyn ap Kenewric  
 Eynon Gogh ap Daid  
 Yeuan ap Wen Wythel  
 Howel Dui ap Adaf  
 Lewelin Vagh(a)n ap Lewelin ap Madoc  
 Gronou ap Cadegon ap Lewelyn  
 Daid Gogh ap Gronou ap Daid  
 Eynon ap Lewelin  
 Lewelin Bole  
 Gronou ap Daid ap Kenthloit  
 Howel ap Griffud ap Howel  
 Kenewric ap Robert

## THE ELIZABETHAN STATUTES OF FRIARS SCHOOL, BANGOR

In a recent article in the *Transactions* of the Denbighshire Historical Society<sup>1</sup> Mr. A. H. Williams writes: "A study of the statutes of Westminster, Bangor Friars and Ruthin Schools would throw much light on the interaction of these three institutions and the contribution made by Goodman and Alexander Nowell to each." Mr. Williams evidently assumed that Nowell, an ex-headmaster of Westminster, followed the model of that school in the Bangor statutes, an assumption also made by L. S. Knight, who wrote in his *Welsh Independent Grammar Schools to 1600* that the schools of Bangor and Ruthin "may be looked upon constitutionally as the offspring of Westminster school."<sup>2</sup> In fact, whereas the statutes of Ruthin follow those of Westminster, those of Bangor are free from Westminster influence.

The case of Ruthin is clear. The school was founded by Gabriel Goodman, who as Dean of Westminster was closely associated with Westminster school.<sup>3</sup> The comparison of the statutes of the two schools made by T. W. Baldwin<sup>4</sup> shows clearly that those of Ruthin are modelled on those of Westminster.<sup>5</sup> Indeed some of the differences in the curriculum noted by Professor Baldwin are found to be non-existent if one turns to the Latin version of the Ruthin statutes rather than to the English version which Baldwin used.<sup>6</sup>

Our concern here however is rather with the Bangor school, the statutes of which<sup>7</sup> were drawn up in 1568 "by and with the device,"<sup>8</sup> as the preamble states, of the bishop of Bangor (Nicholas Robinson), the Dean and Chapter of Bangor, and Alexander Nowell, then Dean of St. Paul's. In the early eighteenth century there was a

1. Vol. 2 (1953), p. 23, n. 2.

2. p. 25.

3. Goodman is stated (e.g. by Sargeant, *Annals of Westminster School*, p. 11, to have been responsible for the Westminster statutes drawn up after the School's refoundation by Queen Elizabeth in 1560, but in fact he seems to have merely continued those drawn up, on the Eton model, by his predecessor, William Bill. Strype, *Annals*, 1824, vol. II pt. II, pp. 615-6; Baldwin, *William Shakespeare's Small Latine and Lesse Greke*, vol. I, p. 321.

4. *op. cit.* I, pp. 382-5.

5. The Westminster statutes are printed in A. F. Leach, *Educational Statutes and Documents*, pp. 496-524. Leach gives the date as 1560, but according to Baldwin (*op. cit.* I, p. 380) Leach's version is in fact a revision made after 1568. The Ruthin statutes are printed in Latin in Newcombe, *Memoir of Gabriel Goodman*, Appendix 5, and in an English version in Knight, *op. cit.* Appendix XVI.

6. Thus Cicero's *De Amicitia*, which is in the Westminster curriculum, is omitted in the English version of the Ruthin statutes, but included in the Latin; and where the English version has "Martialis Epigrams," the Latin has "Epigram. Martialis castrati vel aliorum," which is nearer to the "Epigram. Martialis Catulli aut aliorum" of the Westminster statutes, and probably refers to the same book of epigrams.

7. Printed in Barber and Lewis, *History of Friars School*, p. 139f and in Knight, *op. cit.* p. 113f.

8. "Device" in Barber and Lewis's version; "advice" in Knight's